Williams v. Schembri

• Decision Date: 19 August 1890
• Citation: 46 N.W. 403,44 Minn. 250
• Parties: WILLIAMS v SCHEMBRI.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

44 Minn. 250

46 N.W. 403

WILLIAMSvSCHEMBRI.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 19, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The plaintiff, who had contracted personally for the sale of certain land to the defendant, sues for a specific performance. The plaintiff had title to only an undivided one-third of the land, the remaining two-thirds being in infant wards of the plaintiff. After the making of the contract the plaintiff, as guardian, petitioned the probate court for license to sell the estate of her wards at private sale, which license was granted. No sale was made pursuant to that license, but a report was made showing a sale to this defendant, which was confirmed, and a deed ordered to be executed. A guardian's deed was executed, and tendered to the defendant, reciting that a sale had been made. The plaintiff also tendered her own deed of the premises. Held, that the defendant was not required, under the contract, to accept such a title, as respects the estate of the infants.

2. A cause tried by the court without a jury having been fully submitted for adjudication, and the court having thereupon directed a judgment on the merits, without having made any express findings upon the issues, held, that the remedy for this omission of the court is by application to the court to correct its own omission, and not by appeal from the judgment.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; OTIS, Judge.

Davis, Kellogg & Severance, for appellant.

John B. & W. H. Sanborn, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

In May, 1888, the plaintiff entered into a written contract with the defendant for the sale to the latter of certain land in this state, in consideration of a price therein specified to be paid. She now prosecutes this action to compel a specific performance of that contract by the defendant. Upon the trial, the case having been submitted by both parties for decision, the court at that time directed judgment for the defendant. The grounds upon which this determination of the court was based are not disclosed. If for any reason the decision was justifiable, upon the case presented, it should be sustained, and the judgment from which this appeal is taken should be affirmed. At the time of the making of the contract the plaintiff was the owner of only an undivided one-third of the property, the remaining two-thirds being in her infant children, of whom she was guardian. The contract sought to be enforced was made by the plaintiff, through her agent, as her personal contract of sale, and her personal obligation to convey by good and sufficient warranty deed, upon compliance with the prescribed conditions as to payment. One hundred dollars of the purchase price was paid to her. The contract provided that if the title should be found to be unmarketable, and such defect could not be cured within a reasonable time, the agreement should be void, and the payment made should be refunded. The plaintiff never acquired title to more than the undivided one-third of the property, but, some six months after the making of the contract, tendered to the defendant a deed of the whole property, executed by her, and a guardian's deed of the estate owned by her wards. The plaintiff assumed to show, chiefly by the admission of facts by the defendant at the trial, the authority conferred by the probate court to make this conveyance of the estate for the infants. Without here stating fully the several steps taken, which may be deemed to have been generally regular, and in conformity with the statute, we now refer only to such facts as are deemed to disclose defects which justified the court, in the trial of this cause, in the conclusion that the title so tendered was of such questionable validity that the defendant should not be compelled to accept it. Some time after the plaintiff had entered into the contract with the defendant, she, as guardian, made her petition to the court for license to sell the estate of the infants at private sale. An order or license was thereupon granted to sell the estate at private sale. The report of the guardian showed that she had sold the interest of her wards to this defendant. This was confirmed, and a deed ordered to be executed. The deed tendered to the defendant recited a sale as having been made to the defendant on the 1st day of December, 1888, by virtue of the order and license of the court, for a price stated, which, allowing for interest, is approximately equivalent to two-thirds of the price for which the plaintiff had personally contracted to sell the land to the defendant. The authority of the guardian, it will be seen, was to sell the estate of her wards at private sale. This implied the duty on the part of the guardian, which also her relation to...