Williams v. R.H. Marlin, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9501-CV-5,49A02-9501-CV-5 |
| Citation | 656 N.E.2d 1145 |
| Parties | Howard WILLIAMS and Sharon Williams, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. R.H. MARLIN, INC., Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., Michael Hutchinson, and Real Mechanical, Inc., Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Plaintiffs-Appellants Howard Williams and Sharon Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Williams" individually) appeal from the denial of their motions for partial summary judgment and the granting of the individual summary judgment motions of Defendants-Appellees R.H. Marlin, Inc. (Marlin); Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. (PDM); Michael Hutchison (Hutchison); and Real Mechanical, Inc. (Real).
We reverse and remand with instructions.
We consolidate the numerous issues raised by the parties, and address the following two dispositive issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found that the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act barred Williams's claims against the defendants.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it granted the summary judgment motions of Hutchison, PDM, Marlin and Real.
This case involves a claim for personal injuries sustained by Howard Williams when a caged basket in which he was being lifted by a crane dropped several feet to the ground. At the time of Williams's injuries, he was employed by Irex-Centin Corporation (Centin) as an insulator and was performing work at a facility owned by Citizens Gas & Coke. Centin was a subcontractor on the project, hired by Real to perform the insulation portion of the project. Real was a subcontractor hired by PDM, the general contractor on the project. No direct contract existed between Centin and PDM; however, the contract between PDM and Real included an agreement by Real to perform the insulation portion of the job.
PDM agreed to make available to Real a crane, crane operator and oiler for the performance of Real's work. In furtherance of this arrangement, PDM entered into an agreement with Marlin for the rental of a crane, crane operator and oiler. The crane was intended to be used to perform various tasks of lowering and lifting building materials and workers. It was also expected that the crane would be used by the employees of Real and its subcontractor, Centin. Hutchison was employed by Marlin, and was operating the crane the morning that Williams was injured.
On the morning of May 16, 1991, several Centin employees, including Williams, were in the crane basket to be lifted to the platform on which they were performing insulation work that day. As the crane approached the platform, it suddenly dropped several feet. While the basket was falling, Williams sustained injuries.
Williams filed a negligence suit against the defendants Hutchison, Marlin, PDM and Real. 1 Williams subsequently filed two motions for partial summary judgment--one on the issue of borrowed servant/employer-employee relationship and one on the issue of whether his suit was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. Each of the four defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment based primarily on the argument that Hutchison was the borrowed servant of Williams's employer Centin, and therefore Williams's suit was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act.
Following hearings on the motions, and taking the issues under advisement, the trial court denied Williams's motions for partial summary judgment and granted each of the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the trial court found that Hutchison was not only the employee of Marlin, but was also the "borrowed servant" of Centin, making Hutchison and Williams co-employees thereby relegating Williams to exclusive remedies under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act (hereinafter "the Act"). IND.CODE 22-3-1-2 et seq. Williams appeals.
This case involves two basic issues which were confused and merged by the parties' election to file motions for summary judgment, rather than by challenging the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction. The threshold issue as we see it is whether Williams's sole remedy lies within the Act and whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his common law claims. The second set of issues which will determine liability are: (1) who was Hutchison's general employer; (2) who was Hutchison's special employer under the borrowed servant doctrine; and (3) who is liable for Hutchison's negligence. In order to properly resolve the issues raised, we will first resolve the jurisdictional question and second, we will resolve the liability issue using the summary judgment standard.
Each of the defendants herein moved for summary judgment arguing essentially that Williams's tort claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, I.C. 22-3-2-6 (1994). However, our supreme court has recently held in a series of decisions that the use of a summary judgment motion is inappropriate where the Act's exclusivity provision is raised as a bar to plaintiff's complaint. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc. (1994), Ind., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1286, reh'g denied; Foshee v. Shoney's, Inc. (1994), Ind., 637 N.E.2d 1277, 1280; See also Northcutt v. Smith (1994), Ind.App., 642 N.E.2d 254, 255. Such a defense is an attack on the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be raised by a motion for summary judgment. Perry, 637 N.E.2d at 1286; Foshee, 637 N.E.2d at 1280. Rather, the proper vehicle in which to raise the defense is a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1). Id. A civil court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where a claimant's action falls within the Act's exclusivity provision. Weldy v. Kline (1993), Ind.App., 616 N.E.2d 398, 401 (citing Wolf Corp. v. Thompson (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 1170, 1171).
Based on these recent decisions, the trial court should have treated this issue under the standard of review for motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Perry, 637 N.E.2d at 1287.
Therefore, we will review this issue as a jurisdictional question upon which the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. See Foshee, 637 N.E.2d at 1281. For the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the negligence claim, the claim must fall outside of the exclusivity provision of the Act. Therefore, if we conclude that Williams's exclusive remedy is to pursue a claim for benefits before the Worker's Compensation Board, we must remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Foshee, 637 N.E.2d at 1281; see also Northcutt, 642 N.E.2d at 258. However, if our review of the record satisfies us that Williams established jurisdiction in the trial court, we will review the substantive liability issue raised in the parties' respective summary judgment motions.
We first address whether Williams established jurisdiction in the trial court, and whether his claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. We decide as a matter of law that Centin was not the special employer of Hutchison at the time of the Act. Therefore, Williams and Hutchison are not co-employees and Williams's claims are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act.
Williams contends that the trial court erred when it found that his claim against Hutchison was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. Specifically, Williams argues that the Act does not bar his action against Hutchison because Centin was not the employer of Hutchison within the meaning of the Act, and therefore the fellow-employee immunity provision of the Act is inapplicable.
The dispositive issue then is whether the requisite employer-employee relationship existed between Centin and Hutchison to bring the parties within the protections of the Act. Logically, one must fall within the protections of the Act in order to claim immunities under the Act. Essentially, Hutchison is attempting to claim immunities under the Act without establishing that he was in fact an employee of Centin.
The Act's exclusive remedy provision provides that
[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except for remedies available under IC 5-2-6.1.
I.C. 22-3-2-6. This section limits an employee whose injury meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Act to the rights and remedies provided by the Act. Thus, if an employee's injury occurred by accident and arose out of and in the course of employment, he is entitled to worker's compensation and I.C. 22-3-2-6 operates to bar a court from hearing any common law action brought by the employee for the same injuries. Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp. (1986), Ind., 491 N.E.2d 969. However, the Act permits actions against third party tortfeasors, so long as the third party is neither the plaintiff's employer nor his fellow employee. I.C. 22-3-2-13 (1988) provides as follows:
Whenever an injury or death, for which compensation is payable under chapters 2 through 6 of this article shall have been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer and not in the same employ a legal...
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