Williams v. Mcfadden

• Decision Date: 28 February 1887
• Citation: 1 So. 618,23 Fla. 143
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. McFADDEN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

1 So. 618

23 Fla. 143

WILLIAMS v. McFADDEN.

Florida Supreme Court

February 28, 1887

Appeal from Fifth judicial circuit, Alachua county.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

A misrepresentation made by a vendor of real estate, as to a material fact, knowing at the time that it was untrue, upon which statement the purchaser relies, is actionable. ^[1]

A statement made by the vendor, which is tantamount to an estimate or opinion of the value, condition, character adaptability to certain uses, ect., of such real estate, is not actionable unless the seller resorts to some fraudulent means to prevent the purchaser from examining the property.^[1]

A declaration in an action of deceit, for false representations concerning real estate, should state distinctly that such representations were false, that they were known to be false by the vendor, that the purchaser relied on and was misled by them, and that they were representations of material facts.

The rule for the assessment of damages in an action for deceit for false representations concerning real estate, is the difference between the actual value of the land and its value if the alleged facts regarding it had been true.

The fact that the vendee took possession of the land, and had other transactions with the defendant, without expressing dissatisfaction, does not estop him from bringing an action for deceit.

A written description of land made by the vendor, and placed in the hands of his agent, and to which he refers the vendee before sale, is properly admitted in evidence as a representation concerning said land.

If the representations made by the vendor, though false, were believed to be true by such vendor, he cannot be held responsible in this form of action. ^[1]

The fact of knowledge of the vendor as to the truth or falsity of his representations is a question for the jury to determine.

COUNSEL

Taylor & Sanchez, for appellant.

J. J. &amp S. Y. Finley, for appellee.

OPINION

McWHORTER, C.J.

The appellee sued the appellant in an action on the case upon the following facts as alleged in the declaration: The defendant Williams, was the owner of a farm in the state of Florida. The appellee, McFadden, was the owner of a farm in the state of Kentucky. Williams had seen and examined the farm of McFadden in Kentucky; McFadden had never seen the farm of Williams. Williams made a description of his farm in writing and placed it in the hands of his agent, and referred McFadden to it as a correct description of the property. The description is as follows: 'Pooser Farm, 40 acres land; 30 acres in cultivation. Dwelling-house with six (6) rooms and four (4) fire-places. House thoroughly finished, and in good condition. Barns, stables, etc., complete, and ample for general purposes in Florida. About 100 orange trees in bearing in the yard around the dwelling. Grape, fruit, and bananas in full bearing. Lomons, citrons, pecans, pomegranates, peach, and apple trees growing upon the place, some bearing and others to bear. About 500 young orange trees in nursery, from two (2) to six (6) years old, ready to be put in grove; (2) two fine springs of good water in field. Good well in yard. Projected railroad line runs through horse-lot. Quality of land good oak and hickory. Produces 15 bushels corn and 500 lbs. Sea Island cotton to the acre without the use of fertilizers. This yield could be doubled by the liberal use of fertilizers. One mile from church and two miles from school. Location healthy, and society good.' The declaration alleges that, believing the statement therein contained to be true, he made an exchange of his farm in Kentucky for defendant's farm in Florida, receiving at the time from defendant $500, which was the agreed difference in value of the two places. The declaration alleges that defendant knowingly and willfully misrepresented and misdescribed said Florida land; that said representations were untrue 'in respect to the number and character of the orange trees, and in regard to the dwelling-house, and in regard to the character of the land.' The defendant demurred to the declaration. We think the demurrer should have been sustained.

In the case of Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99, the court says: 'The cause of action thus set forth must be treated as an action on the case for deceit, founded upon false affirmations respecting real estate of which the defendant was the seller. The affirmations here set forth, as between buyer and seller, it has been repeatedly decided will not support an action, although the defendant knew them to be false when made. They concern the value of the land, or its condition and adaptation to particular uses, which are only matters of opinion and estimate, as to which men may differ. The such representations the maxim caveat emptor applies. The buyer is not excused from an examination, unless he be fraudulently induced to forbear inquiries which he would otherwise have made. If fraud of this latter description is relied on as an additional ground of action, it must be specially set forth in the declaration, and cannot be charged in general terms only;' citing Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212; Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348; Veasey v. Doton, 3 Allen, 380.

In the case of Gordon v. Parmelee, supra, the court say: 'The alleged false statements concerning the productiveness of the land, and its capacity to furnish support for cattle, constituted no defense to the notes. They fall within that class of affirmations which, although known by the party making them to be false, do not, as between vendor and vendee, afford any ground for a claim of damages, money. They come within the principle for deceit, or by way of recoupment in a suit to recover the purchase money. They come witnin the principle embodied in the maxim of the civil law, simplex comendatio non obligat. Assertions concerning the value of property which is the subject of a contract of sale, or in regard to its qualities and characteristics, are the usual and ordinary means adopted by sellers to obtain a high price, and are always understood as affording to buyers no ground for omitting to make inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining the real condition of the property. Affirmation concerning the value of land, or its adaptation to a particular mode of culture, or the capacity of the soil to produce crops, or support cattle, are, after all, only expressions of opinion, or estimates founded on judgment, about which honest men might well differ materially. Although they might turn out to be erroneous or false, they furnish no evidence of any fraudulent intent. They relate to matters which are not peculiarly within the knowledge of the vendor, and do not involve any inquiry into facts which third persons might be unwilling to disclose. They are, strictly speaking, gratis dicta. The vendee cannot safely place any confidence in them, and, if he does, he cannot make use of his own want of vigilance and care in omitting to ascertain whether they were true or false as the basis of his claim for damages in reduction of the amount which he agreed to pay for the property.'

To entitle a party to maintain an action for deceit by means of false representations, he must, among other things, show that the defendant made false and fraudulent assertions in regard to some fact or facts material to the transaction in which he was defrauded, by means of which he was induced to enter into it. The misrepresentation must relate to alleged facts, or to the condition of things as then existent. It is not every misrepresentation relating to the subject-matter of the contract which will render it void, or enable the aggrieved party to maintain an action for deceit. It must be as to matters of fact substantially affecting his interests, not as to matters of opinion, judgment, probability, or expectation. 3 Suth. Dam. 484, 485; Long v. Woodman, 58 Me. 49.

The law, we think, is correctly stated in the cases cited above. A misrepresentation made by a seller, as to a material fact knowing at the time that it was untrue, upon which the purchaser relied, is actionable. A statement made by the vendor which is tantamount to an estimate of opinion, such as value, condition, character, adaptability to certain uses, * * * is not actionable unless the seller resorts to some fraudulent means to prevent the purchaser from examining the property. We have...