Rivera v. Crema Coffee Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 18-cv-01531-VKD
• Citation: 438 F.Supp.3d 1068
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Armando RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. CREMA COFFEE COMPANY LLC, et al., Defendants.

438 F.Supp.3d 1068

Armando RIVERA, Plaintiff,

v.CREMA COFFEE COMPANY LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01531-VKD

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division.

Signed February 7, 2020

Zachary Manning Best, Tanya Eugene Moore, Moore Law Firm, P.C., San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff.

Steven Todd Knuppel, Law Offices of Steven T. Knuppel, Danville, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 48

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Armando Rivera sues for alleged violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ; the California Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 - 53 ; and Part 5.5 of the California Health and Safety Code, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 19955 et seq. Dkt. No. 41. He claims that, due to architectural barriers at the Crema Coffee Roasting Company ("the Coffeehouse") in San Jose, California, he was denied full and equal access to the facilities during his visit there on January 9, 2018.

Mr. Rivera now moves for summary judgment on the ADA and Unruh Act claims only. Dkt. No. 48. Defendants Crema Coffee Company LLC d/b/a Crema Coffee Roasting Company ("Crema Coffee") and Ali Farhang oppose.¹ Dkt. No. 49. The Court heard oral argument on Mr. Rivera's motion on January 28, 2020. Dkt. No. 51. Having considered the parties' submissions and arguments made at the hearing, the Court grants in part and denies in part Mr. Rivera's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed.

Mr. Rivera is a T-5 paraplegic who is unable to walk and must use a wheelchair for mobility. Dkt. No. 48-3 ¶ 2. The California Department of Motor Vehicles has issued him a permanent disabled person placard. Id. ¶ 3.

At the time of Mr. Rivera's visit to the Coffeehouse on January 9, 2018, Crema Coffee owned and operated the Coffeehouse premises, which it leased from Mr. Farhang. Dkt. No. 49-7. Crema Coffee's lease includes the building in which it is housed, the patio in front of the building, and the parking spots immediately adjacent to and behind the building. Id. at 2. The lease excludes a second building located on the site and all parking spots adjacent to the second building. Id. at 2–3.

Mr. Rivera visited the Coffeehouse on January 9, 2018. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 10. He was unable to enter the Coffeehouse because the only path of travel into the Coffeehouse includes two sets of stairs, which he could not navigate in a wheelchair. Id. The first set of stairs leads from the sidewalk to the Coffeehouse patio, and the second set leads from the patio to the Coffeehouse entrance. Dkt. No. 48 at 2; Dkt. No. 48-5 ¶¶ 9, 10, Exs. B, C. He filed this action on March 9, 2018. Dkt. No. 1.

On August 14, 2018, Mr. Rivera's access expert, Michael Bluhm, inspected the Coffeehouse's facilities. Dkt. No. 48-5 ¶ 8. At that time, Mr. Bluhm noted that a blue sign had been posted at the junction of the sidewalk and the first set of stairs leading to the patio. Id. ¶ 11. The blue sign contained the International Symbol of Access ("ISA") of a person in a wheelchair and the following text at the bottom: "We are pleased to provide assistance[.] If you need help please ask." Id. The sign displayed no information advising customers about how to communicate their need for assistance with Coffeehouse personnel. Id. Mr. Bluhm also observed a parking spot behind and adjacent to the Coffeehouse, which contained a "marginally" blue painted access aisle and stall line. Id. ¶ 17, Ex. F. Mr. Bluhm observed no signage concerning the status of that parking spot. Id.

Following Mr. Bluhm's first inspection, Mr. Rivera filed a first amended complaint with a lengthy list of barriers to access. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 11. The parties agree that all of the barriers identified have since been remediated or otherwise addressed, leaving two issues in dispute: (1) the inaccessibility of the path of travel into the Coffeehouse and whether an alternative method of access exists, and (2) the lack of van-accessible parking. Dkt. No. 48 at 4–5; Dkt. No. 49 at 1–2; Dkt. No. 50 at 1.

On October 29, 2018, Mr. Bluhm inspected the Coffeehouse's facilities a second time for the purpose of ascertaining whether any previously identified violations had been addressed. Dkt. No. 48-5 ¶ 8. With respect to the path of travel, Mr. Bluhm observed that a white sticker with black text had been added to the top corner of the ISA sign at the junction of the sidewalk and the first set of stairs leading to the patio. Id. ¶ 12, Ex. D. The sticker was located in the top left corner of the sign and contained a phone number. Id. With respect to parking, Mr. Bluhm observed that some of the blue parking stall paint markings had been painted over, and white stall line markings had been added. Id. ¶ 18, Ex. G. The parking area now also had a sign that stated, "No Parking." Id.

On October 8, 2019, Mr. Rivera deposed Duc Lam, Crema Coffee's corporate designee.² Dkt. No. 48-1, Ex. D. Mr. Lam testified that Crema Coffee accommodated persons in wheelchairs by either (1) having employees physically carry the wheelchair and its occupant up and into the Coffeehouse, or (2) offering curbside service to customers who cannot navigate the stairs into the Coffeehouse. Dkt. No. 48-1, Ex. D at 82:2-14, 100:25–101:2, 102:3-20.

On December 24, 2019, Mr. Rivera filed the motion for summary judgment now before the Court. Dkt. No. 48.

At the January 28, 2020 hearing on Mr. Rivera's motion, the parties informed the Court that, shortly before the hearing, Crema Coffee had permanently closed the Coffeehouse with no plan to reopen at that location. Dkt. No. 51. Defense counsel also represented that the owner, Mr. Farhang, intended to lease the property to other tenants, but it was unclear to whom or for what purpose. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In order to meet its burden, "the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. , 210 F.3d at 1102. The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id. A genuine issue of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is "material" only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

A. ADA Claim

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). For purposes of Title III, discrimination includes "a failure to remove architectural barriers ... in existing facilities ... where such removal is readily achievable." Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). "Readily achievable" means "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." Id. § 12181(9).

Defendants contend that Mr. Rivera's ADA claim is now moot because the Coffeehouse has permanently ceased operations, and they urge the Court to deny summary judgment as to that claim. Before the Court may consider the substance of Mr. Rivera's ADA claim, it must first resolve the threshold issue of mootness and whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g. , Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ("Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case."); Price v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin. , 894 F.2d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Before we may reach the merits, we must first consider whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] claims.").

A claim may become moot if (1) subsequent events have made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab. , 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n , 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) ; Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections , 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985) ). In Kohler v. Southland Foods, Inc. , the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants because the plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief under the ADA became...