Williams v. Irby

Decision Date21 July 1881
Docket NumberCASE 1064.
Citation15 S.C. 458
PartiesWILLIAMS v. IRBY.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

1. In a trial justice's court the defendant may orally answer a written complaint.

2. The defendant having orally pleaded a general denial, he could not introduce evidence of a counter-claim; notice was necessary.

3. A demand originating in contract cannot be pleaded as a counter-claim in an action for the recovery of a specific chattel.

Before ALDRICH, J., Marlborough, September, 1880.

Action by Thomas W. Williams against Harriet Irby, commenced in December, 1879, and tried by a trial justice in March, 1880. The opinion states the case.

Messrs. Caston & McIver , for appellant.

Mr. A. A. Pollock , contra.

OPINION

SIMPSON C. J.

During the year 1879 the plaintiff (appellant) carried to defendant's (respondent's) gin certain cotton of his own to be ginned and packed into a bale. The bale having been ginned and packed, was at respondent's gin on December 9th, 1879, when appellant demanded it of respondent. The delivery was refused, and appellant commenced action before a trial justice, alleging the facts as above stated, demanding judgment in his complaint for the recovery of the cotton or for the sum of $68, in case possession could not be had, with $20 damages for the detention. The answer of respondent was made orally, and was as follows: " The defendant puts in a general denial."

On the trial of the case the defendant, without previous notice offered evidence to show a prior indebtedness of plaintiff to defendant on an old account of $20, and also a balance of rent due for the year 1879. The evidence was objected to by plaintiff as not in reply to the case made. This objection was overruled by the trial justice and the evidence was admitted, which established a certain balance due for rent in 1879.

Upon this evidence the trial justice decreed: " That the defendant, as landlord, was entitled to a balance of rent for the year 1879; that the amount of cotton taken exceeded the amount to which defendant was entitled as rent by two hundred pounds of cotton, which was worth, at twelve cents per pound, $24; and that this amount of cotton was wrongfully taken, and that the plaintiff was damaged thereby $10 in addition to the value of the said two hundred pounds of cotton." He then decreed for plaintiff $34 and costs. From this judgment both plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court.

The plaintiff appealed on numerous exceptions; when condensed, however, they present but three grounds:

1. " That the trial justice erred in permitting evidence of a counter-claim, without notice, after issue joined upon a general denial of the facts alleged in the complaint.

2. " Because the trial justice erred in allowing defendant to answer orally after service of written complaint upon him.

3. " Because the trial justice, after having found that the cotton was taken, as charged in complaint, erred in holding that defendant, as landlord, had the right to hold the cotton, and out of it to enforce payment of plaintiff's indebtedness to him for rent," & c.

The defendant appealed upon the ground: " That the trial justice erred in not dismissing the complaint on his motion; because, as was patent, no affidavit had been filed and served at the commencement of the action as required, as he claimed, by Section 74 of code."

Upon the hearing of the appeal, Judge Aldrich rendered the following order: " I have examined and considered the testimony. It appears to me that the trial justice has done substantial justice to the parties litigant. The appeal is dismissed."

From this judgment of Judge Aldrich the plaintiff has appealed, assigning as error, in substance, that the presiding judge overruled his exceptions to the judgment of the trial justice, and that, disregarding these exceptions, which raised questions of law, the judge based his judgment on what appeared to him to be " substantial justice between the parties litigant."

Section 91 of the code, Subdivision 2, provides that the pleadings in trial justices courts may be either oral or in writing. Appellant contends that while this section permits the pleadings to be either oral or in writing, yet that they apply to the whole pleadings, embracing the pleading both of plaintiff and defendant; that a proper construction of this section requires the pleadings on both sides to be the same. If the one is in writing the other should be so also, and the same as to oral pleadings; and inasmuch as the complaint in this case was in writing, it was error to permit the defendant to answer orally.

If this is the true construction of this section of the code, it would, in effect, give to the plaintiff, who always pleads first, the power to determine whether the case should be conducted upon oral or written pleadings. We do not think that this was the intent of this section. No doubt it would be much better in all cases that pleadings on both sides should be in writing. If this were so, much uncertainty and confusion, which often occurs from loose pleadings, would be prevented; and if it was within the power of this court to establish such a rule it might be wise to do so, but this court has not been invested with such power....

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