Williams v. Porter
| Decision Date | 15 April 1947 |
| Docket Number | 15747. |
| Citation | 42 S.E.2d 475,202 Ga. 113 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. PORTER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An implied resulting trust may be established by proof of part payment of the purchase-money, by the person claiming the benefit of the trust, at or before the time title is conveyed to another.
2. The allegations of the petition did not show such laches as would bar the action.
3. Where in an equitable petition extraordinary relief is sought, an amendment offered prior to or at an interlocutory hearing, though not positively verified, is sufficient if supported by 'other satisfactory proofs.'
4. An amendment, which was a mere amplification of the original allegations in the petition, and which detailed with specific averments the nature of the plaintiffs' claim and title was not subject to the objection that it set forth a new and distinct cause of action.
5. The trial court did not err in overruling the ground of special demurrer dealt with in division 5 of the opinion.
6. The trial court erred in overruling the ground of special demurrer directed at the allegation, 'the church * * * did reimburse him for said advance.'
Charles W. Walker and others, suing 'as Trustees of the Providence Baptist Church,' filed an equitable petition against John W. Williams, seeking damages, the cancellation of a deed, an accounting, and an injunction. General and special demurrers were interposed by the defendant. The petition was amended several times; and, after the allowance of the amendments, the original demurrers were renewed and new demurrers were filed to the amendments and to the petition as amended.
The petition, as finally amended, alleged in substance Providence Baptist Church is the owner of the beneficial interest in described real estate, legal title to which is in the name of the defendant, who, by virtue of the facts alleged, holds title as trustee for the church. Located on the described property is a church and four dwelling houses of stated values. Prior to April 28, 1937, the congregation of the church was desirous of obtaining a different location for a church, and a committee was appointed, composed of the defendant and others named, with authority to select and purchase in the name of the church a new site for a new church. Pursuant to their appointment, the committee undertook to secure a suitable parcel of land; and after they had located the described land, negotiations were entered into with the owner by the defendant, acting for and on behalf of the committee and the church. These negotiations resulted in an offer by the owner to sell the property for $4,300, payable $500 in cash, and the balance in seventy-two monthly installments of $62.27 each, commencing May 8, 1937; and this offer was accepted by the defendant and the committee, acting for and on behalf of the church. The church did not have in its treasury the $500 necessary for the cash payment; and, it not being feasible to request the congregation to raise the balance within the time allowed to accept the offer of sale, the defendant agreed with the committee to furnish the difference required, or $105, from his personal fund, under an agreement whereby the church would reimburse him. The church, without demand on the part of the defendant, did reimburse him during the month of May or June, 1937. At the time of the purchase the defendant was the duly elected and acting 'chairman of the board of trustees, chairman of the board of deacons, chairman of the building committee, chairman of the committee to select and purchase a site for the new church, and the superintendent of the Sunday School of the church.' Because of the position of the defendant in the church, and of the special trust and confidence reposed in him by the congregation, and particularly the trustees, all legal details of the purchase were allowed to be performed by the defendant, for and on behalf of the trustees of the church.
Beginning on May 1, 1937, Wall Realty Company was employed by the defendant to manage and collect the rents from the houses on the property; and from that date until August 22, 1941, the realty company paid to the defendant the net rentals on the property in the aggregate sum of $3,051.35, which funds were used by the defendant to pay the purchase-money notes. From August 22, 1941, until the present time, the defendant has collected all rentals from the dwelling houses, which rentals constitute a credit in favor of the church on an accounting between the parties, and the plaintiffs are unable to allege the exact amount of these rentals because the defendant has rendered no statement or accounting to the plaintiffs.
During January, 1940, the defendant, who was a contractor and experienced in the construction of buildings, undertook to superintend the erection of a new church building on the property, and did superintend the construction until the completion of the building in November, 1941. No written contract was entered into between the defendant and the church, but it was understood between the trustees of the church and the defendant that the church would pay to the defendant the costs incurred in the erection of the building. From time to time, as the construction of the church progressed, the defendant reported to the church the costs incurred; and finally, on December 3, 1941, after the completion of the building, the defendant reported to the church conference that the total cost was less than $8,000.
During March, 1942, the defendant, while still occupying positions of trust and confidence with the church, executed and delivered to American Savings Bank a deed to secure debt, to secure an indebtedness of $5,260, part of this loan being used to liquidate the balance of the purchase money notes. Prior to the execution of the loan deed, the defendant prepared and executed to himself a quit-claim deed to the property, this deed purportedly being signed by the trustees of the church, but as a matter of fact the deed was signed by the defendant, as chairman of the board of trustees, and by others named who were not then and never have been trustees of the church.
During the fall of 1944, a member of the board of deacons secured the services of an attorney to abstract the title to the property, and the plaintiffs then discovered for the first time the existence of the loan deed to American Savings Bank and the existence of the fraudulent quit-claim deed to the defendant. Upon inquiry being made of the defendant, he paid off the loan deed and secured its cancellation of record.
In August, 1944, the defendant, in writing, informed the pastor of the church that Since the date of the original purchase, the defendant has returned the property for taxation in the name of the church. (Copies of the returns were attached as exhibits to the petition.) All records of the costs of construction of the new church, and of the rents collected, and of the payments of the purchase price, have been kept by the defendant, are in his possession, and the plaintiffs have no records of these various transactions. All of the defendant's acts in connection with the property have been as trustee and agent of the church.
The petition, as last amended, was in two counts, the only material difference between the counts being that the second alleged that there had been no accounting between the parties, and the first alleged that the defendant had reported to the plaintiffs that the balance due him on the church was $3,900, which the plaintiffs had tendered to him, and which he had refused to accept.
The trial court overruled the general demurrers, overruled certain special demurrers, and sustained others. The defendant excepted to the overruling of the general and special demurrers.
John H. Hudson and J. Walter LeCraw, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Scott, Wiggins, Grizzard & Smith, of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
1. Counsel for all the parties treat the trust sought to be alleged as a resulting trust and not a constructive trust. It will be so dealt with here.
The main insistence of counsel for the plaintiff in error is that the petition failed to state a cause of action because it failed to allege that the 'purchase-money was paid either before or at the time of the purchase.' In support of this contention counsel cite Hall v. Edwards, 140 Ga. 765, 79 S.E. 852; Houston v. Farley, 146 Ga. 822, 824, 92 S.E. 635; and Gales v. Stokeley, 151 Ga. 718, 108 S.E. 34.
The point raised has been adequately dealt with in the recent case of Loggins v. Daves, 201 Ga. 628, 40 S.E.2d 520, 521, where this Court said: ...
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