Williams v. School Dist. of Springfield R-12

• Citation: 447 S.W.2d 256
• Decision Date: 13 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 2,R--12,No. 54040,54040,2
• Parties: Celia Ann WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD, et al., Respondents
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 256

447 S.W.2d 256

Celia Ann WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD R--12, et al., Respondents.

No. 54040.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Oct. 13, 1969.

Motions for Rehearing or for Transfer to Court En Ban Denied

Dec. 8, 1969.

William A. R. Dalton, Daniel, Clampett, Ellis, Rittershouse & Dalton, John D. Ashcroft, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

C. Wallace Walter, Kenneth T. Walter, Mann, Walter, Burkart, Weathers & Schroff, Springfield, for respondents.

ELGIN T. FULLER, Special Judge.

This appeal is taken from an order of the trial court sustaining motions to dismiss plaintiff's (appellant herein) first amended petition and each of the five counts thereof for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted to plaintiff.

Plaintiff, Celia Ann Williams, was a public school teacher in The School District of Springfield R--12, Springfield, Missouri. Her teacher's contract was for one year, beginning August 29, 1966, and terminating June 6, 1967, at an annual salary of $6,280.00. The defendants were The School District of Springfield R--12, the individual members of the Board of Education of said district and Willard J. Graff, the Superintendent of Schools of said school district.

Plaintiff received written notice April 13, 1967, from the Board of Education notifying her that she would not be re-employed for the school term 1967--1968. The action of defendants in not reemploying the plaintiff gave rise to plaintiff's cause of action. Since this case is before this court on the question of whether or not each of anyone of the five Counts of plaintiff's first amended petition stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, careful attention is given to each Count of the petition.

Count I is against the defendant members of the Board of Education only for breach of her teaching contract. It alleges that pursuant to the authority given school boards by Section 171.011 RSMo 1959, the School District of Springfield R--12 adopted rules and regulations which were set forth in a 'Manual of Operations, Fourth Edition, 1964,' marked Exhibit B and made a part of the petition. These rules and regulations are, by Paragraph 4 of the Teacher's Contract, specifically incorporated therein. The following provisions, appearing on page 122 of the Manual of Operations, are the basis of plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.

'Dismissal Procedures

A teacher's contract may be terminated or suspended by the administration for:

refusal to report for duty inefficient and incompetent service

mental or physical disability which renders the teacher incapable of performing the terms of the contract immoral or licentious conduct.

Notice of termination of contract shall be in writing stating reason or reasons for dismissal prior to April 15th

A certificated person receiving a dismissal notice may, within five days, request in writing a hearing before the Board of Education. Requests should be directed to the President of the Board.' (Emphasis ours.)

Court I then alleges that on the afternoon of April 12, 1967, plaintiff was orally advised by a representative of the school district that her teaching contract was being terminated and would not be renewed for the 1967--1968 school year, and was further advised that she could avoid embarrassment by resigning, but if she wished, she could appear before the Board of Education that evening; that she obtained counsel and she and her counsel did appear at 7:00 o'clock p.m. before the Board of Education in closed session and requested of the President of the Board (1) a written transcript of the proceedings; (2) specific reason or reasons in writing or otherwise for termination of plaintiff's contract; (3) a full, fair and timely hearing; (4) that the Board of Education postpone its decision on termination of plaintiff's contract (which termination had been recommended by the administration) until plaintiff and her attorney could be apprised of the accusations made by the administration against her, and an opportunity to refute them; that the Board of Education advised her that it would not be necessary to have any written memorandum of the meeting; that no obligation was owned to make any explanation to plaintiff; that no postponement would be made, and that the Board had only five minutes to consider the matter; that plaintiff advised the Board that she would hold herself ready to fulfill her contractual obligations but she was informed by defendant Superintendent Graff that her services would be terminated. She further alleges that the Board, in the regular meeting April 12, 1967, adopted a motion that, 'In accordance with the recommendations of the administration, plaintiff Celia Ann Williams be not reemployed as a teacher in The School District of Springfield R--12 for the next school year, and that she be advised as directed by statute.'

Plaintiff then pleaded that the School District, in violation of the terms of her contract, failed to notify plaintiff of the reason or reasons in writing or otherwise for termination, and failed to give plaintiff a full, fair and timely hearing before the Board, and that the failure to do these things constituted a breach of contract by the defendant School District; that because of such failure plaintiff was unable to secure other employment as a teacher and was thereby damaged; that plaintiff was eligible for one more year of employment as a teacher in said District before reaching the mandatory retirement age, and as a result of the breach of contract plaintiff would suffer monetary loss in the form of a decrease in retirement benefits and allowances. Plaintiff prayed that the Court enter its order compelling the members of the Board of Education to reinstate and re-employ plaintiff as a teacher, or, in the alternative, if that order could not be entered, that plaintiff be awarded damages in the sum of $14,000.00, and for her costs.

Plaintiff's Count I speaks of 'termination' of her contract. There was no termination of her contract. She was given a written notice April 13, 1967, that she would not be re-employed. Under Missouri law the school board must, before the 15th day of April of the year in which the contract then in force expires, notify each teacher in writing concerning his re-employment or lack thereof. Section 168.111, V.A.M.S. Teachers' contracts are for one year and are annual contracts. School Boards have the right to offer or refuse to offer a contract to any teacher for the following year, and if written notice is given before April 15 of the year in which the contract then in force expires that such teacher will not be re-employed, the Board need not assign or give any reasons. Magenheim v. Board of Education, Mo.App.,347 S.W.2d 409. The Board has the right to decide whom they will employ or re-employ so long as the non-employment is not based on some impermissible constitutional ground, which will be considered in connection with Count II. Plaintiff concedes that Section 168.111 does not establish any kind of tenure and that she had no tenure under the Missouri law. In discussing Section 163.090, RSMo 1949, the predecessor to Section 168.111, the Court stated in Bergmann v. Board of Education of Normandy Consolidated School District, 360 Mo. 644, 230 S.W.2d 714, 720: 'While the latter section provides for reemployment under specified circumstances, it expressly provides for the execution of a new, specific and distinct annual contract for each school year for which the teacher is employed. Notice under the statute that the teacher will not be re-employed for the succeeding year cannot, therefore, be construed as a discharge or dismissal from employment, since the only written contract of employment is in no wise affected by the notice.' (Emphasis ours.)

Plaintiff does not allege that she was prevented from carrying out her teaching duties during the 1966--1967 school term or that she was not paid in accordance with her contract. There is no statutory or case law in Missouri requiring a written notice of a hearing, specific reasons for non-re-employment, or affording a teacher a full hearing before the School Board.

The remaining question is, therefore, did the contract of employment between plaintiff and defendant School District, incorporating the rules and regulations of the Board and containing the 'Dismissal Procedures' set out above, apply to the non-re-employment of plaintiff and require that the Board give reasons for non-re-employment?

The DISMISSAL PROCEDURES provide: 'A teacher's contract may be terminated or suspended by the Administration for: refusal to report for duty, inefficient and incompetent service, mental or physical disability which renders the teacher incapable of performing the terms of the contract, immoral or licentious conduct. Notice of termination of contract shall be made in writing stating reason or reasons for dismissal prior to April 15th. A certificated person receiving a dismissal notice may, within five days, request in writing a hearing before the Board of Education. Requests should be directed to the President of the Board.'

If the requirements set out in the Dismissal Procedures apply to non-re-employment then the School Board would have deprived itself of its statutory power to not rehire a teacher solely by written notice without stating any reason. Section 168.111 reads in part as follows: '3. Each school board having one or more teachers under contract shall notify each teacher in writing concerning his re-employment or lack thereof on or before the fifteenth day of April of the year in which the contract * * * expires.'

Prior to 1870 school boards could dismiss a teacher at any time. However, the school laws were revised and the authority of school boards to dismiss teachers was dropped. This Court in the case of Arnold v. School District, 78 Mo. 226, ruled that the legislature, in...