Williams v. Smelt
| Decision Date | 14 October 1955 |
| Citation | 83 So.2d 1 |
| Parties | Hugh Emmet WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Frank Arthur SMELT, William Catlin, William Catlin, Jr., Bertha M. Catlin and S. Marshall Catlin, individually and as copartners, trading and doing business as William Catlin & Sons, and Clarence M. Steinman, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Osborne, Copp & Markham and J. Henson Markham, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Jack F. Wayman, Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy and Francis P. Conroy, Jacksonville, for Frank Arthur Smelt.
Howell & Kirby and Thos. Malcolm Kirby, Jacksonville, for William Catlin, William Catlin, Jr., S. Marshall Catlin, Bertha M. Catlin and Clarence M. Steinman, appellees.
Appellant Williams, one of a group of defendants in an automobile negligence case, appeals from a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee Smelt, the plaintiff below, naming also as appellees Steinman and Catlin, who were co-defendants below but who received a favorable verdict of the jury at the trial.
Smelt filed a complaint for personal injuries and property damage against Williams, Steinman and Catlin. The injury allegedly occurred when the car of Smelt, driven by Steinman, collided with the car of Williams, driven by the owner. Smelt had taken his automobile to the garage of Catlin to have it repaired. Steinman, an employee of Catlin, was directed by his employer to 'road test' the car to check it. Smelt handed the keys to Steinman who was, therefore, driving the car with the knowledge and consent of the owner. Smelt was sitting on the front seat beside the driver with Catlin sitting on the rear seat of the Smelt car when the collision occurred.
In one complaint Smelt sued Williams, Steinman and Catlin. The complaint outlined the factual background above summarized and then claimed that the injury to Smelt was proximately caused by the negligence of Williams, or in the alternative by the negligence of Steinman, or in the alternative by the concurring negligence of both Williams and Steinman. Catlin was named a defendant because Steinman was his employee acting pursuant to his instructions. Williams counterclaimed against Smelt and crossclaimed against Steinman and Catlin. The Court denied Williams' motion to dismiss the complaint and the jury found for Smelt against Williams but in favor of the other defendants.
The obvious effect of the verdict was that the jury found Williams negligent but found Steinman and, therefore, Catlin not negligent. Before the case went to the jury, the trial Judge denied motions for directed verdicts by all of the parties but he did instruct the jury that if they found that both Steinman and Williams were concurrently negligent, then they could not find against Williams in favor of Smelt for the reason that Smelt would be bound by the negligence of Steinman, the driver of his automobile with his knowledge and consent.
On appeal Williams contends that his motion to dismiss and his motion for directed verdict should have been granted because under the 'dangerous instrumentality doctrine' any negligence of Steinman, driver of the Smelt automobile with the knowledge and consent of the owner, was imputable to Smelt and, therefore, under the allegations of his complaint, he (Smelt) was necessarily guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Williams also contends that the facts revealed by the record should lead us to the conclusion that Williams was guilty of no negligence as a matter of law, and that, by the same token, Smelt was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
We are frank to admit that prior to January 1, 1950, when the so-called new common-law rules became effective, the complaint in this case would have been subject to all of the vices contended against it by the appellant. On that date, however, the Florida Bar rejected its allegiance to the old...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Price v. Florida Power & Light Co., 3354
...Fla.1959, 112 So.2d 832; Lynch v. Walker, 1947, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268; Fleming v. Alter, Fla.1953, 69 So.2d 185; Williams v. Smelt, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 1.7 See discussion in 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § ...
-
Hoover v. State, 67--862
...The evidence is conflicting but it is a fundamental principle that an appellate court does not sit as the trier of fact. Williams v. Smelt, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 1. Where there are conflicts in the evidence in a non-jury trial, it is within the province of the trial judge to reject any testimo......
-
Stegemann v. Hite
...dispute as to the existence of negligence was resolved by the jurors under appropriate instructions by the trial judge. Williams v. Smelt, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 1. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and PEARSON, J., concur. ...
-
Stanley v. State, 68-812
...the briefs and arguments of counsel and have concluded that appellant's contentions are without substantial merit. Williams v. Smelt, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 1; Gibson v. State, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 128; Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 24. Affirmed. PEARSON, Judge (dissenting). It is m......