Williams v. Reid
| Decision Date | 31 March 1931 |
| Docket Number | 28517 |
| Citation | 37 S.W.2d 537 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS et al. v. REID et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
O. F Libby, of Laclede, and Chas. K. Hart, of Brookfield, for appellants.
C. M Kendrick, of Marceline, for respondents.
The petition is in two counts, the first in ejectment and the second an action at law for partition. The answer of the defendant in effect is a specific denial of the plaintiffs' ownership and right to possession of the land involved, and contains also a plea of estoppel by deed and in pais, laches, and the 10year statute of limitations. From a judgment and decree for defendants the plaintiffs appeal.
There are five appellants. Two of them are son and daughter, respectively, of John T. Williams, deceased, the common source of title. The three others are children of a deceased son. John T. Williams left two other daughters -- making five children in all by his first marriage -- but while the record shows these two daughters are dead, it does not show whether they left lineal descendants or persons other than the appellants who might be interested in this controversy. His first wife dying, John T. Williams married again. His second wife, Angeline Williams, bore him three children, two daughters and a son, all of whom died intestate, single, and without issue. The respondents claim the land in suit by mesne conveyances from the second wife.
John T. Williams owned 200 acres of land when he died, and left a will. By the first clause thereof he devised the 100 acres in dispute, described as 'the west half of the northwest quarter of section thirty-two (32), and the west half of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section thirty-three (33), township fifty-eight (58), range eighteen (18), Linn County, Missouri,' to his widow, Angeline, 'to have and to hold the same during her natural life only, then at her death the title thereto shall vest absolutely in my three children by my wife, the said Angeline Williams' (naming them).
The second clause devised the other 100 acres of his land (not involved herein) to the widow Angeline for a term of years, that is, until his youngest living child born of her should reach a stated age, 12 years if either of the two girls and 21 years as to the boy. Respondents say in their brief this made the widow's term estate run seven years. The will continues: 'And then subject to the estate of my wife in and to said lands last herein described, I give and devise the same absolutely to my children by my first wife' (naming them). This clause further provided that if the widow should die before her youngest child attained the age of majority, the title to the land should immediately vest in the five children born of the first marriage. The whole clause is obscure and probably contradictory, but is comparatively unimportant in this case.
By the third item of the will the testator bequeathed each of his eight children $ 200; and to his wife all the residue of his property of every kind to have and use as she might desire, and at her death such as remained undisposed should be shared equally by all his children.
It appears from the evidence that upon a reading of the will the stepchildren, as they will be called for brevity, manifested dissatisfaction. There was, in the portentous phrase of counsel for respondents, 'the distant rumbling of a legal storm.' But a settlement was arranged whereby the widow quitclaimed to the stepchildren the land devised to them subject to preceding estates by the second clause of the will, and gave them each a mule worth $ 100, making $ 500.
The stepchildren in return gave back to the widow a quitclaim deed dated February 2 and acknowledged February 17, 1882, running to 'Angeline Williams and her bodily heirs' conveying to them the 100 acres in controversy in this case, being the land devised in the first clause of the will to Angeline for life, remainder to her three children. The deed further recited that the grantors released to their stepmother all of the moneys and personal property bequeathed them in their father's will, which was the $ 200 cash bequest to each plus their shares in the residuary personal estate remaining undisposed of at her death. The evidence is that the personal estate consisted of 40 head of two and three year old mules, some cattle of different descriptions, and some farm machinery, but does not show whether the estate was fully administered or what was the value of the property remaining after the payment of debts, etc. A month after the settlement had been effected, the will was probated on March 4, 1882.
Angeline Williams lived on the 100 acres thus deeded to her practically until her death in 1925. In the meantime her three children died subsequent to the exchange of the deeds in 1882. In January, 1924, she conveyed the land by warranty deed in consideration of her care and keep to her niece Liddy McCullough and the latter's husband. In March, 1926, after Angeline's death the McCulloughs sold and deeded the land to the respondents. Other facts will be stated in the course of the opinion.
I. By the first clause of the will the widow Angeline took a life estate in the land in dispute, with a vested remainder over in fee to her three children. The respondents do not seriously dispute that. See Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 362, 368, 13 S.W. 395, 396; Rodney v. Landau, 104 Mo. 251, 257, 15 S.W. 962, 963; Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632, 638, 158 S.W. 19, 21.
And when the three children died single, intestate, and without issue, their vested interests in the land passed by descent to their mother, Angeline, and to their kindred of the half-blood (being or at least including the appellants) as heirs under the statute, sections 306, 309, 310, Rev. St. Mo. 1929. This is true unless the deed made by the stepchildren to Angeline in 1882 changed the situation.
That deed was a quitclaim, regular in form. The grantees are designated in the premises as 'Angeline Williams and her bodily heirs of the County of Linn and State of Missouri, party of the second part' and are referred to throughout the remainder of the instrument as 'party of the second part,' except once where they are called 'parties of the second part.' The habendum runs 'until (for unto) the said party of the second part and their heirs and assigns forever. * * *' (Italics and parenthesis ours) Unquestionably this would have created an estate tail at common law, which by our statute, section 3108, Rev. St. Mo. 1929, was converted into a life estate in the first taker, Angeline, with a remainder in fee over to those who should prove to be the heirs of her body at her death. Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 223, 243 S.W. 882, 885; Owen v. Trail, 302 Mo. 292, 301, 258 S.W. 699, 701; Inlow v. Herren, 306 Mo. 42, 65, 267 S.W. 893, 899; Bank of Brumley v. Windes, 314 Mo. 206, 211, 282 S.W. 696, 697; Shaw v. Bank of Dearborn (Mo. Sup. Div. 1) 23 S.W.2d 20.
As the interests thus conveyed to Angeline's three children were contingent on their surviving her and as they did not survive her, they took nothing by the deed, and their estates of inheritance derived under the will and passing to their mother and half-brothers and half-sisters at their deaths, as explained in a preceding paragraph, were not augmented thereby; that is, by the deed. Neither was the interest of the widow Angeline in the land increased by the quitclaim deed. For, as we have stated, she took only a life estate thereunder and she already had that by the will. Other than that, whatever title was conveyed by the deed reverted to the grantors, the stepchildren, on the death of Angeline without issue. 21 C. J. p. 931, § 43; Gillilan v. Gillilan, 278 Mo. 99, 116, 212 S.W. 348, 351, 352; Stockwell v. Stockwell, 262 Mo. 671, 677, 172 S.W. 23, 24. Also, the deed did not and could not divest the stepchildren of the undivided interests they subsequently inherited from Angeline's three children, because the instrument was a mere quitclaim deed and did not pass this after acquired title. Section 3107, Rev. St. Mo. 1929; 18 C. J. § 299, p. 315; Inlow v. Herren, supra, 306 Mo. loc. cit. 52, 267 S.W. loc. cit. 895; Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 525, 285 S.W. 433, 436.
II. the foregoing discussion considers the legal effect of the deed on its face. But respondents argue it ignores a cardinal rule for the construction of such instruments which requires that effect be given to the intention of the parties if not contrary to law, and that such intention be ascertained not only from a scrutiny of all the provisions of the instrument but from a consideration of the situation of the parties as well, where the language of the writing is not conclusive. A large number of cases are cited on this point.
Then it is pointed out that the deed was made in compromise of a controversy between the widow and stepchildren over the provisions of the will, and that pursuant to that settlement the deed conveyed to the widow 'and her bodily heirs' land in which the will gave her a life estate and her three children a vested remainder. In addition to this, the fact is stressed that in consideration for the deed to her the widow paid the stepchildren $ 500 and by a companion deed released to them the other 100 acres of land (not involved herein) in which she had a term estate under the will running for seven years more, this land having a rental value of $ 200 per year and the whole consideration therefore being $ 1,900. Over against this, it is insisted, the return received by the widow from the stepchildren was wholly inadequate if the deed they made her be construed as giving her only the life estate in the real estate in controversy already granted her by the will; for that, respondents...
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