Williams v. P.I. Props. No. 42

• Decision Date: 31 October 2022
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-05023-ODW (JPRx)
• Parties: LATANYA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. P.I. PROPERTIES NO. 42, L.P., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

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LATANYA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. P.I. PROPERTIES NO. 42, L.P., Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-05023-ODW (JPRx)

United States District Court, C.D. California

October 31, 2022

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [23]; ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: MONETARY SANCTIONS

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Latanya Williams moves for default judgment against Defendant P.I. Properties No. 42, L.P. for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) at a liquor store located at 16024 Amar Road in City of Industry California. (Mot. Default J. (“Mot.”), ECF No 23-1.) The Court hereby takes the matter under submission and VACATES the hearing on the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Williams's Motion and ORDERS Williams's counsel TO SHOW CAUSE regarding monetary sanctions in light of counsel's repeated reliance on outdated law.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Williams uses a wheelchair due to medical conditions that significantly impair her mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) In May 2022, Williams visited the subject liquor store. (Id. ¶ 10.) P.I. Properties is “the real property owner[], business operator[], lessor[] and/or lessee[]” of the property where the liquor store is located. (Id. ¶ 2.) Williams alleges that P.I. Properties failed to provide a disabled parking space that complies with the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26.)

Williams initiated this action against P.I. Properties asserting five causes of action: (1) violation of the ADA, (2) violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, (3) violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, (4) violation of California Health & Safety Code § 19955, and (5) negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 18-49.) The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims (claims two through five) and dismissed those claims without prejudice, leaving only the ADA claim at issue. (Order Declining Suppl. Jurisdiction, ECF No. 15.) Upon Williams's request, the Clerk entered default against P.I. Properties. (Default by Clerk, ECF No. 22.)

Williams now moves for default judgment against P.I. Properties. (See Mot.) She seeks an injunction under the ADA directing Defendants to remedy the ADA violations she alleges exist at the disabled parking space. (Id. at 5.) She also seeks attorneys' fees and costs in the total amount of $2,667.00. (Id. at 6.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) authorizes a district court to grant a default judgment after the Clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). Before a court can enter a default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 54(c) and 55, as well as Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2. Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant submit a declaration establishing: (1) when and against which party default was entered; (2) identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or active service member; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 521, does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was properly served with notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1.

If these procedural requirements are satisfied, a district court has discretion to enter default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “A defendant's default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal 2002). In exercising discretion, a court must consider several factors (the “Eitel factors”):

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, after the Clerk enters default, the defendant's liability is conclusively established, and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, except those pertaining to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant's failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

Williams's Motion is deficient in at least three ways. First, Williams fails to show, either with evidence filed in support of her Motion or with well-pleaded factual allegations, that she personally encountered access barriers and as a result was denied accommodation. Second, she makes no attempt to plead or show that removal of any alleged access barriers is readily achievable. Third, she fails to show that P.I. Properties is responsible for the alleged ADA violations.

As a result of these deficiencies, Williams fails to satisfy the second and third Eitel factors, which “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175). In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, “facts which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). To weigh these two factors, the Court evaluates the merits of Williams's ADA cause of action. The Court may properly consider the evidence Williams submitted with her Motion as part of this analysis, as long as the allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to place P.I. Properties on notice of the violation being demonstrated. See, e.g., McComb v. Vejar, No. 2:14-cv-00941-RSWL-E, 2014 WL 5494017, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (examining plaintiff's evidence on default judgment to determine if removal of barrier was readily achievable).

To begin with, Williams's Motion suffers from an overall lack of specificity regarding the true nature of the ADA violations on the property. In the Complaint, Williams alleges three particular ADA violations. First, she alleges that there was no parking space identification sign bearing the International Symbol of Accessibility. (Compl. ¶¶ 13a, 24.) Second, she alleges that there was no sign indicating “Minimum Fine $250” or “Van Accessible.” (Id. ¶¶ 13b, 24.) Third, she alleges that there were no access aisles with blue hatched lines and “NO PARKING” markings. (Id. ¶¶ 13c, 2526.) Williams provides no further evidence of these violations with her Motion for Default Judgment and instead refers only generally to the parking space violations without providing any further detail. (See generally Mem. ISO Mot., ECF No. 23-1.) Indeed, it remains unclear whether Williams contends that P.I. Properties provides no disabled parking space at all or that P.I. Properties provides a disabled parking space that is merely missing certain signage and markings. (See generally Decl. Latanya Williams ISO Mot. (“Williams Decl.”), ECF No. 23-3 (failing to describe “barriers and conditions in the parking space” with any detail)).

This key ambiguity underpins each of the Motion's three deficiencies, discussed below. The Court denies the Motion based on these deficiencies without addressing whether Williams meets the procedural requirements for obtaining default judgment.

A. Williams fails to allege or show she was denied accommodation.

“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation ....'” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 12182(a)). As relevant here, discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). To succeed on her ADA claim, Williams must establish that (1) she is “disabled within the meaning of the ADA,” (2) P.I. Properties “own[s], lease[s], or operate[s] a place of public accommodation,” (3) P.I. Properties denied Williams public accommodation because of her disability, (4) “the existing facility presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA,” and (5) “the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Rivera v. Crema Coffee Co. LLC, 438 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1074 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020) (first citing Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007); and then citing Ridola v. Chao, No. 16-cv-02246-BLF, 2018 WL 2287668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2018)).

Williams's Motion fails on the third element. Williams neither alleges nor substantiates with any meaningful degree of specificity that the alleged ADA parking space violations imposed any barrier to her full use and enjoyment of the liquor store or otherwise caused a denial of accommodation. Williams declares in the most general and conclusory of terms that when she got to the liquor store, she “discovered barriers and conditions in the parking space that denied full and equal access by persons like [...