Williams v. McCauley

• Decision Date: 31 December 1940
• Docket Number: 28202.
• Citation: 108 P.2d 822,7 Wn.2d 1
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. McCAULEY, Warden.

108 P.2d 822

7 Wn.2d 1

WILLIAMS v. McCAULEY, Warden.

No. 28202.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 31, 1940

Department 2.

Habeas corpus proceedings by C. R. Williams against James M McCauley, as Warden of the Washington State Penitentiary wherein petitioner sought release from imprisonment under an allegedly void judgment and sentence. From an unsatisfactory judgment, petitioner appeals.

Judgment modified and affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County; Timothy A. paul judge.

Adam Beeler and Josiah Thomas, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Smith Troy, Atty. Gen., and W. A. Toner, of Olympia, for respondent.

JEFFERS Justice.

C. R Williams filed in the superior court for Walla Walla county his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein he alleged that he was being illegally held and imprisoned in the Washington state penitentiary, and had been so held since May 28, 1934, under and by virtue of a judgment and sentence rendered and imposed by the superior court for Lewis county, in cause No. 1199; that the judgment and sentence were based upon a conviction of the crime of first degree forgery, and provided that petitioner should be committed to the state penitentiary for a term of not less than fourteen and not more than twenty years. It is further alleged that the judgment and sentence imposed were in violation of the indeterminate sentence law, which was in full force and effect at the time petitioner was sentenced, and particularly in violation of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2281, which provides: 'Whenever any person shall be convicted of any felony for which no fixed period of confinement is imposed by law, the court shall, in addition to any fine or forfeiture which he may impose, direct that such person be confined in the state penitentiary, or in the Washington state reformatory, as the case may be, for a term not less than the minimum nor greater than the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for the offense of which such person shall be convicted; and where no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed by law, the court shall fix the same in his discretion at not less than six months nor more than five years * * *.'

It is further alleged that the minimum sentence imposed upon petitioner was in excess of any legal minimum that could have been imposed for the crime of which petitioner was convicted, and that the judgment of the court in fixing a fourteen year minimum was therefore in excess of its jurisdiction.

The matter came on for hearing Before the court, and at such hearing it was admitted by defendant, in open court, that petitioner was and had been confined under the judgment above referred to, which judgment and sentence provides that petitioner shall be confined in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than fourteen years nor more than twenty years; and that petitioner has been confined for the full period of five years. It was further admitted that petitioner was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law, and that the maximum minimum which the court could lawfully have imposed was five years.

On this state of facts, petitioner contended, and here contends, that he is entitled to be discharged from custody.

The trial court, at the close of the hearing, made and entered an order, which provides in part as follows:

'It is ordered by the court that any part of the petitioner's minimum sentence in excess of five years be and the same is hereby declared void.

'It is further ordered that the board of prison terms and paroles bring the applicant Before it and consider him for parole in all respects as the said board would have considered him had the court fixed his minimum sentence at five years; that in all other respects the petition be denied.'

Petitioner has appealed from the order entered.

Appellant contends that, inasmuch as the trial court held and decided that a portion of appellant's sentence in excess of five years was void, he is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, as that is the only remedy by which he can obtain relief from a judgment and sentence declared void.

Respondent contends that the judgment is not void, but at most is only voidable, and while conceding that the minimum sentence of fourteen years was unauthorized and beyond the power of the court to impose, notwithstanding that fact, appellant, not having served the maximum of twenty years, which was legally imposed, is not entitled to his discharge. In other words, it is respondent's contention that the entire judgment and sentence is not void because the court fixed a minimum which it was not authorized to impose.

Under the indeterminate sentence law in force at the time appellant was sentenced, no court would have had the power to have ordered appellant discharged from custody after he had served his legal minimum sentence, but Before he had served the legal maximum sentence imposed.

In much of appellant's argument, he refers to the judgment as being void, but this conclusion is based entirely upon the fact that the minimum sentence alone was erroneously imposed. In a great deal of his brief, appellant seems to overlook the fact that the maximum sentence was correctly imposed, and had not been served. We may concede, as a general proposition, that if appellant had now served a term which is equal to any maximum which the court could legally impose, appellant's contention would have merit, but the weight of authority, including that of our own state, is contrary to appellant's contention, under a state of facts such as here presented.

In view of the extent to which Judge Paul's order goes, we desire to briefly discuss the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus.

In Re Newcomb, 56 Wash. 395, 105 P. 1042, 1043, we quoted from Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 67 Am.Dec. 374, as follows: "A habeas corpus is not a writ of error. It cannot bring a case Before us in such a manner that we can exercise any kind of appellate jurisdiction in it. On a habeas corpus, the judgment of even a subordinate court cannot be disregarded, reversed, or set aside, however clearly we may perceive it to be erroneous, and however plain it may be that we ought to reverse it if it were Before us on appeal or writ of error. We can only look at the record to see whether a judgment exists, and have no power to say whether it is right or wrong. It is conclusively presumed to be right until it is regularly brought up for revision."

The opinion continues: 'All the courts acknowledge the existence and binding force of this general rule, but when we come to consider what constitutes error, and what constitutes a want of jurisdiction, they differ widely. The error complained of in the matter of drawing and selecting the jury manifestly did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot be considered at this time.' See, also, In re Hulet, 159 Wash. 98, 292 P. 430.

In an extensive note under the heading 'Illegal or erroneous sentence as ground for habeas corpus,' found in 76 A.L.R., beginning on page 468, we find the general rule stated as follows: 'While it is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be permitted to perform the functions of an appeal or writ of...