Williams v. Scott, 3663
| Decision Date | 26 April 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 3663,3663 |
| Citation | 153 So.2d 18 |
| Parties | Joe WILLIAMS and Katie Williams, his wife, Appellants, v. Claire SCOTT, a minor, and Clarence S. Scott and Nelle J. Scott, his wife, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Edward J. Hunter, Tampa, for appellants.
Vernon W. Evans, Jr., of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings, Glos & Evans, Tampa, for appellees.
This is an appeal by plaintiffs below from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict for the defendants in a personal injury suit.
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued the minor defendant Claire Scott and her parents for damages allegedly resulting from injuries sustained by plaintiff Katie Williams at a Tampa street intersection when she was struck by an automobile operated by said minor. The intersection was serviced by overhead traffic control lights. The plaintiff's husband sought derivative damages, and the parents of the minor defendant were named parties defendant by reason of their ownership of the automobile and their endorsement of their minor daughter's application for a restricted operator's permit. There were the usual allegations of negligence and contributory negligence.
Plaintiff Katie Williams was struck as she was attempting to walk south across the far side of the intersection in relation to defendants' automobile proceeding west. There was testimony indicating that the defendants' automobile had slowed to 20-25 miles per hour as it neared and reached the intersection. Although there was some conflict on the point, there was testimony tending to show that the defendant driver was favored by a green light when she entered the intersection. After passing one-half to three-quarters through the intersection she heard a scream, looked to her right and observed the plaintiff for the first time near the right front wheel of the automobile. She applied her brakes but could not avoid contact.
The plaintiff, a 55-year old Negro woman, sustained painful and partially disabling injuries and was taken to a hospital where she was interviewed by an investigating officer. Plaintiff first contends that it was reversible error to permit the investigating officer to testify as to statements or conclusions drawn from statements then made by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was not in a conscious condition and, moreover, the testimony should have been excluded under Fla.Stat. § 317.17 F.S.A. 1 The testimony of the officer was as follows: '* * * I definitely recall the impression that she did not know what color the light was.' This was received in evidence on the theory that only those statements made to investigators by drivers are in the nature of accident reports privileged under the immunity provision of § 317.17 F.S.A. supra. We can not follow this interpretation.
It is true that §§ 317.12-317.15 F.S.A. do not specifically require an involved pedestrian to make an accident report; but if he does in fact make a 'report' to an inquiring official investigator, we think his statements come within the protective cloak of § 317.17 F.S.A. The latter section, as previously noted, provides that '[a]ll accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting * * * .' (emphasis added) This language does not restrict immunity to those who are required to report, and we are unable to read such restriction into the section by reference to other sections.
It is settled that the rights and responsibilities of motorists and pedestrians are reciprocal. See e. g. Green v. Loudermilk, Fla.App.1962, 146 So.2d 601; King v. Griner, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 177. Since both are held to the same standard of ordinary care, presumptively they are entitled to reciprocal rights and immunities as litigants. The admission of the pedestrian's report in such a case while excluding the driver's report would do violence to this concept as well as to the plain language of § 317.17 supra.
The admission of the 'report' being legally improper, it devolves upon us to decide whether such admission constitutes reversible error. In the light of all the evidence we think it was not reversible error. The plaintiffs' testimony raised at most an extremely tenuous inference of causative negligence on the part of the defendant driver. Katie Williams' own testimony was contradictory as to whether she proceeded with or against the traffic signals, suggesting negligence on her own part as well as negligence on the part of the defendant driver. It is significant that Katie Williams' testimony was the only direct testimony in behalf of the plaintiffs on this crucial point, for it was not until after the impact that plaintiffs' witness Ralph Giddens observed a red signal against the defendant's line of traffic. In this situation we do not think the officer's testimony was fatally prejudicial. See Fla. Stat. § 54.23 F.S.A. 2 Cf. Sea Crest Corp. v. Burley, Fla.1949, 38 So.2d 434.
The Sea Crest Corp. case involved an action for injuries by a guest while riding with defendant's agent. Testimony of a police officer relative to statements made by the agent at the police station a few minutes after the accident was held not harmful error where such statements were established by other witnesses and were cumulative. In the instant case the defendant driver testified that she looked at the light as she approached the intersection and again as she passed under it, and at all times the light was green. Plaintiffs' witness Ralph Giddens, an employee in a nearby filling station, testified that he heard brakes squeal, heard a bump and saw the defendant's vehicle come to a stop, and then he looked at the light and saw it was red for traffic traveling the route used by defendant. This is neither contradictory nor incompatible with the other testimony. This witness also testified that the light was a short light in that it turned 'pretty quick.' He did not observe the accident and, as previously noted, did not observe the light until after the accident occurred.
We come now to consider whether it was error to refuse to give plaintiffs' requested instruction number three. 3 This instruction was correctly refused. It was obviously too broad and would tend to impose absolute liability upon any driver colliding with a pedestrian at an intersection, whereas the rights of pedestrian and motorist are reciprocal. Green v. Loudermilk, sup...
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...correct, and not likely to confuse or mislead the jury. See: Leonardi v. Walgreen Co., Fla.App. 1962, 146 So.2d 773; Williams v. Scott, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 18. Having reviewed the instructions given in light of the foregoing, we find no harmful error on the part of the trial court.' (Em......
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...and the error, at most, would be no more than harmless. See: Sea Crest Corporation v. Burley, Fla.1949, 38 So.2d 434; Williams v. Scott, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 18; § 54.23, Fla.Stat., Turning lastly to the question of the excessiveness of the verdict or that it was computed contrary to the......
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