Williams v. Richmond County

• Decision Date: 07 March 1978
• Docket Number: Nos. 33058 and 33059,s. 33058 and 33059
• Citation: 243 S.E.2d 55,241 Ga. 89
• Parties: Phillip WILLIAMS v. RICHMOND COUNTY, Georgia, et al. (two cases).
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 55

243 S.E.2d 55

241 Ga. 89

Phillip WILLIAMS v. RICHMOND COUNTY, Georgia, et al. (two cases).

Nos. 33058 and 33059.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 7, 1978.

Rehearing Denied March 28, 1978.

G. Hughel Harrison, Lawrenceville, J. Carlisle Overstreet, Williams J. Williams, Augusta, for appellant.

Robert C. Daniel, Jr., Augusta, for appellees.

BOWLES, Justice.

The Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Richmond County, Georgia, individually as citizens and taxpayers of the county, and collectively in their official capacities, filed a complaint against Phillip Williams, individually and as alleged Coroner of Richmond County, and Iree W. Pope, individually and as Probate Judge of Richmond County, seeking relief by way of declaratory judgment, quo warranto, a writ of prohibition and general equitable relief.

The defendant-respondent, Iree W. Pope, as Probate Judge, on the 14th day of September, 1977, appointed defendant-respondent, Phillip Williams, Coroner of Richmond County to fill the unexpired term of the former Coroner, Jesse C. Redd, who resigned effective September 15, 1977.

The principal issue raises the question of who has the authority to fill a vacancy when one occurs in a county office in Richmond County.

Respondents contend that the Probate Judge of Richmond County, Georgia has this authority by virtue of the general law of this state, specifically Code Ann. §§ 21-101, 21-102, 23-1102(a), (b).

The complainants contend that the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Richmond County has this authority by virtue of a special Act of the General Assembly of Georgia, Ga.L.1907, p. 324, as amended.

The trial court ruled in favor of complainants, removed Williams from office, and declared the attempted appointment by the Probate Judge void and without authority of law. Respondent Williams appeals to this court from that judgment, and although there may be some imperfection in his appeal, we think the case should be decided on its merits. We affirm.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in that the general law of this state, under authority contained in Code Ann. § 23-1102(b), as amended by Ga.L.1969, p. 350, gives the Probate Judge of each county the authority to fill vacancies in the office of Coroner. He urges that Article I, § II, P VII (Code Ann. § 2-207) of the Constitution of Georgia, 1976 controls, which Code section provides: "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special laws shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law . . . " Thus, the special law creating the Board of Commissioners of Richmond County, Georgia, and delegating to them the specific power and authority to fill vacancies in Richmond County offices is a special act in conflict with the general law on that subject, and, therefore, must yield to the above cited constitutional provision.

The 1877 Georgia Constitution, Article XI, § III, P 1 provided: "County officers to be uniform. Whatever tribunal, or officers, may hereafter be created by the General Assembly for the transaction of county matters, shall be uniform throughout the State, and the same name, jurisdiction and remedies, except that the General Assembly may provide for the appointment of commissioners of roads and revenue in any county." That Constitution was later amended to provide in Article VI, § 6, P 2, "Powers. The courts of ordinary shall have such powers, in relation to roads, bridges, ferries, public buildings, paupers, county officers, county funds, county taxes, and other county matters as may be conferred on them by law." Also, Article VI, § XIX, P I provides, "Power to create county commissioners. The General Assembly shall have power to provide for the creation of county commissioners in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties." (Emphasis supplied.)

On this authority four Acts of the legislature were adopted which are pertinent to the decision in this case. Ga.L.1880-1, p. 574, created the city court in the County of Richmond providing in part: "The judge of said city court shall be ex officio commissioner of roads and revenues for the County of Richmond, and as such shall discharge all of the duties formerly devolved upon the justices of the inferior court as to county business." Ga.L.1882-3, p. 528, reaffirmed the judge of the city court in the County of Richmond ex officio commissioner of roads and revenues for the county saying that the previous Act was of doubtful validity. Among other things, it granted to the judge of that court the following specific authority: "In supplying by appointment, all vacancies in county offices and in ordering elections to fill them."

Ga.L.1907, p. 324, created a Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues for the County of Richmond and defined their powers and duties as follows: " § 3. Be it enacted, that the said Board of Commissioners shall exercise all of the powers relative to county matters that were vested in the judge of the city court as ex officio commissioner of roads and revenues under and by virtue of an Act 'to constitute the judge of the city court in the county of Richmond ex-officio commissioner of roads and revenues for Richmond county; to define his powers and duties, and for other purposes.' " Ga.L.1964, p. 2809 empowered the county commissioners the right to call special elections to fill vacancies.

Our State Constitution of 1976, Article I, § II, P VII (Code Ann. § 2-207) provides, similarly: "General laws: uniform operation: how varied. Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law . . . "

Article IX, § I, P VI (Code Ann. § 2-5806) of the 1976 Constitution also provides: "County government uniform; exceptions. Whatever tribunal, or officers, may be created by the General Assembly for the transaction of county matters, shall be uniform throughout the State, and of the same name, jurisdiction, and remedies, except that the General Assembly may provide for County Commissioners in any county, . . . " Article IX, § I, P VII (Code Ann. § 2-5807) of the 1976 Constitution, provides: "Power to create county commissioners. The General Assembly shall have power to provide for the creation of county commissioners in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties."

Code Ann. § 21-101 provides that coroners are elected, commissioned, and qualified in the same manner as clerks of the superior courts. Code Ann. § 21-102 provides that the probate court shall appoint coroners on the same terms and in the same manner as they appoint county surveyors. Code Ann. § 23-1102 provides for the election of county surveyors, and the filling of vacancies by the Probate Judge (formerly the Ordinary). These last three referred-to Code sections are laws of general application throughout the State.

Thus we have a special or local law authorizing the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Richmond County, Georgia to fill the vacancies in the office of Coroner in that county, which is in conflict with the method of appointment by general law prevailing throughout most of the State. The General Assembly has the power to pass separate and distinct laws creating county commissioners; and the provisions of general laws enacted by the legislature do not apply to such officers, unless made so by the special laws creating them. Rhodes...