Williams v. Milling-Nelson Motors
| Citation | 40 S.E.2d 633,209 S.C. 407 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | 15889. |
| Parties | WILLIAMS et ux., v. MILLING-NELSON MOTORS, INC. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Fred D. Townsend, of Columbia, for appellants.
Herbert & Dial, of Columbia, for respondent.
The plaintiffs, Samuel J. Williams and Mrs. Samuel J. Williams commenced this action in the Richland County Court by service of summons and complaint in September, 1945, for recovery of damages for the alleged conversion of plaintiffs' automobile by the defendant on or about the 16th day of June 1945. The defendant, by its answer, denied that it had converted the plaintiffs' automobile, and alleged that plaintiffs, through their own acts, brought about the loss if any. The case came on for trial before the Honorable Legare Bates, Judge of the Richland County Court, and a jury March 26, 1946. At the close of the testimony for the defense, motion was made by the defendant for a directed verdict which was granted.
Plaintiffs now appeal to this Court upon exceptions which raise several questions, the first of which is whether or not error was committed in admitting into evidence the following written instrument over the objection of the plaintiff:
Appellants contend that such instrument, not being properly identified, was not admissible as evidence.
The defense presented the above instrument to the plaintiff, Mr S.J. Williams, while under cross examination, for the purpose of identification, and Mr. Williams testified to the effect that he had compared this signature with the known signature of Mrs. Williams, and he was of the opinion that it was not Mrs. Williams' signature, and that the "s" had been left off the surname. No other attempt was made by the defendant at proper identification, other than the testimony of defendant that W.B. Ray presented it to the defendant as his authorization to sell, saying it was from Mrs. Williams his sister-in-law. Upon the attempt by the defendant to introduce said instrument into the record, the plaintiff objected on the grounds that it had not been properly proven. The Court overruled this objection, and admitted the instrument as evidence. This purported authorization, as will be noted, carried no witnesses and none were presented to testify to the genuineness of the signature thereto, or execution thereof.
Wigmore on evidence, Third Edition (1940), Section 2130, states:
"The general principle has been enforced that a writing purporting to be of certain authorship cannot go to the jury as possibly genuine merely on the strength of this purport, there must be some evidence of the genuineness (or execution) of it."
In Vol. 32, C.J.S., Evidence, p. 647, section 733 states the rule to be: "As a general rule, the execution or authenticity of a private writing must be established before it may be admitted in evidence."
In 20 Am.Jur.,...
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