Williams v. Sleepy Hollow Mining Co.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1906
• Citation: 86 P. 337,37 Colo. 62
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. SLEEPY HOLLOW MINING CO.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

86 P. 337

37 Colo. 62

WILLIAMS v. SLEEPY HOLLOW MINING CO.

Supreme Court of Colorado

June 4, 1906

Rehearing Denied July 2, 1906.

Error to District Court, Gilpin County; A. H. De France, Judge.

Action by Minnie Williams against the Sleepy Hollow Mining Company. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.

J. Warner Mills, H. A. Hicks, and Clinton Reed, for plaintiff in error.

Milton Smith and Percy Werner, for defendant in error.

BAILEY J.

Defendant was the owner of the Sleepy Hollow mine, situate in Gilpin county. The shaft was about 625 feet deep. The Americus mine with a shaft about 500 feet deep, joined the Sleepy Hollow on the west. The Mabee-Fisk mine, with a shaft more than 700 feet deep, joined the Americus on the west. The owners of the Americus ran a level, known as the '390-foot level,' eastward into the territory of the Sleepy Hollow. The Americus also ran a level known as the 490-foot level westward to within about 50 feet of the Mabee-Fisk line and opposite the point on the Mabee-Fisk property where the ore had been stoped out to the line between the Americus and the Mabee-Fisk, leaving 50 feet between the end of the 490-foot Americus level and this stoped ground. There had been a level known as the 'Fraser drift' run from the Mabee-Fisk property to the eastward, extending into the Americus property at a point below the Americus level, running parallel with it. A body of ore had been taken from this Fraser drift upon the Americus property, so that the distance between the upper portion of the stope from which the ore was taken to the bottom of the Americus tunnel was only about four feet, and the character of this rock in the intervening space appears to have been loose, veinous matter. The defendant made an upraise from its 400-foot level to connect with the end of the 390-foot level of the Americus which extended into the Sleepy Hollow property, so that the Sleepy Hollow and the Americus mines were connected at a point about 400 feet from the surface of the ground, and the Americus and Mabee-Fisk properties were connected with the exception of the few feet of veinous matter lying between the Fraser drift and the 490-foot level of the Americus property. The Mabee-Fisk mine became filled with water. The superintendent and manager of defendant company was warned of the presence of this water, and he caused his foreman and one of the employés, Williams by name, who was a brother of decedent, to visit the Mabee-Fisk shaft for the purpose of determining the extent to which it was filled with water. This foreman and Williams went down the Mabee-Fisk shaft to the Fraser drift and at that time found that the water was some 16 feet below the drift. They saw the Fraser drift, but made no investigation as to how far it extended eastward. The water continued to rise in the Mabee-Fisk shaft and the superintendent of that property continued to inform the superintendent of the Sleepy Hollow property of the extent of the water. This continued from time to time until the water in the Mabee-Fisk shaft had reached a point about 200 feet above the Americus 490-foot level, at the place where there were only a few feet of rock between that level and the Fraser drift. At about this time the superintendent of defendant was again cautioned by the superintendent of the Mabee-Fisk property, and was told by such superintendent that the defendant's employés would be drowned shortly unless some precautions were taken. In none of these conversations was there any mention made of the fact that the Fraser drift extended into the Americus property, and had been stoped out so closely to the Americus 490-foot level. It appears that this defendant's superintendent rested under the belief that there were 50 feet of matter between the Mabee-Fisk property and the Americus, so that the water would have to break through this 50 feet of stone before it could reach the Americus property and before it could reach defendant's employés. It nowhere appears in the testimony that defendant's agents knew that the Fraser drift had extended into the Americus property. It does appear, however, that Carbis, defendant's foreman, who went into the Mabee-Fisk shaft for the purpose of measuring the water, saw the Fraser drift, and saw that it extended in the direction of the Americus property, but made no investigation to determine its extent. Williams, the deceased, talked with his brother, who was defendant's timber boss--that is, had charge of the timbering in defendant's property--and told him that he had heard at Black Hawk, a town nearby, that the lives of employés in the Sleepy Hollow property were in danger by reason of this water. The brother did not think so, because of the distance existing, as he supposed, between the Americus workings and the Mabee-Fisk workings. A few days after this conversation the water broke through from the Fraser drift, running through the Americus property and into the Sleepy Hollow property, and Williams was drowned. This action was brought by Minnie Williams, the widow of deceased. At the trial, after plaintiff had proved the foregoing facts, the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and in doing so stated that before plaintiff could recover she would have to prove that there was danger; that it was known to the defendant; that it was not known to deceased, and that defendant had not warned the deceased of this danger; that if there is a failure or want of proof upon either of these conditions, then a verdict should be directed for the defendant. A writ of error was prosecuted, assigning the direction of the verdict as error, as well as some other alleged errors occurring in the course of the trial.

We cannot say that as a matter of law the defendant was or was not negligent in failing to make such examination of the adjoining premises as would lead it to a full understanding of existing conditions. There is no dispute as to the facts in this case but it is over the conclusions to be drawn from the facts that the controversy arises, and it is the rule in this state that if the facts are such that honest men might honestly differ as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, then the matter should be left to the jury. Empson Packing Co. v. Vaughn, 27 Colo. 71, 59 P. 749; Solly v. Chayton, 12 Colo. 33, 20 P. 351; Railway Co. v. Martin, 7 Colo. 599, 4 P. 1118. The same rule is announced by the United States Supreme Court in Railway Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 665, 21 L.Ed. 745, wherein it is held that, even though the facts are not disputed but are such that different minds might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the case must be left to the jury for their determination. Negligence in a particular case is generally a matter for the jury to determine, and it is always so when the measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable care. In such cases the standard of duty is variable. Cunningham v. U. P. Ry. Co., 4 Utah 206, 7 P. 795; W. C. & P. Ry. Co. v. McElwee, 67 Pa. 315.

Defendant seems to argue that because the water was located at some distance from this property, and was an extraneous cause of danger, defendant was under no obligation to make an investigation as to the extent of this danger. To this we cannot agree as a legal proposition. The employer must exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably safe place in which the employé may perform the services required of him. It is his duty to use diligence to keep his place in reasonably safe condition so that the servant may not be exposed to unnecessary risks. The care and diligence required differ as circumstances differ, but in all cases it is such as a reasonably prudent man would exercise under like circumstances in order to protect the persons of his employés from destruction or injury. A far higher degree of care is necessary in the case of an employer whose employés are far underground with but scant means of escape in case of danger than where the employés are not subject to unseen dangers or are in such a position that escape may be readily effected. The master is bound to use such care as circumstances demand from a reasonably prudent man. If he fails to do so, he is negligent. In actions like the present one, questions of negligence are for the jury. The ordinary care which the parties are to use in the discharge of their respective duties so varies with the situation of the parties, their knowledge or means of knowledge, the surrounding circumstances of each particular case, the measurement of which depends so much upon the knowledge and experience of practical men in practical affairs, that it has long been the policy of the law to submit the question of reasonable care to the judgment of a jury. It is only when the facts are undisputed and are such that reasonable men can honestly draw but one conclusion from them that the court should consider the question of negligence one of law, and not of fact. U. P. Ry. Co. v. Jarvi, 53 F. 68, 3 C.C.A. 433. It is the duty of the master to furnish a safe place in which the servant is to perform his labor. It must not alone be safe from such dangers as are patent, but also from such as are latent; not alone from those in the place, but from such extraneous matters as menace its safety, and which could be ascertained upon reasonable inquiry.

Appellee knowing of the existence of the water in the neighboring mine in such quantities as to become dangerous to its employés, was in justice bound to make such investigations as would suggest themselves to one using ordinary care and prudence, and if, upon making such investigation, it learned that there was danger of the mine becoming flooded, it then became its duty to make such provision for the...