Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health

Decision Date22 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. C2-95-456.,C2-95-456.
Citation960 F.Supp. 1276
PartiesJanice E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Barbara Kozar Letcher, Issac Brant Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, for Plaintiff.

James John Schubert, Donald Michael Collins, Pamela J. Gordon, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Employment Law Section, Columbus, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SARGUS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendants now challenge the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain a suit brought by an individual against a state under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. Relying on the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ____, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the defendant asserts that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution deprives this Court of the jurisdiction otherwise granted under Article III.1

I.

The defendants primary contention is that the Seminole Tribe of Florida decision prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction over a case in which a citizen has filed suit against a state, or its subdivision, such as the Ohio Department of Mental Health, without the state's consent, unless Congress has unequivocally abrogated the sovereign's immunity through a valid exercise of constitutional powers. In Seminole Tribe of Florida, a divided Supreme Court held inter alia that Congress could not, pursuant to its interstate commerce power, abrogate the sovereign immunity of a state and authorize suits in federal courts brought by citizens against a state.

At the same time, all members of the Supreme Court recognized that Congress has clear constitutional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity and to authorize suits against a state in the federal courts.2 The primary issue before the Court is whether the Americans with Disabilities Act represents an exercise of Congress' authority pursuant to its interstate commerce powers or to its Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment authority.

If the Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' interstate commerce powers, the majority holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida precludes this Court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in this case, since plaintiff seeks only damages and injunctive relief against her employer.3 Conversely, if the ADA was properly enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress expressly intended to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and the defendant's motion must be denied.4

II.

Resolution of the issue before the Court involves consideration of several important constitutional provisions. Under Article I, Section 8, "The Congress shall have power ... To regulate commerce ... among the several states...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The same section provides that Congress may, "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers ..." Id. at cl. 18. Further, Article VI of the Constitution states in part, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI.

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution initially set forth the jurisdiction of the federal courts which permitted federal courts to hear controversies, including inter alia, cases "between a state and citizens of another state." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This provision of the Constitution made no reference to the necessity of consent by a state to be sued in Federal Courts.

Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution and the original Bill of Rights contained in the first Ten Amendments, the Eleventh Amendment was enacted which states:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by the citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. While the language of the Amendment refers only to a suit brought by a citizen of one state against another state, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), the Supreme Court held that the amendment also precluded a citizen from bringing a suit against his or her own state in federal court.

After the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution further altered the federal-state relationship. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part:

... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Section 5 of the same amendment provides, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.

As explained in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon:

There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a state waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action ... Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 [96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614] (1976). As a result, when enacting pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the State's consent.

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 171, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 926, 106 S.Ct. 18, 87 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985).

At the same time, the Supreme Court has noted that the Eleventh Amendment implicates a fundamental constitutional balance between the national power granted to the federal government and the authority remaining with the individual states. For this reason, the Supreme Court has held that before it will conclude that Congress intended to abrogate the immunity of a state from suit in federal court, the statute in question must include "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Thus, before turning to the question of whether Congress has the authority to promulgate the ADA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be demonstrated that Congress clearly intended to abrogate the State of Ohio's sovereign immunity.

As to this portion of the analysis, Congress has made an unequivocal statement. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 states:

A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.

Therefore, the sole issue before the Court is whether the Americans with Disability Act was passed pursuant to congressional authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause or pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress itself included within the ADA a statement with respect to this issue.

It is the purpose of this chapter—

(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and

(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority. including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day to day by people with disabilities. [emphasis added.]

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).

With respect to 41 U.S.C. 12101(b)(4), it is clear that Congress intended to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the application of the ADA as to the states and to invoke its interstate commerce powers to make the same act applicable to private enterprise.

In Seminole Tribe of Florida, the Supreme Court reviewed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702, et. seq. The Act provided for a complex regulatory scheme authorizing and limiting certain types of gaming on Indian lands. At the same time, the statute provided for a procedure by which disputes between tribes wishing to authorize gaming and states opposing the same could be resolved. Specifically, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) provided that the U.S. District Courts could heard cases brought by Indian tribes against various states. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, contained in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court concluded that Congress may not use its powers under Article I, which include both the Indian Commerce Clause as well as the Interstate Commerce Clause, to authorize by statute, actions in ...

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