Williams v. Lash

• Decision Date: 01 January 1863
• Citation: 8 Minn. 441
• Parties: PHANELA S. WILLIAMS vs. ISRAEL G. LASH.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

8 Minn. 441

PHANELA S. WILLIAMS vs. ISRAEL G. LASH.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Error to district court, Ramsey County.

Action to foreclose a mortgage, executed October 1, 1856, by Wm. H. Randall to Samuel Mayall; by him assigned October 9, 1857, to John Mayall, and by him assigned to plaintiff April 20, 1858. There was a judgment, a lien on the property prior to the mortgage, docketed September 17, 1850, in favor of Henry N. Hart against Wm. H. Randall, and also another prior judgment docketed September 1, 1856, in favor of the board of county commissioners of the County of Ramsey against Wm. H. Randall. Under an execution upon this last judgment the real estate was, February 19, 1858, sold and bid in by the board of county commissioners. On March 25, 1858, John Mayall, then the holder of the mortgage in suit under it, redeemed from this sale. After his assignment of the mortgage to plaintiff, John Mayall procured to be executed to himself, a sheriff's deed of the real estate under the execution sale and his redemption; and he then executed a quit-claim deed of the real estate to John H. Randall, and he executed a mortgage upon it to the defendant, and the defendant foreclosed his mortgage and became the purchaser at the sale. In 1860, the real estate was levied on and sold under execution upon the judgment in favor of Henry N. Hart, and Hart became the purchaser and received the usual certificate of sale. And he afterwards assigned the certificate and all his right, title, interest, and estate, in the real estate to defendant, who took the assignment to protect the estate and interest he claimed under the mortgage from John H. Randall. After this and within the proper time, the plaintiff, through her agent Samuel Mayall, attempted, under the mortgage in suit, to redeem from the sale under the judgment in favor of Hart, and produced her papers and tendered the money to a deputy sheriff then in charge of the sheriff's office. But she did not produce the assignment, nor a copy of the assignment of the mortgage from John Mayall to her, but instead of it produced the affidavit of Samuel Mayall, stating that he saw John Mayall execute an assignment of the mortgage to plaintiff, and that she was then the owner and holder thereof.

The referee who tried the cause found these facts, and found among his conclusions of law that the purchase by the county commissioners under their judgment was valid. And that the attempt of plaintiff to redeem from the sale under the judgment in favor of Hart was ineffectual, and ordered judgment for the defendant.

Points and authorities for plaintiff in error: —

1. The commissioners of Ramsey County had not capacity to purchase the real estate involved in this action, or any real estate, at judicial sale, and the purchase by them, and certificate of sale, were void and of no effect.

2. Said commissioners are only authorized to purchase real estate or hold title thereto for court house and jail sites, and other public uses, and had no power to purchase on the execution sale, and consequently the redemption of John Mayall is wholly unauthorized. Comp. Stat. 153, § 13.

3. If a purchase could be made by the board of commissioners, it must appear that it authorized such purchase by resolution, and no such action was had. Angell & Ames on Corp. § 229, et seq.; Comp. Stat. 193, § 4.

4. The sheriff's deeds to John Mayall did not follow the judgment or execution, and were therefore irregular and insufficient to pass the title.

5. The facts found by the referee show that the plaintiff legally redeemed the property sold under the Hart judgment, and therefore the sheriff's deeds to Lash, after said redemption, were nugatory, and passed no title.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. The assignment of the mortgage by John Mayall to the plaintiff carried no interest in the real estate described in the mortgage. This mortgage was subsequent to the Ramsey County judgment. All Randall's interest in the property, at the time of the docketing of the Ramsey County judgment, when it is found that Randall was the owner in fee-simple thereof, was sold by the sheriff under execution on this judgment, on the 19th day of February, A. D. 1858, and purchased by Ramsey County. By this purchase Ramsey County obtained a perfect estate in fee-simple, and older than that of the mortgage, subject, however, to the statutory rights of redemption by the judgment debtor, and other subsequent parties in interest. On the 25th of March, 1858, less than a month after the sale, John Mayall, then the undisputed owner of this mortgage, and being, therefore, entitled to redeem, did redeem from the sale under the Ramsey County judgment. He thus became the owner of the same estate in the land held by Ramsey County after its purchase at the sale, that is, of all the right, title, interest, and estate, which Randall had at the docketing of the judgment, subject, however, to the remaining statutory rights of redemption. Now this estate John Mayall never assigned or transferred to the plaintiff, but afterwards, on the 20th April, 1858, he assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff as collateral security for a loan, which assignment, however, was never recorded, nor otherwise notified to defendant in error till 18th September, A. D. 1861, long after his title had been perfected. Now the estate obtained by John Mayall by virtue of the redemption, was a very different estate from the one he held under the mortgage. His estate under the mortgage empowered him to obtain the other prior estate, that is all. Comp. Stat. 573, § 115.

2. The constitution imposes no restrictions upon the powers of the county to hold property, and it is therefore conceived that there can be no particular limit in this regard; certainly none excepting such as may be implied from the purposes for which it is created. But this inquiry is not material in the case at bar, for the suit in which the Ramsey County judgment was obtained was brought to enforce an official bond, executed to the county, and this purchase of real estate was made to collect the judgment recovered in such suit. Comp. Stat. 109, §§ 251-2.

3. The title of the defendant in error to the property in question is perfect, and paramount to the plaintiff's claim, under the sheriff's sale on the Hart judgment. The attempt of the plaintiff to redeem from that sale is invalid for the reasons assigned by the referee, and also for the further reason that the tender, if such it was, was made, not to the officer who made the sale, but to a deputy of a successor in office. Comp. Stat. 573, § 116.

Smith & Gilman and Henry Hale, for plaintiff in error.

Lorenzo Allis, for defendant in error.

ATWATER, J.

The title of the defendant in error to the premises in question depends upon the validity of the sale and purchase by the board of commissioners of Ramsey County, under the judgment obtained in favor of that county. It becomes therefore necessary to determine whether the county had the power and capacity to purchase under that sale, and whether it obtained any title to the premises by virtue thereof.

A county is a body politic, having a corporate capacity only for particular, specified ends and purposes, and is termed by legal writers a quasi corporation, that is having corporate attributes sub modo. 2 Kent Com. 314. And the same author states, that the modern doctrine is to consider corporations as having such powers as are specifically granted by the act of incorporation, or as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect the powers expressly granted, and as not having any others. (2 Kent Com. 350). This principle has been established and affirmed by numerous and uniform decisions in the United States and state courts, so that at this day it stands unquestioned, and the only difficulty that can arise with regard to it is, to determine its applicability to the particular case in hand.

And first, as to the powers of counties as expressly granted, defined, and limited, by statute at the time of the purchase of this real estate by the County of Ramsey, February 19, 1858. Sec. 251, Comp. Stat. 109, provides that "each county shall continue to be a body politic and corporate for the following purposes, to-wit: To sue and be sued; to purchase and hold for the public use of the county, lands lying within its own limits, and any personal estate; to make all necessary contracts; and to do all other necessary acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county." Some other provisions with regard to the power of county commissioners, having no bearing upon the question under discussion, need not here be cited.

It is to this enumeration of the powers of counties that we must look for the authority claimed by the county, or on its behalf, to purchase the lands in question. The second paragraph is the only one conferring express power upon the county to purchase and hold real estate. That limits the power of the county to the purchase of such lands only, as are for the public use of the county, and lying within its own limits. It will be observed by reference to the act of February 28, 1850, (Sess. Laws, 1860, p. 131) that an additional grant of power was made, authorizing the county to purchase lands sold for taxes. The "public use" by the county, mentioned in the statute, must mean that actual use, occupation, and possession, of real estate, rendered necessary for the proper discharge of the administrative or other functions of the county, through its appropriate officers. Section 254 of the same act shows for what purposes the county may need the use of real estate, to-wit, in the erection of court houses, jails, fireproof offices, and all other necessary buildings for the use of the county. If the use be extended beyond these specified and obvious purposes, it is difficult to see what limitation can be placed upon the power of the county to purchase, so as to give the...