Williams v. Rosinsky Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1955
• Citation: 284 P.2d 979,133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 798
• Parties: 133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 798 Bernice WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROSINSKY MOTOR COMPANY, etc., Defendant and Appellant. C. A. 8679. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California
• Court: California Superior Court

Page 979

284 P.2d 979

133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 798

Bernice WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROSINSKY MOTOR COMPANY, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

C. A. 8679.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California.

May 25, 1955.

Arkin & Weissman, Culver City, Foster, Tagert & Mills, Los Angeles, for appellant.

David J. Lee, Los Angeles, for respondent.

BISHOP, Acting Presiding Judge.

We see no escape from the conclusion that the judgment, awarding the plaintiff $2,614.98 upon certain conditions, must be reversed because the trial court was without jurisdiction of the case when the judgment was made and entered.

The events leading to the situation that we deem fatal to the judgment are a bit unusual. The action as brought was one within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. Framed in three causes of action, the complaint alleged, first of all, an action to recover the payments made upon a contract (as amended by a second) induced by fraud and which plaintiff had and still sought to rescind. These payments, including a $500 Cadillac, were alleged to be $2,854.10. The second cause of action was based on the claim that the contracts, which were conditional sales contracts, were void because of failures to comply with section 2982 of the Civil Code. The third cause of action may be ignored because it was only an endeavor to plead as a common count one or the other of the causes already pleaded. Wellman v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 1951, 108 Cal.App.2d 254, 263-264, 238 P.2d 679, 684. By her prayer, the plaintiff asked to have the contracts cancelled; for judgment for $2854.10; 'and for such other and further relief as to the court seems just and proper.'

This complaint--presenting an action within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, section 89, Code of Civil Procedure--was filed November 27, 1953. The two defendants answered and the case went to trial on July 8, 1954. Early in the proceedings it was stipulated that the plaintiff had paid to the defendants, in one way or another, a little over $3,600. The defendants, on July 9, filed cross-complaints in which they sought to recover for the reasonable use of the Cadillac during the months that the plaintiff had driven it, 'but not to exceed $2,999.'

The case was submitted for decision on July 9. In a statement, filed a few days later, the trial judge expressed his opinion that the contracts were void, because of noncompliance with section 2982, Civil Code, and that as a consequence the plaintiff was entitled to recover the total of her payments plus a penalty, altogether $4,614.98, less the reasonable value of the use of the car, determined to be $2,000. Judgment in plaintiff's favor was entered July 22, 1954 for $2,614.98. A motion for a new trial was made in September, and, in lieu of granting it, the judgment was set aside; the case reopened for further proceedings; plaintiff was given permission 'to file amendment to the complaint to conform to proof'; defendants were given permission to answer the amendment; and all parties given permission to introduce additional evidence.

The plaintiff did file, September 21, her 'amendment to complaint,' in which she alleged that since the commencement of this action she had paid the defendants 'the further sum of $1,000' upon the contracts. No attempt was made to amend the prayer of the original complaint, when this supplement complaint was filed, and it contained no prayer of its own. The defendant now appealing filed an answer in which it placed the amount plaintiff had paid since the action was filed at $984.00, not $1,000. With the record in this condition, no further evidence being introduced by either party, judgment was again ordered for the plaintiff, and a judgment was entered, October 25, 1954, for $2,614.98. It is from this judgment that the defendant Rosinsky Motor Company appeals.

So far as we are aware, no decided case exists that entirely fits all facts of this one, but we do have a number of principles established that direct us to the correct conclusion. First of all, a superior court and a municipal court do not have concurrent jurisdiction over any action; jurisdiction is in one or the other. Const. Art. VI, sec. 5; Norton v. Baranov, 1935, 4 Cal.2d 443, 444, 50 P.2d 67, 68, and case cited. A municipal court, having jurisdiction of a case, has authority to permit an amendment that results in depriving the court of continued jurisdiction. Thomasian v. Superior Court, 1953, 122 Cal.App.2d 322, 336, 265 P.2d 165, 176. The fact that the judgment was for an amount within the jurisdiction of the municipal court does not mean that jurisdiction was not in the superior court. Sellery v. Ward, 1942, 21 Cal.2d 300, 304, 131 P.2d 550, 552; and cases cited. Nor is the jurisdiction of the superior court defeated by the possibility or probability that a good defense exists to enough of the demand made in the complaint, so that the amount awarded in the judgment will be less than the sum chosen to determine jurisdiction. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Ames, 1936, 18 Cal.App.2d 311, 314, 63 P.2d 1208, 1210; Brooks v. Brooks, 1941, 48 Cal.App.2d 347, 349, 119 P.2d 970, 972.

Our legal literature is not without such statements as this: 'The most frequently used yardstick to determine jurisdiction of the court in actions for money judgments is the amount in controversy as indicated by the prayer of the complaint.' Berry v. Skone, 1953, 118 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 877, 255 P.2d 825, 826. However, it is settled that the ultimate test of jurisdiction is not the prayer but the facts as alleged in the complaint. 'Appellant is mistaken in her contention that the sum demanded in the prayer of the complaint is the final test of jurisdiction. None of the cases cited by her, and none ever called to our attention, go to the length of holding that the prayer, irrespective of the allegations of the complaint, concludes an examination into the real amount in controversy.' Demartini v. Marini, 1920, 45 Cal.App. 418, 420, 187 P. 985, 986. We find this observation about an earlier case in Consolidated Adjustment Co. of California v. Superior Court, 1922, 189 Cal. 92, 94, 207 P. 552, 553: 'In Lehnhardt v. Jennings, 119 Cal. 198, 48 P. 56, 51 P. 195, the court had under consideration the question whether the prayer of the complaint, or the facts stated therein, constituted the determining factor in ascertaining whether the demand in suit amounted...