Williams v. Rego
| Decision Date | 18 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | 1:17-cv-01273-GSA-PC |
| Parties | MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BRENNA REGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 1.)
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Michael B. Williams ("Plaintiff") is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on September 25, 2017. (ECF No. 1.)
The Complaint is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e).
The in forma pauperis statute provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Plaintiff is presently detained at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California, where the events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants Brenna Rego (Unit 2 Supervisor) and Kenneth Underwood (Unit 2 Psych Tech) (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff's allegations follow.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Rego and Underwood retaliated against him byinterfering with Plaintiff's mail because Plaintiff had filed lawsuits against them. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have withheld his returned-to-sender legal materials, which were originally mailed by Plaintiff as certified mail to the Innocence Project in New York City. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants suppressed his outgoing and incoming attorney legal mail and denied him other legal correspondence sent to him by the court clerk, or the case analyst, from the United States Supreme Court as well as mail from other legal resources that facilitate legal education. Plaintiff also alleges that he was subject to "reprimands, discipline, harassment, indirect threats [and] censure, because of Plaintiff's amended complaint filed against Defendants." Compl. at 5.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, costs of suit, attorney's fees, and appointment of counsel.
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.
Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether "exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. At this early stage in the proceedings the court cannot make a determination that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. By this order, Plaintiff's Complaint shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. Thus, there shall be no complaint on record in this case for which the court has found any cognizable claims. Moreover, the court finds that Plaintiff canadequately articulate his mail interference and retaliation claims, which are not complex. Plaintiff is advised that he is not precluded from renewing the request for appointment of counsel at a later stage of the proceedings Therefore, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel shall be denied, without prejudice to renewal of the request at a later stage of the proceedings, should there be subsequent proceedings in this matter.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). "To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress." Id.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him or her of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisitecausal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard 'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint are vague and conclusory. Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his own individual actions, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff has not done so in the Complaint.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that each of the individual Defendants personally acted against him. Plaintiff fails to attribute any personal act to either of the Defendants. Plaintiff refers to "Defendants" throughout the Complaint and alleges that "Defendants" collectively interfered with his mail and otherwise acted against him. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against any of the Defendants unless he demonstrates in his allegations that each of them, identified by name, personally acted or failed to act, violating Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but...
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