Williams v. Roper

Decision Date06 December 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–2579.,10–2579.
Citation695 F.3d 825
PartiesMarcellus S. WILLIAMS, Petitioner–Appellee v. Donald ROPER, Respondent–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael Joseph Spillane, AG, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

Kent E. Gipson, argued, Kansas City, MO, Laurence E. Komp, on the brief, Manchester, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Marcellus Williams was convicted by a jury in Missouri of the first-degree murder of Felicia Gayle and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct review, State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462 (Mo.2003) (“Williams I ”), and subsequently affirmed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433 (Mo.2005) (“Williams II ”). Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief on twelve of Williams's claims, but granted relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of trial. The State appeals the grant of relief, and we reverse.

I.

On August 11, 1998, Marcellus Williams drove his grandfather's car to a bus stop and traveled by bus to University City, Missouri. Once in University City, Williams began looking for a house to burglarize, and came upon the home of Felicia Gayle. After knocking on the front door and receiving no answer, Williams knocked out a window pane near the door, reached in and unlocked the door, and entered Gayle's home. Williams heard water running in the shower on the second floor, so he went into the kitchen, found a butcher knife, and waited.

Gayle finished her shower and went downstairs. Williams attacked Gayle, stabbing and cutting her forty-three times, and inflicting seven fatal wounds. Williams then washed Gayle's blood from his body and concealed his bloody shirt with a jacket. Before leaving Gayle's home, he took Gayle's purse, which contained, among other things, a St. Louis Post–Dispatch ruler and a calculator, and her husband's laptop computer.

Williams returned to the bus stop, retrieved his grandfather's car, and picked up his girlfriend, Laura Asaro. Asaro noticed that Williams was wearing a jacket, despite the summer heat. When Williams removed the jacket, Asaro noticed blood on his shirt and scratches on his neck. Asaro questioned him, and Williams claimed he had been in a fight. Asaro also saw a laptop computer in the car. Later that day, Williams put his bloody clothes in his backpack and threw them into a sewer drain.

The next day, Asaro tried to retrieve some items from the trunk of Williams's car, but he tried to prevent her from opening it. Before he could push her away, Asaro grabbed Gayle's purse from the trunk. Inside the purse she found Gayle's Missouri state identification card and a black coin purse. Asaro confronted Williams about the purse, and Williams confessed that he had killed Gayle. He explained in detail how he had waited for her in the kitchen with a butcher knife, and that when she came downstairs, he stabbed her in the arm and neck, twisting the knife as he went. After confessing the details to Asaro, Williams grabbed her by the throat and threatened to kill her, her children, and her mother if she told anyone.

On August 31, 1998, Williams was arrested on unrelated charges and incarcerated at the St. Louis City Workhouse, where he shared a room with Henry Cole for a period of time. While watching television one evening, Cole and Williams saw a news report about Gayle's murder. After the news report, Williams told Cole that he had committed the murder. Over the next few weeks, Williams and Cole had several conversations about the crime, during which Williams provided considerable details about the break-in and murder. After Cole was released from jail in June of 1999, he went to the University City police and told them about Williams's involvement in Gayle's murder.

As a result of the information provided by Cole, University City police contacted Asaro about the murder. Asaro told the police that Williams admitted to her that he had killed Gayle. The police then searched Williams's grandfather's car and found Gayle's Post–Dispatch ruler and calculator.The police also recovered Gayle's husband's laptop, which Williams had sold after the murder.

The State charged Williams with several offenses and sought the death penalty. Williams was tried and convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action.

In preparation for the penalty phase of the trial, Williams's attorneys, Joseph Green and Chris McGraugh, hired multiple experts, including a mitigation specialist. The mitigation specialist collected records on Williams and his family, and introduced Green and McGraugh to Williams's family so that the attorneys could collect information about his childhood development and family history.

During the penalty phase, the State presented extensive evidence of Williams's criminal history. The jury heard testimony detailing a residential burglary in 1997, armed robberies of both a doughnut shop and a Burger King in 1998, and a threat to kill a corrections officer at the St. Louis City Workhouse in 1999. The State also introduced certified copies of Williams's sixteen convictions: second degree burglary and stealing over $150 in 1988; second degree assault in 1988; second degree burglary in 1988; two counts each of second degree burglary and stealing over $150 in 1991; first degree robbery, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon in 2000; and first degree robbery, armed criminal action, stealing a motor vehicle, and two counts of false imprisonment in 2000. The State completed its presentation with victim impact evidence from Gayle's family and friends.

In mitigation, Williams's counsel presented evidence that Williams was a caring and loving father, and that his execution would have a significant effect on his family. The defense presented testimony from several of Williams's family members and friends, including his son, his step-daughter, his mother, his aunt, his brothers, and others. They testified about Williams's positive relationship with his son and step-daughter. This evidence included testimony that the continued contact and visitation with Williams made the children feel loved, and that Williams would encourage the children to read and do well in school. Williams's counsel also attempted to present testimony from Dr. Mark Cunningham that Williams's continued relationship with his children would have a positive impact on them and that his execution would have a negative impact on them, but the trial court found the evidence inadmissible. According to Williams's counsel, their theory of defense for the penalty phase was residual doubt; they hoped the jury would have a lingering doubt about Williams's guilt and impose a life sentence.

The jury deliberated for less than two hours and returned a sentence of death. In doing so, the jury found the existence of ten aggravating circumstances: that the murder involved depravity of mind; that Williams committed the murder during a burglary; that Williams committed the murder during a robbery; that Williams committed the murder in order to receive money or something of value from Gayle; that Williams committed the murder in order to prevent his lawful arrest; and each of five prior convictions committed by Williams—second degree assault in 1998, first degree robbery in 2000 and 2001, and armed criminal action in 2000 and 2001. See Williams I, 97 S.W.3d at 473.

Williams appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which affirmed the conviction and sentence. Id. at 466. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Williams's petition for a writ of certiorari. Williams v. Missouri, 539 U.S. 944, 123 S.Ct. 2607, 156 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003).

On May 30, 2003, Williams filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, pursuant to Supreme Court of Missouri Rule 29.15, and appointed counsel filed an amended motion on September 8, 2003. One of the several grounds asserted by Williams was that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of Williams's traumatic childhood.

In support of this claim, Williams asserted that his trial counsel intended to present expert testimony to explain Williams's social history and criminal conduct, but the psychologist they hired was unable to establish a rapport with Williams because he was hired too late. According to Williams, if his counsel had properly investigated his background, they would have uncovered and introduced the following significant mitigating evidence: that Williams was subjected to brutally violent physical and sexual abuse by family members; that he was abandoned and resented by his parents; that his family condoned and encouraged criminal behavior and substance abuse; that he came from an impoverished and dysfunctional household; and that he was exposed to guns, drugs, and alcohol at a young age. This evidence also would have included testimony from Dr. Donald Cross, who diagnosed Williams as suffering from significant mental illnesses, including depression, drug and alcohol dependence, and post-traumatic stress disorder. According to Dr. Cross, these disorders, which went untreated, contributed to Williams's criminal behavior, and Williams “was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and circumstantial conditions [such] that his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or conform his behavior to the law was substantially impaired.”

The postconviction court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on this claim, but Williams's trial counsel, Green, submitted an...

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