Williams v. Hurlings
| Decision Date | 29 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 08-3377 (WJM) (MF) |
| Parties | Williams v. Hurlings et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
MARK FALK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
USPO & COURTHOUSE
NEWARK, NJ 07101
Dear Litigants:
Plaintiff Joseph Williams, proceeding pro se, moves the Court for leave to amend the Complaint, and to extend the discovery deadline. See CM/ECF Nos. 41, 52. Defendant Hurlings opposes both requests. See CM/ECF Nos. 46, 53. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motions are granted.
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 7, 2008, against Jeremiah T. Healy, Leonardo Rinaldi, Michael Hurlings, and several unknown officers pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights. See CM/ECF No. 1. The case arises from an incident on July 6, 2006, in which Defendant Hurlings and an unknown officer of the Jersey City Police Department, pled as Doe defendants, allegedly arrested Plaintiff without probable cause and used excessive force to subdue him. Id. Further causes of action against other Defendants were later dismissed from the complaint by the Honorable William J. Martini, U.S.D.J., on January 11, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See CM/ECF No. 7.
On May 3, 2011, the Court held an in-person conference to discuss several outstanding discovery issues. Plaintiff advised the Court at that time that he wished to amend the complaint to name one of the previously unknown Doe defendants. The Court granted Plaintiff's request to seek leave and extended discovery to July 1, 2011. See CM/ECF No. 36.
Plaintiff filed a purported "motion for leave to amend" on June 1, 2011. See CM/ECF No. 41. The notice of motion was accompanied by certification which statesthat Plaintiff was unaware of the name of the second officer that arrested him, only identified as "Sgt. Redmond," until he received a copy of a police report filed in connection with his criminal appeal from the New Jersey Public Defender's Office on December 20, 2010. Id. Defendant Hurlings filed an opposition to the motion on July 21, 2011. See CM/ECF No. 46. He objects principally on the basis that any claims against Sergeant Redmond are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims under New Jersey law. Id. He also argues, without more, that Sergeant Redmond would be "unduly prejudiced" by the amendment.
Rule 15(a)(2) permits a party to amend its pleading at any point prior to trial "only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Leave should be freely granted "when justice so requires." Id. This mandate encompasses a broad range of equitable factors. See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006). A court will consider whether the delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, prejudicial, or if it would ultimately be futile. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). Absent one of these factors, leave should be "freely given." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1964). The decision to grant leave rests in the Court's sound discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971).
At the outset, it bears mention that Plaintiff does not include a copy of the proposed amended complaint with his motion. Ordinarily a party seeking leave to file an amended complaint must attach a copy so the Court can evaluate the sufficiency of the amendments. L. Civ. R. 7.1(f); see also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2000) (); Yuhasz v. Poritz, 166 Fed. Appx. 642, 646 (3d Cir. 2006) (). Nevertheless, this requirement may be relaxed when doing so is in the interest of justice. See In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 398 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); City of Perth Amboy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 539 F. Supp. 2d 732, 755 (D.N.J. 2008); U.F.C.W. Local 56 Health and Welfare Fund v. J.D.'s Market, 240 F.R.D. 149, 153 (D.N.J. 2007); In re Donald J. Trump Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 566 n.12 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
It appears that Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint merely to indicate the name of one of the John Doe officers involved in his arrest. The Court is mindful that documents submitted by pro se litigants should be afforded "liberal construction." E.g., Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court therefore construes Plaintiff'sapplication simply to identify a Doe Defendant. Provided that Plaintiff's amendment merely seeks to change the name of a preexisting party, a copy of the proposed amended complaint is unnecessary to determine the propriety of Plaintiff's request. See City of Perth Amboy, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 755. The Court now turns to the merits.
"Futility" means that the proposed amendments would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In other words, the amendment must be able to withstand a motion to dismiss. Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983)). However, given the liberal standard for amending the pleadings, "courts place a heavy burden on opponents who wish to declare a proposed amendment futile." See Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2000). Thus, the proposed amendment must be plainly frivolous or advance a claim that is insufficient on its face. See 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1468 (2010 ed.). An amendment that seeks to add a claim that is clearly beyond the applicable statute of limitations can be plainly frivolous. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir. 2001); Jablonski, 863 F.2d at 292.
Defendant correctly notes that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are subject to the limitations period for personal injury torts in the state in which the claim accrued. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). Actions for personal injury in New Jersey are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Defendant does not, however, address the possibility of relation back. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an amendment made after the limitations period has expired will "relate back" to the date the pleading was initially filed under certain circumstances. Under Rule 15(c)(1), an amendment will relate back when permitted under the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations. Pursuant to New Jersey law, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions may be tolled by operation of the fictitious party rule. See DeRienzo v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Greczyn v. Colgate-Palmolive, 183 N.J. 5, 17 n.3 (2005) (). The rule states in relevant part:
A plaintiff may avail themselves of the fictitious party rule if a defendant's true identity is "unknown" at the time of filing. N.J.R. 4:26-4; Mears v. Sandoz Pharm., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 622, 631-32 (App. Div. 1997). A corollary to this prerequisite is that a plaintiff may not utilize the rule if the unknown party's true identity was ascertainable through due diligence. See Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115 (1973); Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 479-80 (App. Div. 2003) (citations omitted). To fulfill this obligation, a plaintiff must "investigate all potentially responsible parties in a timely manner." Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002) (per curiam). In other words, a plaintiff that "consistently took active steps to identify the [unknown party]" will satisfy the diligence threshold. DeRienzo 357 F.3d at 355. On the other hand, diligence will be lacking where the party's true identity could have been obtained through basic inquiry or routine discovery. See Matynska, 175 N.J. at 53; Mears, 300 N.J. Super. at 631; Cardona v. Data Sys. Comp. Ctr., 261 N.J. Super. 232 (App. Div. 1992).
At the time the original complaint was filed, Plaintiff was an inmate at a prison in West Trenton, New Jersey (Compl. ¶ 2). In fact, it appears that Plaintiff has been incarcerated since his arrest on July 6, 2006. See State v. Williams, No. A-1745-09T4, 2011 WL 2416734 (N.J. App. Div. June 17, 2011) (affirming guilty plea). On June 7, 2010, Plaintiff advised the Court that he intended to amend the Complaint, but would be unable to do so until he received a copy of the underlying police report from Defendant's counsel. A scheduling order was entered by the Court on July 16, 2010, that provided for several months of discovery. See CM/ECF No. 20. Plaintiff thereafter sought a copy of the police report from his adversary. See CM/ECF No. 22. Defendant's counse...
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