Williams v. Jackson

Decision Date31 December 1941
Docket NumberNo. 7915.,7915.
Citation159 S.W.2d 99
PartiesWILLIAMS v. JACKSON, Chief Justice, et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Hughes, Hardeman & Wilson, of San Angelo, for appellant.

McDonald & Anderson, of Wichita Falls, and Ritchie & Ritchie, of Minerals Wells, for Stone and another.

W. T. Link and J. R. Porter, both of Clarendon, for Fitts and another.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Dennis P. Ratliff, as district judge of Kent County, to proceed to judgment closing a receivership in which relator is receiver and taxing the costs therein, and for a writ of prohibition restraining the Court of Civil Appeals at Amarillo from interfering with the entry of such judgment.

The pleadings disclose that the controversy involves the estate of James E. Kuteman, who died intestate July 18, 1938, a resident of Donley County, leaving as his only heirs his mother, Mrs. Nellie Kuteman, and his sister, Mrs. Beatrice K. Stone, both respondents herein. His estate consisted of a considerable amount of land in Kent, Nolan, Clay and Montague Counties. On the 1st day of August, 1938, Mrs. Kuteman was appointed administratrix of his estate by the probate court of Donley County. On March 11, 1940, Jerome S. Stone, on behalf of his wife, Mrs. Beatrice K. Stone, filed suit against Mrs. Kuteman in the district court of Kent County to enforce a written contract entered into by the Stones and Mrs. Kuteman on October 31, 1938 providing that the estate should be kept intact for a period of two years. He alleged that Mrs. Kuteman was violating the contract by wasting the property of the estate and by attempting to dispose of some of the land, and prayed that a receiver be appointed to take possession of the estate. The district judge heard testimony in vacation and granted the receivership. He appointed Guinn Williams, the present relator, as receiver and authorized him to take possession of the estate, with full powers of management and operation. On May 3, 1940, Mrs. Kuteman filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the receivership suit and moved to vacate the receivership on the ground that the probate court of Donley County, where the administration was pending, had exclusive jurisdiction of the estate. This plea was overruled by the district judge, and Mrs. Kuteman appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at Amarillo. That court reversed the order of the district judge and dissolved the receivership on the ground that the probate court of Donley County had exclusive jurisdiction of the estate, and that as a consequence the order of the district court appointing a receiver was void. The court also held that the contract of October 31, 1938, did not oust the probate court of jurisdiction and was not binding upon the estate, although Mrs. Kuteman may have incurred some personal liability for its breach. Kuteman v. Stone, 150 S.W.2d 102.

Thereafter, at the September term of the District Court of Kent County the receiver presented his report and account for final settlement, in which he showed that he had taken possession of the estate and managed it advantageously. He prayed that he be allowed $5,000 as receiver's commission and that his attorney be allowed $3,500 as attorney's fee, in addition to the $1,500 which had previously been allowed to each of them, that these sums and all other expenses be taxed as costs against the estate, that he be discharged as receiver, and that the estate be finally closed. The district judge took the case under advisement, and before he announced any decision Mrs. Kuteman applied to the Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of prohibition restraining the district judge from taxing the estate with any of the costs of the receivership. On October 6, 1941, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the district court was "without power or authority to subject any portion of the Kuteman estate or its property or money to the payment of receiver's fees, attorney's fees, court costs, expenses or any other item or charge." The court said that when it dissolved the receivership on March 17, 1941, "the proper order for the court below to have entered at the ensuing term was an order discharging the receiver upon proper final account filed by him and taxing the costs of the entire proceeding up to that time against the plaintiff in that case, Jerome S. Stone." Thereupon the Court of Civil Appeals issued a writ of prohibition, by which it was provided that plaintiffs and the trial court were "prohibited and enjoined from assessing, by order, judgment or decree any sum or sums as receiver's commissions, attorney's fees, court costs, or incidental expenses of any kind against the estate of James E. Kuteman, deceased, or against Nellie Kuteman, and from creating any lien, charge or encumbrance upon any of the property of such estate or of Nellie Kuteman, the relator, to secure the payment thereof, or of any other charge against the same." See Kuteman v. Ratliff, 154 S.W. 2d 864, 866.

As a result of this writ of prohibition, the district judge has taken no further...

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4 cases
  • Hunt v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2, 14902.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 9 Julio 1948
    ...S.W.2d 536; writ dismissed, correct judgment; Whitman et al. v. Aldrich et al., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W. 464; Williams v. Jackson, Chief Justice et al., 138 Tex. 352, 159 S.W.2d 99; Wilson et al. v. Cone et al., Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d Specifically answering appellant's point No. 2, wherein ......
  • Metropolitan Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Tarter
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 29 Enero 1987
    ...that could result in an inconsistent determination of that ultimate issue. The controlling principle is stated in Williams v. Jackson, 138 Tex. 352, 159 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1941), quoting 30 AM.JUR. 930, as Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not hav......
  • Kuteman v. Alexander, 5767.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 1947
    ...by the cases of Kuteman v. Stone, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 102; Kuteman v. Ratliff, Tex.Civ. App., 154 S.W.2d 864; and Williams v. Jackson, 138 Tex. 352, 159 S.W.2d 99; that on June 15, 1942, appellant conveyed the land in question to W. A. Mays, who, on July 7, 1942, with the assistance of......
  • Brown v. Scherck
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 29 Julio 1965
    ...daughters in the future on the basis of certain factors which they were instructed to take into consideration. In Williams v. Jackson, 138 Tex. 352, 159 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1941), our Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Alexander, held as 'In 30 American Jurisprudence p. 930, it is sa......

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