Williams v. Morristown Memorial Hospital

• Citation: 59 N.J.Super. 384,157 A.2d 840
• Decision Date: 05 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. A--333,A--333
• Parties: Ralph S. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 384

59 N.J.Super. 384

157 A.2d 840

Ralph S. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a corporation of the State of

New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--333.

Superior Court of New Jersey

Appellate Division.

Argued Jan. 11, 1960.

Decided Feb. 5, 1960.

John B. Applegate, Hoboken, for appellant (Besson & Applegate, Hoboken, attorneys).

Clifford W. Starrett, Morristown, for respondent (Schenck, Smith & King, Morristown, attorneys).

Before Judges GOLDMANN, FREUND and HANEMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HANEMAN, J.A.D.

Plaintiff Ralph S. Williams appeals from a judgment of the Morris County District Court granting the motion of defendant Morristown Memorial Hospital for an involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the entire case and from the denial of his motion for a new trial.

On the evening of October 22, 1956, between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., plaintiff drove his wife to the defendant hospital in response to a telephone call informing him that their daughter had just undergone a dangerous delivery. It was raining hard as he drove along the private approach driveway leading from the public street to the main front entrance of the hospital. He proceeded around a traffic island in said driveway and discharged his wife at the front entrance. Thereupon, he continued around the island and re-traversed a portion of the driveway initially travelled on his approach to the main entrance, in order to find a place to park. He parked his car close to the curb on his right, facing the main entrance, and to the rear of two parked cars. It is undisputed that defendant permitted such parking at this location. When plaintiff got out of his car from the driver's side onto the roadway, he discovered that the heavy rainfall had caused a flow of water, some of which ran over the top of his shoes. Although there was a metal lamp post near the point where he parked, plaintiff testified that it was dark. However, he did observe a cement walkway at his right about 6--7 feet distant, leading to the front entrance. The sidewalk was separated from the roadway at this point by an irregular strip of grass, 15 feet wide at the widest point. Plaintiff could have walked in the driveway for some feet--either in the direction of the front entrance or in the opposite direction--and have gained access to the sidewalk without crossing the grass strip. He could have as well continued walking the length of the driveway to the front entrance without using the sidewalk. Any one of these three modes of approach to the hospital would have exposed him, however, to the dangers of contact with approaching vehicles. He took the most direct route to the sidewalk by walking in front of his car and crossing the grass plot. When he reached the point where the grass and sidewalk met he tripped over a low wire fence about 18 inches high and fell heavily to his knees. Plaintiff testified that he did not see the fence and that no warning of any kind had been provided by the hospital.

Defendant's maintenance supervisor testified that the fence in question had been erected in order to prevent people from crossing the grass plot. He further testified that the fencing had previously extended around the entire grass plot, but had been so frequently trampled down that the part along the curbside had been removed.

It was not disputed that plaintiff's presence on the hospital grounds generally was in the capacity of an invitee.

At the end of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal. The court reversed decision and directed defendant to put in its case. At the end of the entire case the trial judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had exceeded the scope of his invitation in crossing the grass plot and that he was, as a matter of law, a trespasser to whom defendant owed no duty except to refrain from willful injury.

I

Plaintiff contends that the question of whether he exceeded the scope of his invitation on defendant's premises should have been submitted to the jury and not determined by the court.

Our Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed the rule that the duty owed by an occupier of land to third persons coming thereon is determined according to the status of such third person, i.e., invitee, licensee or trespasser.

'Indeed, the ascertainment of that status is an essential preliminary to the application of the particular standard of care to be exercised by the land occupier.'

Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 311, 153 A.2d 1, 5 (1959). The distinction between invitees, licensees and trespassers, has been stated many times: invitees come onto the premises by invitation, either express or implied; licensees are not invited, but their presence is suffered; trespassers are neither invited nor suffered. Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 584, 45 A.2d 491 (Sup.Ct.1946); Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., supra. An owner or occupier of lands owes a greater duty to invitees than to licensees coming upon his premises. He must exercise ordinary care to render the premises reasonably safe for the purposes embraced in the invitation to an invitee, Murphy v. Core Joint Concrete Pipe Co., 110 N.J.L. 83, 164 A. 262 (E. & A. 1933). As for a licensee, only if the occupier knows of some artificial or natural condition on the premises and, in the exercise of reasonable foresight, should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to a licensee which he could reasonably anticipate that the licensee would not observe and avoid, is he under a duty to take reasonable care to make the condition safe or to give a warning of its presence and of the extent of the risk involved. Mistretta v. Alessi, 45 N.J.Super. 176, 131 A.2d 891 (App.Div.1957); Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 152 A.2d 20 (1959); 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, § 27.9, p. 1472 (1956).

There is no doubt that the special obligation owed by an occupier of land to invitees is limited to that part of the premises covered by his invitation, express or implied. Gudnestad v. Seaboard Coal Dock Co., 15 N.J. 210, 104 A.2d 313 (1954).

'This 'area of invitation' will of course vary with the circumstances of the case. * * * (I)t extends to all parts of the premises to which The purpose may reasonably be expected to take him, and to those which are so arranged as to lead him reasonably to think that they are open to him.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Prosser on Torts, § 78, p. 458 (1955). There is much persuasive authority to the effect that an invitation extends to such parts of premises as the land owner ought in reason to understand that his invitees would understand were for their use or, in other words, to those parts to which the invitee reasonably may be expected to go in view of the invitation given to him. Nary v. Dover Parking Authority, 58 N.J.Super. 222, 156 A.2d 42 (App.Div.1959); Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., supra, 30 N.J. at page 314, 153 A.2d at page 6; Roy v. Amoskeag Fabrics, Inc., 93 N.H. 324, 41 A.2d 607 (N.H.Sup.Ct.1945); 38 Am.Jur.Negligence, § 100; 65 C.J.S.Negligence § 48, 1950).

'Whether or not the invitee stayed within the confines of the invitation is usually an Issue for the jury. Even where the deviation was quite marked and an employee of a contractor on the property went upon land immediately adjacent under an alleged implied invitation, his right to do so was at least determinable by the jury. * * *

'Under the circumstances here, where the plaintiff admittedly was invited upon defendant's premises and it is alleged he exceeded his invitation, The question whether...