Williams v. Singler

Decision Date31 July 2013
Docket NumberNo. W2012-01253-COA-R3-JV,W2012-01253-COA-R3-JV
PartiesBRANDON WILLIAMS v. KATIE SINGLER
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Tipton County

No. 09-JV-139

Rachel J. Jackson, Judge, sitting by interchange

This appeal involves the modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties' minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the mother had violated the parenting plan and held that this constituted a material change in circumstances. It changed the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney fees as punishment for the contempt. The mother now appeals. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the finding of a material change in circumstances, but hold that the trial court erred in holding that it was in the child's best interest to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. We also vacate the holding of contempt against the mother and the award of attorney fees as punishment for the alleged contempt and remand for additional findings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court is Affirmed

in Part, Reversed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Frank Deslauriers, Covington, Tennessee, for Petitioner/Appellee Brandon Williams

Roscoe A. Feild, Memphis, Tennessee and Steven R. Walker, Oakland, Tennessee, for Respondent/Appellant Katie Singler

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Respondent/Appellant Katie Singler ("Mother") and Petitioner/Appellee Brandon Williams ("Father") had one child together, a son born in January 2008 ("Son"). The parties were never married to each other. Mother has been the child's primary caregiver since he was born.

After parentage proceedings were initiated in the Juvenile Court of Tipton County, Tennessee, in April 2009, Juvenile Court Judge William Peeler entered a consent order declaring Father to be Son's natural father. The consent order included an agreed permanent parenting plan that named Mother as the primary residential parent, gave Father alternate residential parenting time for two days each week on his days off work, and set Father's child support obligation.

In January 2010, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to designate him as the primary residential parent and to hold Mother in civil contempt for allegedly refusing to allow his scheduled parenting time on "numerous occasions." Father's petition recited several occasions on which Mother interfered with his parenting time and described Mother as "volatile and unstable."

Father's petition set off a confusing course of proceedings. Mother's initial response was to file a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Tipton County Juvenile Court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. The Tipton County Juvenile Court held a hearing on Mother's motion to dismiss in May 2010. This prompted an apparently premature interlocutory appeal.1

In July 2010, before any hearing on Father's January 2010 petition to modify the parenting plan and before entry of any order resolving the jurisdiction of the Tipton County Juvenile Court, Father filed another petition with allegations similar to those in his January 2010 petition. This second petition contained the heading "Petition for Writ of Scire Facias for Contempt and Emergency Petition for Custody." This "emergency petition" asserted that Mother "continues to deny . . . visitation without any legal cause and without anyexplanation," and asked the trial court to hold her in contempt for her denial of his parenting time. Father also alleged that Mother had lied to Father's supervisor in order to obtain Father's private cell phone number.

On August 11, 2010, again prior to entry of any order resolving Mother's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, an evidentiary hearing was held on Father's "emergency petition." The hearing was not held by Judge Peeler; it was conducted by Judge Rachel Jackson, by interchange. Judge Jackson conducted the hearing "to address visitation and contempt." The appellate record does not include a transcript of the hearing, but Judge Jackson apparently heard considerable testimony from both parties. During the hearing, after the trial court inquired about proof regarding harm to the child, the parties took a brief recess. After the recess, they announced that they had reached an agreement. By agreement, the proceedings were suspended and the issues of "Custody and/or Emergency Custody" were reserved. The parties agreed to "attempt to re-acclimate the child to the father" and to "strictly comply" with the existing parenting plan; the agreement included details on the times and days of Father's parenting time, and on the exchange of the child between the parents.

The next day, on August 12, 2010, Judge Peeler entered an order holding that the Tipton County Juvenile Court retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction because Father continued to reside in Tipton County. In the same order, Judge Peeler recused himself from hearing further proceedings in the matter, because Father was a police officer who often appeared in Judge Peeler's court.

A few days later, on August 16, 2010, Judge Jackson entered her order on the August 11, 2010 hearing. The order first denied Mother's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In her order, Judge Jackson noted that Mother had moved, with the child, to Shelby County. The order held, however, that the Tipton County Juvenile Court retained subject matter jurisdiction because both parties and the child resided in Tipton County when the original parentage proceedings were initiated, and Father continued to reside in Tipton County. The order observed that Mother's attorney had informed the Tipton County Juvenile Court that "a modification and/or contempt proceeding was filed in Shelby County," and stated that because the Shelby County court was without jurisdiction, the Tipton County Juvenile Court would consider any order entered by the Shelby County court to be void.

The August 16, 2010 order set forth the parties' agreement resolving their parenting dispute, and found the agreement to be reasonable and in the child's best interest. The order stated: "[I]t is expressly ordered . . . that the parties will strictly comply with these provisions and that there be no deviation whatsoever from its terms without the written agreement of both parties." (emphasis in original). The order included no findings of fact.

Unfortunately, the August 16, 2010 agreed order did little to resolve the parties' disputes. Less than a month later, in September 2010, Mother filed an emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time with their child and for a protective order. Mother's petition asserted that, when she picked up Son after his parenting time with Father, Mother saw a bruise on his buttock in the form of a hand print. Mother took the child to the hospital to be examined. After examining the bruise, Mother's petition said, the hospital staff contacted the police and the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS"). When police officers questioned the child about the bruise, the child said, "Daddy hit me because I went potty." The child's pediatrician apparently also examined the bruising; the pediatrician's notes described it as "likely signs of abuse." Mother's petition asserted that the child returned from visits with Father fearful about being spanked for making a mistake in his potty training. Mother alleged that Father had abused steroids in the past and asked for testing to determine if he was still abusing them. Mother's petition claimed that DCS, out of Shelby County, was investigating the incident regarding the child's bruising.

In response to Mother's petition, the trial court suspended Father's parenting time with the child, pending a preliminary hearing. It set a hearing for September 27, 2010. Shortly thereafter, Father filed a response denying the allegations of abuse. He also filed a "Counter-Petition for Immediate Custody and for Contempt." Father's counter-petition asserted that Mother had refused to permit him to see their child for his scheduled parenting time, in violation of the parenting plan, and that Mother's allegations against Father of abuse were "designed to cover up her own abuse of the child. . . ." Father asked the trial court to temporarily designate him as the primary residential parent, hold Mother in contempt of court, and grant Mother only supervised parenting time with the child.

The trial court held a preliminary hearing on Mother's emergency petition. The appellate record does not include a transcript or statement of the evidence from that hearing. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order vacating the protective order and enjoining both parties from using corporal discipline or discussing the legal proceedings with the child in a threatening way.2 The order set a date for a final hearing on the remaining issues, motions, and petitions. It included no findings of fact.

In early March 2011, before resolution of Father's outstanding petition to change the designation of primary residential parent, Mother filed a petition to increase Father's child support obligation. Her petition asserted that his child support obligation was miscalculated in the original child support order, and that consequently, Father owed an arrearage.

A few days later, on March 10, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Father's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent and Mother's petition...

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