Williams v. Monroe

• Decision Date: 10 December 1857
• Citation: 57 Ky. 514
• Parties: Williams <I>vs.</I> Monroe.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

57 Ky. 514

Williamsvs.

Monroe.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 10, 1857.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

Tho. A. Marshall and Fry & Speed, for appellant —

S. S. Bush, for appellee —

Judge SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the Jefferson circuit court by Monroe against Williams for a fee of two hundred and fifty dollars, which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable for, on the ground that he had treated his wife with so much cruelty as to render it necessary for her to procure a divorce, which she had done, and that the plaintiff had, at her instance, acted as her attorney at law in the action which she had brought in the Louisville chancery court for that purpose. He also alledged that the labor and services rendered by him in that action, as an attorney at law, were reasonably worth the fee claimed by him.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the court below for the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, and the question that arises on this appeal is, can the husband, according to common law principles, be made responsible for the fees of counsel employed by the wife, in an action brought and prosecuted by her for a divorce?

The doctrine is well settled that when the conduct of the husband towards his wife makes it necessary that she should apply to the law for securing either protection or support, the husband will be chargeable for the expenses thus rendered necessary by his own misconduct. Such is the case where the wife finds it necessary for her safety, to exhibit articles of peace against her husband, and also where she is compelled to seek a separate maintenance in the form of alimony. This doctrine was recognized in the case of Billings vs. Pilcher and Hauser, 7 B. Mon. 458. But in the cases mentioned, the marital relation still subsists between the parties, and the husband's liability arises out of the obligation which the law imposes upon him to support and protect his wife.

He is not, however, according to common law principles, liable to the legal adviser whom his wife may employ in prosecuting a suit for a divorce. The reason is that it is never necessary for her safety as wife to obtain a divorce from him, and when divorced absolutely, he is no longer under a duty to provide for her support and protection. (Wing vs. Harlburt, 15 Vern. 607; Dorsey vs. Goodman, Wright, 120; Shelton vs. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417; Bishop on marriage and divorce, sec. 571.)

There is thus...