Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 09 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-1469, No. 15-1390,14-1469 |
| Citation | 848 F.3d 549 |
| Parties | Craig WILLIAMS, Appellant v. SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dorina Varner, Chief Grievance Coordinator; Tina Friday, Records Officer, in her individual and official capacity ; Jeffrey R. Rogers, Manager, in his individual and official capacity ; Tracy Shawley, Grievance Coordinator, in her individual and official capacity ; Louis Folino, in his individual and official capacity Shawn T. Walker, Appellant v. Michael A. Farnan; Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Superintendent Graterford Sci; Cindy G. Watson, and others to be named later |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
James J. Bilsborrow, Esq. [Argued], Weitz & Luxenberg, 700 Broadway, New York, NY 10003, Attorney for Appellants
John G. Knorr, III, Esq. [Argued], Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120, Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 564 Forbes Avenue, 6th Floor, Manor Complex, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Randall J. Henzes, Esq., Claudia M. Tesoro, Esq., Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 3rd Floor, 21 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19107, Attorneys for Appellees
Before: McKEE* , Chief Judge, FUENTES** , and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
We are asked to decide whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest that prohibits the State from continuing to house inmates in solitary confinement1 on death row after they have been granted resentencing hearings, without meaningful review of the continuing placement. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore limits the State's ability to subject an inmate to the deprivations of death row once the death sentence initially relied upon to justify such extreme restrictions is no longer operative.2 However, we also hold that, because this principle was not clearly established before today, the prison officials ("Defendants") in this consolidated appeal are entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, we will affirm the district courts' grants of summary judgment in favor of Defendants based on qualified immunity. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that this liberty interest, as explained more fully below, is now clearly established.
Craig Williams and Shawn T. Walker ("Plaintiffs")3 are inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Each was sentenced to death and housed on the death row of his respective institution following imposition of his death sentence. Eventually, their death sentences were vacated, but several years elapsed before they were resentenced to life without parole.4 In the interim, Plaintiffs were kept on death row until their appeals were finally decided. Accordingly, they spent several years in the solitary confinement of death row from the date their death sentences were vacated, until they were finally resentenced to life imprisonment and placed in the general population.5
After their sentences were vacated, each Plaintiff brought suit seeking damages6 from various DOC officials.7 Their suits allege the officials violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by continuing to subject them to the deprivations of solitary confinement on death row without meaningful review of their placements after their death sentences had been vacated.8 Inasmuch as the claimed liberty interest turns on the conditions of Plaintiffs' confinement, we will first describe those conditions and the legal authority relied upon to impose it, and then address whether those conditions violate a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Plaintiffs were placed on death row after receiving their death sentences pursuant to 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303, which provides:
Plaintiffs assert that this provision no longer applied to them once their death sentences were vacated. They further stress that they did not receive meaningful review of their continuing placement on death row to determine if the deprivations of that placement were necessary.
In total, Walker spent approximately twenty years on death row. Roughly eight of those years were spent after he had been granted a resentencing hearing.10 Williams spent twenty-two years on death row, with six of those years following his grant of resentencing.11
After his death sentence was vacated, Walker remained on death row where he was confined in a windowless seven by twelve feet cell for almost twenty-four hours a day. There, like other death row inmates at SCI–Graterford, he lost "virtually all communication [with] the general population and the outside world."12 Walker was permitted four (non-legal) visits per month. During those visits he was 13 Even Walker's meals were provided in the isolation of his cell.
Walker was permitted to leave his cell only five times a week for two-hour intervals of exercise in the open air, in a restricted area known as the "dog cage."14 However, to enter the "dog cage," Walker first had to undergo an invasive strip search.15 To avoid the psychological and physical intrusion of these "full" body searches, Walker did not leave his cell for open air exercise for nearly seven years.16
Walker alleges that his prolonged confinement on death row in these constricting conditions has taken a toll on his mental and physical well-being. He describes these effects as "long term and debilitating." 17
For example, due to the constant noise of other inmates on death row, and a "fear of being executed accidentally," Walker developed insomnia.18 He also claims to suffer from uncontrollable body tremors and severe emotional distress.
Williams's plight on death row at SCI–Greene was similar to Walker's. He remained confined to his cell for almost twenty-two hours a day after his death sentence was vacated. His meals were also provided in the confines of his cell. Williams explains that because medical consultations were provided at his cell door, inmates in separate cells could hear his exchanges with medical providers, which compromised his privacy. During the short intervals that Williams was not in his cell, but in the prison yard, law library, or shower, he was held inside a small locked cage that continued to restrict his movement and freedom of association. Like Walker, he was only permitted non-contact visits.
Plaintiffs filed numerous prison grievances based on continually being subjected to these deprivations. Those grievances were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs then filed the suits that are before us in these consolidated appeals. The procedural background leading to these suits is as follows.
In 1988, Williams was convicted of first degree murder in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and was later sentenced to death. Williams's criminal judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.19 Williams then pursued relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").20 On July 11, 2006, the trial court concluded that Williams was entitled to a new penalty hearing. Williams appealed the court's denial of his guilt phase claims, but the State did not appeal the court's invalidation of the death sentence that was imposed at the sentencing phase. On May 1, 2012, Williams was resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Soon thereafter, he was finally removed from death row at SCI–Greene and placed in the general population.21
In July of 2012, Williams filed a pro se and in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various DOC officials. He alleged that his confinement on death row between the time that he was granted resentencing and the time his new sentence was imposed violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Williams's confinement while awaiting resentencing did not violate his constitutional rights. Defendants also argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity, a defense they had raised earlier in their answer to Williams's complaint. In a Report and Recommendation, the assigned Magistrate Judge concluded that Williams's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim failed because he did not have a liberty interest in being housed in the general prison population.22
The Magistrate Judge also concluded that because Defendants' policy of keeping inmates like Williams on death row even after their death sentences were vacated was grounded in legitimate penological goals, Williams did not have a substantive due process claim.23 Overruling Williams's objections, the district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.24 Williams appealed.
Walker was also convicted of first degree murder in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in 1992, and sentenced to death. The verdict and sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal.25 Walker thereafter filed for relief under the PCRA. In April 2004, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas upheld his conviction but granted a new sentencing hearing. After additional unsuccessful challenges to his conviction,...
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