Williams v. London Utility Commission
| Citation | 375 F.3d 424 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-5573.,03-5573. |
| Parties | Dewey Michael WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LONDON UTILITY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Before MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.*
Dewey Michael Williams appeals from the adverse grant of summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and disability-discrimination claims, arising from his employment as superintendent of the London Utility Commission. Mr. Williams alleges that the district court erred: (1) in holding that Mr. Williams's employment agreement was void from its inception because the London Utility Commission exceeded its statutory authority by creating the contract without the approval of the Mayor; and (2) in holding that Mr. Williams did not prove that the City of London's reasons for firing him were pretext for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Finding no error, we affirm.
The London Utility Commission of London, Kentucky, hired Mr. Williams in late 1992. In March 1998, the Utility Commission entered into an employment contract with Mr. Williams. At the time that the contract was signed, both the Utility Commission and Mr. Williams knew that the contract might be invalid if the Utility Commission lacked authority to enter into the agreement.
The contract provided that Mr. Williams would be employed for a three-year term, and the contract would renew automatically for another three-year term unless one party gave the other 90-days written notice of termination, which the defendants concede was not given. The contract also provided that Mr. Williams could be removed only for cause by the Utility Commission. The agreement was signed by the Commissioners, but not signed by Mayor Smith.
In early 2001, Mayor Smith1 decided to terminate Mr. Williams. He has given various reasons for this decision, including: Mr. Williams's inability to deal with personnel problems on his own, Mr. Williams's inability to get along with customers and the public, and a complaint by Ken Wilson, a former employee.2 Mayor Smith also perceived that after the city passed Ordinance 981 (discussed below), Mr. Williams became obstinate and difficult. Mayor Smith alleged that Mr. Williams was upset by the removal of his authority and refused to solve petty employment issues on his own. The Mayor also believed that Mr. Williams had lied to him, but he was unable to identify a specific instance in which Mr. Williams lied.
On February 22, 2001, one of the London Utility Commissioners told Mr. Williams that he must attend a meeting with Mayor Smith. The Commissioner told Mr. Williams that he was going to be fired. At the meeting with the mayor, the subject of Mr. Williams's health arose. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr Williams and the Mayor agreed that Mr. Williams could stay until June 2001, so that he could apply for disability benefits. Subsequently, Mr. Williams sent a letter to the Mayor stating that he had a valid contract and that the Mayor did not have the power to terminate him. After receipt of this letter, Mayor Smith terminated Mr. Williams on February 28, 2001.
Mr. Williams filed suit in the district court claiming that he suffered disability discrimination and age discrimination.3 Mr. Williams also brought due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. Mr. Williams appeals the section 1983 and state-law contract claims and the disability-discrimination claim. He does not appeal the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Lake v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir.1996).
We must first determine whether the London Utility Commission had the power to enter into the contract with Mr. Williams. Thus, we must examine the applicable Kentucky constitutional and statutory provisions, together with the ordinances of the City of London.
In 1891, section 162 of the Kentucky Constitution was adopted, which provides that "[n]o county, city, town or other municipality shall ever be authorized or permitted to pay any claim created against it, under any agreement or contract made without the express authorization or law, and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void." Subsequently, in 1942, the Kentucky legislature passed section 96.530 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which allows cities to create and operate light, heat, and power plants. This statute allows for the establishment of a utility commission as a separate corporate body with the power to contract and the power to manage all employment issues. As the district court noted, this statute specifically does not include water commissions. In fact, in 1942, the Kentucky legislature also passed section 96.350 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which allows certain cities, including the City of London, to operate waterworks facilities. This statute does not provide for a commission organized as a separate corporate body with control of its own employees as does section 96.530.
In 1948, the City of London passed Ordinance 344, which created the Utility Commission for water and sewers. This ordinance gave the Utility Commission the authority to hire a project superintendent, who could be removed by the Commission "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance or malfeasance in office." As noted by the district court, Ordinance 344 appears as if it were organized to meet the strictures of section 96.530, rather than section 96.350.
In 1980, the Kentucky legislature passed the "Home Rule Statutes." Section 83A.130(9) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that "[t]he mayor shall be the appointing authority with the power to appoint and remove all city employees ... except as tenure and terms of employment are protected by statute, ordinance or contract." Furthermore, section 83A.020 provides that all ordinances which conflict with the Home Rule Statutes are void.
The London Utility Commission hired Mr. Williams in 1992, and the parties entered into the employment contract in question in 1998. In December 2000, the City of London passed Ordinance 981, which repealed Ordinance 344 and reorganized the Utility Commission to align with the Home Rule Statutes. Ordinance 981 states that the Utility Commission shall recommend to the mayor a person to employ as superintendent. Acknowledging the Home Rule Statutes, Ordinance 981 also states that the "[m]ayor shall make all decisions relating to employment[, including] hiring, lay-offs, terminations, and other similar decisions relating to employment." Section 9 of Ordinance 981 states that the "Commission shall be bound under the terms of any previous contracts and/or agreements made and entered into by or on behalf of the Commission that exist at the time of enactment."
We agree with the district court that the contract was void from its inception. Mr. Williams was hired after the passage of the Home Rule Statutes, which indicate that only the mayor has the power to hire and fire city employees. According to the Home Rule Statutes, any ordinances in conflict with the Home Rule Statutes are void. Thus, Ordinance 344 was void, at least in part, upon the passage of the Home Rule Statutes. Because Mr. Williams was hired...
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