Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co.
| Decision Date | 05 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-483,94-483 |
| Citation | 888 S.W.2d 303,318 Ark. 792 |
| Parties | , 26 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1116, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,112 Kathy WILLIAMS, d/b/a the Corner Fast Food Restaurant, Appellant, v. MOZARK FIRE EXTINGUISHER COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jon P. Robinson, Brian D. Wood, Springdale, for appellant.
Curtis L. Nebben, Fayetteville, for appellee.
In December 1987, Kathy Williams employed the Mozark Fire Extinguisher Company to install a fire extinguishing system in her restaurant. The system was designed to automatically activate in case of a fire in the area under a cooking hood. Upon activation the system was to blanket the area with sodium bicarbonate so that a fire would be smothered. The system was also designed to accommodate an electrical power shut-off device for cooking appliances. However, Mozark offered testimony that it was not involved with the installation of the electrical shut-off system, but instead that work was to be done by an independent electrician. There was no showing by Williams that any electrician hired to connect the system had any association with Mozark.
On May 13, 1988, five months after the system was installed, a repairman employed by Williams apparently removed the high temperature limit thermostat from one of the deep fat fryers. A cook later filled the fryer with cooking oil and plugged it into an electrical outlet. The cook noticed that it was smoking more than normal, unplugged it, and called the restaurant manager. The manager came to the restaurant, again plugged it in, and left the restaurant to find the repairman. The oil in the fryer caught fire. A waitress and a customer testified that the fire extinguishing system activated. The waitress testified that the chemical controlled the fire momentarily, but, after it stopped spraying, the fire reignited.
Mozark offered testimony to show that after the system releases the sodium bicarbonate over the appliance area, the fire is smothered because of lack of oxygen, but, if an appliance is overheated by electricity and the electricity remains on and continues to overheat the appliance, the oxygen seal will be lost and the hot appliance will reignite the fire. There was additional testimony that the power shut-off system did not activate.
Williams sued Mozark in tort for negligent design and installation of the system. Mozark answered that Williams was guilty of contributory negligence. On July 16, 1993, Williams amended her complaint to allege breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This breach of contract amendment was made more than five years after the fire, and there was no allegation that Williams had given Mozark prior notice of the alleged breach. After Williams presented her case-in-chief, the trial court directed a verdict for Mozark on the contract count because there was no proof of notice as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court submitted the tort count to the jury, and it found Williams to be one hundred percent at fault and Mozark to be without fault. Williams appeals both counts. We affirm.
Mozark had the burden of proving Williams's contributory negligence. Young v. Johnson, 311 Ark. 551, 845 S.W.2d 510 (1993). Williams argues that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in her favor on Mozark's affirmative defense of contributory negligence. It is well settled that:
The test for the trial court in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict by either party is to take that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the non-moving party and give it its highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences deducible from it; after viewing the evidence in this manner, the trial court should: (1) grant the motion only if the evidence is so insubstantial as to require that a jury verdict for the non-moving party be set aside, or (2) deny the motion if there is substantial evidence to support a jury verdict for the non-moving party. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henley, 275 Ark. 122, 628 S.W.2d 301 (1982). Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will compel a conclusion one way or another. It must force or induce the mind to pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture. Id.
Young, 311 Ark. at 556, 845 S.W.2d at 513 (quoting Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 671 S.W.2d 178 (1984)).
Here, there was substantial evidence to support a finding of negligence on the part of Williams. There was evidence that Williams's employees knew the fryer was not working properly, yet again plugged it in and left it to catch fire. There was evidence that Williams failed to hire an electrician to properly connect the automatic power shut-off system and that, in turn, the failure of the shut-off system was the cause of the fire reigniting. Even so, Williams argues that the foregoing is irrelevant because the proximate cause of her loss was that the system failed to extinguish the fire, regardless of how negligent she might have been in causing the fire. The argument is without merit.
While it is accurate to state that a plaintiff's own negligence is not always a proximate cause of his damages, see Kubik v. Igleheart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983), such is not the case now before us. Here, Williams's negligence was a contributing proximate cause of her own damages. Proximate cause is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Id. The fire and resulting damages would not have occurred without the negligence of Williams and her employees. Our comparative statute provides: "The word 'fault' as used in this section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party." Ark.Code Ann. § 16-64-122(c) (Supp.1993). Thus, Williams's conduct is to be viewed as to whether it was a proximate cause of her damages.
Williams correctly states that under the comparative fault statut...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cohen v. Subaru of Am., Inc.
...of notice must be alleged in the complaint in order to state a cause of action.'” (quoting Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 888 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Ark. 1994))); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ill. 1996) (“[I]n general, buyers such as the instant plaintiffs must dir......
-
In re Smitty's/Cam2 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.
... ... into one for summary judgment.” Williams v ... Employers Mutual Casualty Co. , 845 F.3d 891, 903-04 (8th ... law”); Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher ... Co. , 318 Ark. 792, 797 (1994) (“We have ... ...
-
In re Smitty's/Cam2 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.
... ... into one for summary judgment.” Williams v ... Employers Mutual Casualty Co. , 845 F.3d 891, 903-04 (8th ... law”); Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher ... Co. , 318 Ark. 792, 797 (1994) (“We have ... ...
-
Gregorio v. Ford Motor Co.
...pre-suit notice to the seller is required, and the filing of a complaint is not sufficient. See Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co. , 318 Ark. 792, 888 S.W.2d 303, 305–06 (1994). But "[t]he content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transactio......