Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 17 September 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-CV-0629.
• Citation: 834 F. Supp. 794
• Parties: Ronald K.M. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Elton Jolly, Roxanne D. Galeota, and Anthony Hughes, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

834 F. Supp. 794

Ronald K.M. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Elton Jolly, Roxanne D. Galeota, and Anthony Hughes, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 93-CV-0629.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

September 17, 1993.

Frederick C. Timm, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Sara M. Staman, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

On August 30, 1992, Defendant Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) discharged Plaintiff Ronald K.M. Williams, Esquire (Williams) citing the misfeasance and nonfeasance of duties as Assistant Counsel to PHA. Williams brought this suit against PHA alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law.

Williams alleged in counts I and II of his complaint that PHA terminated his employment without a proper hearing thus depriving him of both property and liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Count III included an additional state claim for breach of contract.¹

We now face cross-motions for summary judgment. PHA moved for summary judgment asserting that 1) as an at-will employee, Williams had no expectation of continued employment with PHA and, therefore, no property interest; 2) PHA offered Williams the opportunity to challenge his discharge and was not, therefore, deprived of due process in connection with a liberty interest; and 3) as an at-will employee, Williams had no contract.

Williams incorporated his response to PHA's motion with his own cross-motion for partial summary judgment. First, he argued that he detrimentally relied upon a written agreement with PHA which allegedly guaranteed continued employment upon his return from medical leave and that such reliance is sufficient to create a property interest under the equitable estoppel doctrine. Second, he asserted that PHA violated his liberty interests because stigmatizing information concerning his employment with PHA was published without the opportunity for a formal hearing. Lastly, although he incorporated the same equitable estoppel argument to support his state breach of contract claim in response to PHA's motion, he did not include this claim in his cross-motion for summary judgment.

II. Facts

PHA hired Williams on May 10, 1991, as an at-will employee to serve as an Assistant Counsel. At the time, he was a four-year member of the bar of Pennsylvania and of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendant Roxanne Galeota was his immediate supervisor and General Counsel, defendant Elton Jolly was the Executive Director, and defendant Anthony Hughes was the Director of Human Resources.

On August 31, 1992, PHA discharged Williams following a well documented series of unauthorized absences and misconduct. In November 1991, Ms. Galeota reprimanded Williams in writing for taking a vacation day without prior approval. Despite the warning, Williams continued to take unauthorized absences which also began to affect his performance.

On May 12, 1992, without having given notice to Ms. Galeota or the court of his planned absence, Williams failed to appear for a scheduled settlement conference before the Honorable William H. Yohn Jr. of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. PHA subsequently suspended Williams from his duties without pay. Also in May, Williams received a separate suspension for other repeated and unauthorized absences. Finally on July 9, 1992, following a failure to attend a scheduled arbitration meeting, Ms. Galeota placed Williams on 90 day probation.

Despite the probation, William's misconduct continued. On July 16, Williams submitted a memorandum stating that he would be absent the next day. However, he neglected to coordinate the appropriate measures necessary to cover a scheduled court appearance before the Honorable Robert F. Kelly of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The next day, Judge Kelly notified PHA of Williams' failure to show in court forcing Ms. Galeota to represent PHA via telephone in Williams' stead.

As a result of this series of misconduct, Ms. Galeota notified Williams that she planned to recommend his termination and offered him an opportunity to resign. Williams, however, declined to resign and, Ms. Galeota terminated his employment effective July 30.

Williams subsequently requested and obtained a personal interview with Mr. Jolly, PHA's Special Master who has the final authority over all dismissals. Williams explained that his poor performance came as a result of the stress that he suffered arising from personal domestic disputes and related litigation. He argued that if not for the domestic problems, his performance would be satisfactory.

With Mr. Jolly's approval, Williams received a 30 day medical leave of absence. A letter from Ms. Galeota, conditioned the approval of the leave on several stipulations. First, Williams was to submit a medical certificate supporting his medical leave. Second, he was to use the leave to resolve all personal difficulties preventing him from satisfactory performance. Third, PHA was obligated only to return Williams to a job at the same grade and pay level as he previously held. Lastly, in the event of further infractions of a similar nature Williams would be subject to immediate termination without the opportunity for appeal to Mr. Jolly.

During Williams' leave, Ms. Galeota distributed the vacant workload to the other attorneys. As the new attorneys reviewed the material, they discovered evidence that Williams allegedly submitted inaccurate case reports to Ms. Galeota. In these reports, he failed to disclose his failure to respond to discovery requests in several cases. All of the failures to respond resulted in the courts levying substantial monetary sanctions against PHA.

Based on this new evidence, PHA terminated Williams' employment effective August 30, 1992. In a meeting with Williams, Ms. Galeota and Mr. Hughes advised him verbally and in writing of the reasons for his termination. They informed Williams that the letter of termination would not be placed in his employment record for two weeks giving him the opportunity to resign his position. They also gave him the opportunity to file a written appeal within ten days of the termination's effective date to Mr. Jolly.

Williams did not file an appeal with Mr. Jolly, but instead on September 7, 1992, demanded in writing to Mr. Hughes a formal discovery and evidentiary hearing. On September 15, Ms. Galeota wrote and again offered him the opportunity to submit a written statement to Mr. Jolly if he wished to challenge the termination.

On September 23, 1992, Williams finally submitted a letter to Mr. Jolly again only demanding formal discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Williams did not challenge his termination by offering facts, evidence or sound reasons to support his position. Mr. Jolly reviewed the letter and affirmed Williams' termination effective August 30, 1992 for the nonfeasance and misfeasance of his duties as counsel to PHA.

III. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When examining a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Hall, 730 F.Supp. 646, 648 (M.D.Pa.1990). The court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of facts but to determine whether there are any factual issues to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If met, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must then go beyond the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and interrogatories to show that there is more than a metaphysical doubt as to material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

In cases where the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, each side essentially contends that no issue of material fact exists from its perspective. Hall, 730 F.Supp. at 648. We must, therefore, consider each motion for summary judgment separately. Id. The standards under which we grant or deny summary judgment do not change because cross-motions are filed. Id. Each party still bears the initial burden of establishing a lack of genuine issues of material fact. Id. Such contradictory claims do not necessarily guarantee that if one party's motion is rejected, the other party's motion must be granted. See id. quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968).

IV. Discussion

For the sake of simplicity and since the parties are arguing opposite sides of the same issues, we will establish each argument separately, the opposition thereto, and then the pertinent law and its application.

A. Alleged deprivation of property interests

PHA moves for summary judgment on the grounds that under Pennsylvania law an at-will employee has no expectation of future employment and, therefore, cannot have a property interest. Since Williams was an at-will employee, PHA argues that his deprivation of property interest claim must fail.

Williams does not dispute his former status as an at-will employee and concedes that Pennsylvania law does not recognize that a public, at-will employee may have a property interest in continued employment. He instead argues that the equitable estoppel doctrine creates an exception to Pennsylvania's stringent at-will employment doctrine. He alleges that since he detrimentally relied on the leave agreement...