Williams v. Howard, 48040

• Decision Date: 26 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 48040,48040
• Citation: 329 So.2d 277
• Parties: J. H. 'Jim' WILLIAMS, as Secretary of the Department of Administration, et al., Appellants, v. Ray E. HOWARD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 277

329 So.2d 277

J. H. 'Jim' WILLIAMS, as Secretary of the Department of Administration, et al., Appellants, v. Ray E. HOWARD et al., Appellees.

No. 48040.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 26, 1976.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Thomas A. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., David V. Kerns of the Department of Administration, and Arthur C. Canaday, Tallahassee, Gen. Counsel to the Governor, for appellants.

David H. McClain, of McClain & Walkley, and Mark R. Hawes, Tampa, for appellees.

Michael McK. Wilson and David A. Barrett, Tallahassee, for Donald L. Tucker, Barry Kutun, Robert C. Hector, Donald F. Haxelton and Robert McKnight, amicus curiae.

SUNDBERG, Justice.

This matter comes to us on direct appeal from the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida. We have jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, in that the trial court declared unconstitutional Subsection 20.315(6), Florida Statutes, which was enacted by Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida. ¹

Appellees brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Section 86.021, Florida Statutes, to have declared unconstitutional those portions of Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida, which transfer non-quasi-judicial powers from the Parole and Probation Commission to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation. Appellees Howard and Cross sued individually and as members of the Parole and Probation Commission contending that the transfer of the powers, duties and functions of that Commission relating to the supervision of parolees and probationers is unconstitutional under Article IV, Section 8(c), Florida Constitution. ² Appellees Limpus and Gall sued individually and as field staff employees of the Parole and Probation Commission, alleging that their rights were affected under the Florida Career Service System. Appellees Goolsby and Fletcher sued individually and as probationers under the supervision of the Parole and Probation Commission, alleging that the instant statutory enactment affects the quality of rehabilitation and supervision they receive as probationers.

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss filed by appellants Williams and the Department of Administration of the State of Florida (DOA), the trial court expressly found that appellees Limpus, Gall, Goolsby and Fletcher, had standing to raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Act in their respective alleged capacities. The trial court explicitly ruled that appellees Howard and Cross lacked standing in their capacity as minority members of the Parole and Probation Commission. Each appellee was alleged to be a citizen and taxpayer of the State but the trial court found the complaint to be lacking in any specific allegation as to any unlawful expenditures of public monies if the act is invalid. The court concluded, however, that in view of the presence of other sufficient powers for prosecuting the suit by some of the plaintiffs, the general motion to dismiss should be denied without the necessity of determining whether or not the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a case for relief as citizens and taxpayers. The motion to dismiss was denied in an order which also found the statute to be unconstitutional. In the order the court, on the authority of State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 17 Fla. 67 (1879), of its own motion, declined to take jurisdiction of the Governor. Thereafter, Williams and DOA filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. Upon appropriate motion, the court entered an order permitting the State of Florida on the relation of Attorney General Shevin to intervene fully as to the papers, pleadings and orders dealing directly with the constitutionality of Section 20.315(6), Florida Statutes, as enacted by Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida.

Appellees then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Appellants responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings declaring that Section 20.315(6), Florida Statutes, is a constitutionally valid enactment. Based on agreement of all the parties that final judgment be entered on the motions without further argument or briefing, the trial court entered its final judgment, which in pertinent part declared that so much of Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida, as purports to transfer from the Parole and Probation Commission of the State of Florida to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation the authority to supervise persons on probation and parole and all powers incident thereto, including the making of necessary investigations and the maintenance of adequate records, is invalid by reason of the operation of the superior force of Article IV, Section 8(c), Constitution of Florida, and enjoining Williams and DOA from taking any action pursuant to the purported authority of those portions of Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida, which were therein adjudged to be invalid. In its final judgment the court referred to its earlier order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint and determined that it was unnecessary to repeat in the final judgment the conclusions announced in that order. This appeal ensued.

The issues presented for our determination are (i) whether the trial court erred in finding that appellees, as plaintiffs below, have standing to maintain this suit and (ii) whether the trial court erred in finding Section 20.315(6), Florida Statutes, enacted by Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida, to be unconstitutional. For the reasons hereinafter stated we determine that the trial court did err as to the standing issue, making it unnecessary for us to consider the second issue presented.

With respect to the standing of appellees Howard and Cross to maintain this suit, we concur with the trial court in its determination that those individuals in their capacity as a minority of the Parole and Probation Commission lacked standing to maintain the suit. See Rawls v. D'Alemberte, 41 Fla.Supp. 130 (Leon Cty.Cir.Ct.1974). We also concur in the trial court's finding that the allegations of the complaint were not specific as to any unlawful expenditures of public monies arising from the asserted invalidity of Section 20.315(6), Florida Statutes. We conclude, however, that such deficiency in the allegations of the complaint is fatal to the standing of Howard and Cross to maintain the suit as citizens and taxpayers. See Rickman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1917), the principles of which are reaffirmed in Dept. of Administration v. Horne, 269 So.2d 659 (Fla.1972) as to the point here under consideration. We do not accept the proposition that standing on the part of some of the plaintiffs to maintain a suit confers standing on other plaintiffs who are not similarly situated.

For the same reasons that the allegations were insufficient to create standing in Howard and Cross as citizens and taxpayers, they are insufficient for the other appellees in such capacity.

We therefore turn next to the standing of appellees Limpus and Gall to maintain this suit as employees of the Parole and Probation Commission. The allegations of the complaint material to this inquiry are contained in paragraphs (2) and (8) of the complaint. They are as follows:

'2. That plaintiffs' rights, status, and legal relations are affected by the transfer of the supervisory authority over parolees and probationers from the Parole and Probation Commission to a newly created department pursuant to Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 169 passed by the Legislature of the State of Florida on May 26, 1975, known as the 'Correctional Organization Act of 1975,' having an effective date of July 1, 1975, and designated as Chapter 75--49, Laws of Florida, a copy of said Act marked 'Exhibit A' is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.'

'8. That in view of Section 8(c) of Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Florida, a dispute exists as to whether the Legislature can constitutionally transfer to the newly created Department of Offender Rehabilitation all of the powers, duties and functions of the Parole and Probation Commission pertaining to the supervision of parolees and probationers; that said dispute affects the legal rights under the Florida Career Service System of plaintiffs, Charles Limpus and Charles D. Gall, as individuals and as employees of the Parole and Probation Commission, as well as the type and quality of rehabilitation and supervision over plaintiffs, Darrell H. Goolsby and Robert J. Fletcher, who under said Act will be supervised by a newly created Department of Offender Rehabilitation also having supervision and custody of inmates confined in State penal institutions.'

It is necessary first to determine the proper test to be applied in disposing of the motions for judgment on the pleadings in the context in which those motions were presented to the trial court. The rule ordinarily applicable is that all well-pleaded material allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and All allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false. Judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts as so admitted, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140; Paradise Pools v. Genauer, 104 So.2d 860 (Fla.App.3d 1958); 2A Moore's Fed.Practice, 2d Ed., 2343. Strict application of the rule here would, of itself, preclude entry of judgment for the appellees because their allegations as to standing were denied in the answer. However, the final judgment entered by the trial court recites, 'All parties have agreed that final judgment be entered on the motions without further argument or briefing'. We conclude, therefore, that the parties waived strict application of the rule so that the matter could be expeditiously concluded. See Storer v. Florida Sportservice, Inc., 115 So.2d 433 (Fla.App.3d 1959) as discussed in Davis v. Davis, 123 So.2d...