Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1934
• Docket Number: 13923.
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

176 S.E. 340

173 S.C. 448

WILLIAMS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 13923.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 11, 1934

Appeal from Circuit Court of Chester County; E. C. Dennis, Judge.

Action by C. E. Williams, as administrator of the estate of Floyd A Williams, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions.

Carlisle Brown & Carlisle, of Spartanburg, Elliott, McLain, Wardlaw & Elliott, of Columbia, and McDonald, Macaulay & McDonald, of Chester, for appellant.

Hemphill & Hemphill, of Chester, for respondent.

BLEASE Chief Justice.

The defendant, insurance company, has appealed from a verdict and judgment thereon, for both actual and punitive damages rendered against it in favor of Williams, as administrator of the estate of his deceased son, in the court of common pleas for Chester county.

The defendant makes little, if any, complaint of the result as to actual damages, the amount of the policy, and interest thereon.

One of the exceptions, directed to the refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance, if sustained, might affect the judgment as to actual damages, but, clearly, there is no merit in the position that there was error of law in refusing the desired continuance. The granting of a continuance is so largely within the discretion of the trial judge that this court hardly ever interferes with a ruling thereabout. In this instance, the continuance was requested because of the absence of Dr. J. B. McKeown, a witness for the defendant. But the plaintiff readily agreed to allow the defendant to offer in evidence a sworn written statement of Dr. McKeown as to what his testimony would be, and this statement was offered.

It is not necessary that exceptions, alleging error in the charge to the jury, be considered, for, under our view, if the instructions were erroneous, which we do not concede, they would not have affected the verdict for actual damages.

The main question in the appeal relates to the exceptions, based on the failure of the presiding judge to grant the defendant's motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict as to punitive damages. Regarding the propriety of granting those motions, the learned circuit judge, Hon. E. C. Dennis, expressed himself as being in great doubt. He indicated, however, in his rulings thereon, that the termination of the litigation would be expedited by his declining to grant them, the final decision resting, as he stated, with this court.

The action, one for the alleged breach of contract, accompanied by fraudulent acts, grew out of the declination of the company to pay a life insurance policy.

It was alleged by the plaintiff, and admitted by the defendant, that the plaintiff's son, Floyd A. Williams, on September 12, 1928, placed with an agent of the company his application for the policy involved in the suit, one on his life in the sum of $218, the premiums thereon being 10 cents per week; that the policy was delivered to the insured on October 1, 1928; that the premiums were regularly and promptly paid by the father of the insured; and that the insured died on December 23, 1928.

In the written application, the applicant for the insurance agreed that "the policy shall not be binding upon the Company unless upon its date I shall be alive and in sound health." Therein the applicant also represented that he had "never had any of the following complaints or diseases: * * * consumption * * * disease of kidneys * * * disease of lungs," and he also represented that he had not been "under the care of any physician within three years" of the date of his application.

The applicant was examined, on September 14, 1928, by Dr. P. S. Thomas, the medical examiner of the company, who died before the trial of the case. That physician, as well as J. M. Crawford, the agent of the company who took the application, recommended the issuance of the policy.

The policy contained what is termed a "facility of payment clause," in the following language: "The Company may make any payment or grant any non-forfeiture privilege provided herein to the Insured, husband or wife, or any relative by blood or connection by marriage of the Insured, or to any other person appearing to said Company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the Insured, or for his or her burial; and the production of a receipt signed by either of said persons, or of other proof of such payment or grant of such privilege to either of them, shall be conclusive evidence that all claims under this Policy have been satisfied."

Among the conditions contained in the policy, it was provided: "If, (1) the insured is not alive or is not in sound health on the date hereof, or if (2) before the date hereof, * * * the insured * * * has, within two years before the date hereof, been attended by a physician for any serious disease or complaint, or, before said date, has had any pulmonary disease, * * * unless such medical attention or previous disease is specifically recited in the "space for endorsements' on page 4 in a waiver signed by the secretary; * * * then, in any such case, the company may declare this policy void and the liability of the company in the case of any such declaration or in the case of any claim under this policy, shall be limited to the return of premiums paid on the policy."

In the "space for endorsements" on the policy, there was not recited any medical attention, or previous disease, as required in the quoted clause.

On December 24, 1928, the day following the death of the insured, the agent of the company called at the home of the father, where the insured had lived and died, for the purpose of preparing the proofs of death. The proofs, as sent in to the district manager, consisted of form No. 65, termed "Claimant's Statement," and form No. 66, "Physician's Statement."

In the claimant's statement, which was filled out by the agent, certain information, more or less pertinent to the issue for our determination, was set forth as follows: The date of birth of the insured was given as March 31, 1908; the place of birth as York county; the date of death, December 23, 1928; the cause of death, "acute tuberculosis"; the duration of his last sickness, two months; the date when the deceased first consulted a physician in his last illness was fixed at October 1, 1928; and the date on which the deceased quit work was stated to be October 1, 1928. Therein there was purported to be set forth the names and ages of the father, mother, brothers, and sisters of the insured.

In the physician's statement, made by Dr. J. B. McKeown, the age and apparent age of the insured was placed at twenty-one years. The cause of his death was stated to have been "pulmonary tuberculosis," the duration of which, according to the physician's knowledge, was three months, thirteen days, and, according to the history given him, four months. It was stated by the physician that his first visit in the last illness was September 13, 1928, and his last visit on November 16, 1928, and that the deceased had been ill when the physician was first called "about three or four weeks," and that death occurred on December 23, 1928.

The pertinent allegations of the quite lengthy complaint, as to the alleged fraudulent acts of the company and Crawford, its agent, were to this effect: Upon the death of the insured, that fact was communicated to the agent, and, in response thereto, the agent went to the plaintiff's home, having with him "proof of death blanks"; that he falsely and deceitfully represented to the plaintiff that the defendant would gladly pay the "face of the policy"; the agent requested the surrender of the policy, which plaintiff refused, but the plaintiff did surrender the premium receipt book; that the agent informed the plaintiff that he must sign his name to certain blanks; that, if the plaintiff would sign these papers "in blank," the agent "would properly and correctly complete said proof of death blanks," and defendant would pay him within a few days the amount due on the policy; that, relying upon the representations of the agent, the plaintiff trustingly signed his name "to all proofs of death blanks wherever he was told to sign same," and delivered the premium receipt book; that the company and its agents well knew all the material facts concerning the health and personal history of the insured at and before the time of the issuance of the policy, and that they knew the insured "was in sound health and an insurable risk"; for the purpose, and with the intention, of cheating and defrauding the plaintiff out of the money due to him under the terms of the policy, and to place the defendant in the position where it could deny legal liability thereunder, the agent of the company "improperly and incorrectly filled out and completed" the said proofs of death.

The gist of the allegations as to the fraudulent conduct on the part of the agent, as it will be noted, was that he did not, as he promised the plaintiff he would do, fill out properly and correctly the proofs of death.

Perhaps the complaint was properly subject to a motion to have its allegations, as to the manner in which the proofs of death were incorrectly filled out, made more definite and certain. That motion was not made, however, and, accordingly, the plaintiff was permitted, in the trial, much liberality in endeavoring to establish the errors in the proofs of death which he claimed had been made.

In his testimony, the plaintiff, sole witness for himself, said that he was a textile operative, and had very little education and that his son had been engaged in the same class of work. He related that,...