Williams v. Krumsiek
| Decision Date | 10 March 1955 |
| Citation | 280 P.2d 486,131 Cal.App.2d 411 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Ruel G. WILLIAMS and E. R. Dickerson, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Irene A. KRUMSIEK, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 4911. |
Frederick E. Hoar, Bakersfield, for appellant.
Vizzard, Baker & Sullivan, James Vizzard, Bakersfield, for respondents.
This is an action for the recovery of damages alleged to have been suffered by plaintiffs as a result of defendant's refusal to perform a contract for the exchange of real properties. It is alleged in the amended complaint that on or about July 9, 1948, defendant Irene Krumsiek entered into an agreement in writing with O. A. and Lola B. Sanders for the exchange of real properties in Kern and Los Angeles counties; tht the exchange agreement was secured through the efforts of plaintiffs as real estate brokers, who fully performed their part of the agreement; that the exchange agreement provided, among other things, that the defendant should pay to plaintiffs the sum of $1,500, and that said O. A. and Lola B. Sanders should pay plaintiffs a like sum as commissions for securing the sale and exchange of the said properties of the respective parties; that on or about July 13, 1948, an independent agreement in writing was executed by plaintiffs and Sanders and his wife wherein it was provided that Mr. and Mrs. Sanders would pay their share of the commission from the first crops of 1949 from the Kern county ranch property being acquired by them and that said payment, if made from proceeds of crops before June 1, 1949, would be from crops on said property; that defendant refused to perform the exchange agreement; that as a direct and proximate result of her failure of performance, Sanders and his wife were never placed in possession of the Kern county property and were unable to produce crops therefrom and that they, therefore, did not become obligated to pay their share of the commission, to the damage of plaintiffs in the sum of $1,500. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appealed and the judgment was reversed by this court in Williams v. Krumsiek, 109 Cal.App.2d 456, 241 P.2d 40. Defendant then filed her answer to the complaint, denying generally the allegations thereof and setting up as an affirmative defense that plaintiffs had recovered a judgment against the defendant on the same cause of action in a former action, numbered 49950, filed in the superior court of Kern county, and that said judgment had been paid.
When the instant action came on for trial it was stipulated that the cause be submitted on the plea of res judicata and on the transcript of the testimony in said former action No. 49950. The trial court found that the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint were true and that the allegations in defendant's affirmative defense were untrue. Judgment was entered for plaintiffs against the defendant for the sum of $1,500, with interest and costs. Defendant appeals from this judgment and contends that the finding of fact that the instant action was not barred by the former action between the same parties on the same cause of action was not supported by and was contrary to the evidence. We are in accord with this contention.
The former action, No. 49950, to which reference is made, was filed by plaintiffs in the superior court of Kern county on November 1, 1948. That action was brought by plaintiffs herein against Irene Krumsiek and O. A. Sanders and Lola B. Sanders. Plaintiffs sought therein to recover $1,500 from Irene Krumsiek and a like amount from Mr. and Mrs. Sanders alleged to be due plaintiffs under the terms of the exchange agreement executed by the defendants on July 9, 1948. Sanders and his wife filed an answer and cross-complaint therein in which they alleged, among other things, that performance by them of the agreement had been prevented by plaintiffs' failure to effect completion of the transfer of the properties; that the commission to be paid by them was to be paid from crops produced on the property which was to be conveyed to them by Irene Krumsiek; that they had never secured possession of the property; that defendant Irene Krumsiek did not secure the consent of the co-owner of the Krumsiek property to a transfer thereof and that said Irene Krumsiek had stopped payment on a check given to plaintiffs as a part payment of the expenses of the transfer of the properties; that by reason of the wilful refusal of Irene Krumsiek to complete said transfer, cross-complainants had lost the opportunity to sell their property and were thereby damaged. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiffs against Mrs. Krumsiek for the sum of $1,500 and denied plaintiffs a judgment against Sanders and his wife. They, as cross-complainants, obtained a judgment against Mrs. Krumsiek for attorneys' fees. The judgment against Mrs. Krumsiek...
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...& Lux, Inc. v. James, 180 Cal. 38, 44, 179 P. 174.) It is for the public good that there be an end to litigation. (Williams v. Krumsiek, 131 Cal.App.2d 411, 280 P.2d 486.) If it be assumed arguendo there is a "taking" by the legislative negation of the finality of a judgment, such taking ma......
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