Williams v. Lee
| Decision Date | 26 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | 14-cv-597 (NSR) |
| Parties | ROBERT WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM LEE, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Robert Williams ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Currently pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") issued by Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), recommending that the petition be denied. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the R & R, and the petition is DENIED.
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case, the underlying criminal proceeding, and Petitioner's collateral state challenges.
Following Petitioner's convictions and the exhaustion of his state court appeals, he timely filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on January 23, 2014, Petitioner argued that habeas corpus should be granted because the trial court (1) violated his due process rights by admitting statements that he made involuntarily, unknowingly, and unintelligently to the police; (2) violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing "clearly prejudicial hearsay" testimony from the victim's mother and sister relating to previous violence between Petitioner and the victim; and (3) denied him his right to a fair trial because the court empaneled a biased jury and later provided prejudicial jury instructions. (Pet'r's Pet. for Habeas Corpus, pp. 5 - 30, ECF No. 1.)
On December 4, 2017, Judge McCarthy issued her R & R recommending that this Court deny the petition, finding that on Petitioner's first claim, the state court's admission of his statements to law enforcement was not unreasonable and that Petitioner's second and third claims were procedurally barred. Petitioner filed objections on January 5, 2018, after the December 18, 2017 deadline to file objections. (ECF No. 17.) The Court deemed the objections to be filed nunc pro tunc. (ECF No. 16.)
"Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding, a prisoner seeking habeas relief must establish that the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (d)(2); Cousin v. Bennett, 511 F.3d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 2008). A state court's findings of fact are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Nelson v. Walker, 121 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1997).
28 U.S.C. § 636(b); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), (3). However, "[t]o accept the report and recommendation of a magistrate, to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Nelson v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Feehan v. Feehan, No. 09-CV-7016(DAB), 2011 WL 497776, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee note (1983 Addition, Subdivision (b)) ("When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.").
Petitioner's habeas petitioner challenges his 2010 conviction by asserting that the trial court (1) violated his due process rights by admitting statements that he made involuntarily, unknowingly, and unintelligently to the police; (2) violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing "clearly prejudicial hearsay" testimony from the victim's mother and sister relating to previous violence between Petitioner and the victim; and (3) denied him his right to a fair trial because the court empaneled a biased jury and later provided prejudicial jury instructions.
Judge McCarthy found that Petitioner properly exhausted his claims surrounding his statements to law enforcement but that the state's decision to admit Petitioner's statements was reasonable, consistent with clearly established federal law, and was based on a reasonable determination of the facts. The Second Department reasonably determined that Petitioner's initial statements at the scene were not the product of custodial interrogation and that the administration of Miranda rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not required because the public safety exception applied. Petitioner's pre-Miranda statements in booking were reasonably determined to be spontaneous utterances, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to find his statements made in the videotaped interview after he was advised of his rights to be uncoerced and an implied waiver of those rights. The state court was also reasonable in finding Petitioner's statements made at the hospital to be admissible because Petitioner had previously been provided with a Miranda warning and continued to voluntarily waive those rights.
However, Judge McCarthy determined that Petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim relating to testimony from the victim's mother and sister about Petitioner's previous physical altercation with the victim was procedurally barred. Petitioner's state court filings on this issue focus solelyon the trial court's application of a New York state evidentiary rule from People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901), and there was nothing in his submissions to put the Second Department or the Court of Appeals on notice that there was a federal law aspect to this claim. Judge McCarthy found that Petitioner's fair trial claims were also procedurally barred for several reasons. First, the Second Department determined that, although the trial court erred in failing to obtain individual assurances of impartiality from the jurors during voir dire, reversal was not required because the defense counsel failed to exercise his available peremptory challenges prior to the end of jury selection as required for reversal under state law. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 270.20(2). This judgment rested on an independent and adequate state law ground and was therefore procedurally barred from habeas review. Second, Petitioner was procedurally barred from asserting claims related to the jury instructions because he did not fairly present the same constitutional claim in his state court filings.
Based on this analysis, Judge McCarthy recommended that the Petition be denied in its entirety and that no certificate of appealability be issued.
Petitioner objects to the R & R on several grounds. First, he argues that he has a due process claim about the testimony of the victim's mother and sister that is not procedurally barred because he raised a claim that this their testimony was inadmissible hearsay in his state court appeals. Second, Petitioner contends that his statements at the scene, during the videotaped interview, and at the hospital should have been suppressed. Petitioner also asserts that the verdict sheet was fundamentally flawed and deprived him of due process in the form of a fair trial. Finally, Petitioner requests a reduced sentence because his current sentence is cruel and unusual.
The Court undertakes a de novo review of Petitioner's specific objections to the R & R.
According to Petitioner, because he raised hearsay objections to this testimony in his direct appeal, the claim that this testimony deprived him of a fair trial in violation of his due process rights is not procedurally barred.1
For a habeas petition to be granted, a petitioner must have exhausted his claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Exhaustion requires a prisoner to have "fairly presented to an appropriate state court the same federal constitutional claim that he now urges upon the federal courts." Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim presented to the state court must be the "substantial equivalent" of that raised in the federal habeas petition. Jones v. Keane, 329 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2003).
Although Petitioner is correct that he raised hearsay objections to the testimony from the victim's mother and sister in state court, he...
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