Williams v. Municipality of Anchorage

• Decision Date: 11 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 4721,4721
• Citation: 633 P.2d 248
• Parties: Leslie Jerry WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 248

633 P.2d 248

Leslie Jerry WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.

No. 4721.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Sept. 11, 1981.

Francis S. Floyd, Bradbury, Bliss & Riordan, Inc., Anchorage, for appellant.

Robert B. Mason, Pletcher & Slaybaugh, Anchorage, for appellee.

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, and BURKE, JJ.

OPINION

BURKE, Justice.

This appeal involves a challenge to the superior court's application of Alaska Civil Rule 56, in an action for damages for personal injuries. Appellant Leslie Williams contends that there were genuine issues of material fact barring entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee, the Municipality of Anchorage. We reverse.

Williams, plaintiff in the court below, was employed as first mate aboard the ocean tug M/V Kirt Chouest. On October 12, 1975, the M/V Kirt Chouest docked at the Port of Anchorage, a facility owned and operated by the Municipality of Anchorage. During the late evening hours of October 12, the tug's one-piece, twenty-five foot ladder was either lost or stolen. The ladder was necessary for access to the top of the dock alongside which the vessel was moored.

After discovering the disappearance of the ladder, Williams or another crew member requested and received the use of another ladder from a port employee, one Glenn Vestal. Vestal later stated, "(I) thought it would be better and safer to lend them a ladder than have them try to jump onto the tug and risk killing themselves." ¹

The ladder was used without incident until the following day, October 13. That evening, however, the ladder collapsed as Williams was climbing from the vessel to the top of the dock. Williams fell to the deck below and was seriously injured.

Williams sued the Municipality of Anchorage and others, on theories including strict liability and negligence. Asserting that it owed the plaintiff no duty of care and that no genuine issue of material fact was presented, the municipality moved for summary judgment pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 56. The motion was granted, without opinion, on November 14, 1978.

A party is entitled to summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that (the) party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper in a particular case, the trial court's function is limited to determining whether or not a genuine issue of material fact exists. Wilson v. Pollet, 416 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska 1966). Where the record presents such an issue of fact, the question must be resolved at trial. "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment all reasonable inferences from the proofs offered are drawn against movant and viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. at 383-84. See also Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 526 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Alaska 1974); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 290 n.24 (Alaska 1961). Thus, the party seeking summary judgment "has the entire burden of proving that his opponent's case has no merit." Nizinski v. Golden Valley Electric Ass'n, Inc., 509 P.2d 280, 283 (Alaska 1973), quoting Braund, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50, 54 n.5 (Alaska 1971).

Williams first argues that the municipality is strictly liable for his injuries, since it voluntarily undertook to perform a duty owed him by the vessel's owners. ² The owners, North American Towing Company and Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc., had a strict duty to provide Williams and the other crewmembers with a seaworthy means of ingress and egress. Sanford v. Caswell, 200 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940, 73 S.Ct. 831, 97 L.Ed. 1366 (1953); Sullivan v. Lyon Steamship Ltd., 63 Wash.2d 316, 387 P.2d 76 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 932, 84 S.Ct. 1335, 12 L.Ed.2d 296 (1964). According to Williams,

Since the municipality voluntarily undertook to perform the duty owed by the vessel owner(s) to Williams, the municipality assumed an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy means of ingress and egress to Williams and other members of the crew. The municipality, by assuming the duty, must be held to the same standard of care as the one(s) from whom the duty is assumed, i. e. (,) the vessel's owner(s).

Appellant's Brief at 12 (citation omitted).

In Shannon v. City of Anchorage, 478 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1970), we held that the then City of Anchorage, now the Municipality of Anchorage, could not be held strictly liable on this theory, stating: "(T)he doctrine of unseaworthiness has no applicability." 478 P.2d at 819 n.20. Williams attempts to distinguish Shannon on the ground that the city there failed to provide a ladder, allegedly contrary to its past custom and practice, while in the case at bar the municipality furnished a ladder for the crew's use, thereby assuming the duty of the vessel's owners. This distinction, however, fails to persuade us that a different rule should apply in the instant case. "The idea of seaworthiness and the doctrine of implied warranty of seaworthiness arises out of the vessel, and the critical consideration in applying the doctrine is that the person sought to be held legally liable must be in the relationship of an owner or operator of a vessel." Daniels v. Florida Power & Light Co., 317 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 832, 84 S.Ct. 78, 11 L.Ed.2d 63 (1963). ³

Williams next argues that, even if not strictly liable under the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, the municipality is liable for his injuries if it failed to exercise reasonable care.

The municipality is correct in its contention that it had no statutory duty to provide a ladder for the use of the M/V Kirt Chouest. Shannon v. City of Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17, 18 (Alaska 1967). However, having undertaken to provide a ladder, it was under a duty to exercise some degree of care for the safety of those using the same. "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully ...." Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240 (Alaska 1976), quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). The precise nature and extent of that duty, while a question of law, depends upon the nature and extent of the act undertaken, a question of fact. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 321-324 A, (1965).

In the case at bar there was evidence indicating that the loan of the ladder involved more than the mere supplying of a chattel. In a recorded interview with James Keenan, an insurance investigator, Vestal stated that after loaning the ladder to the tug's crew he "went so far as...