Williams v. Southland Corp., 53707
| Citation | 237 S.E.2d 639,143 Ga.App. 111 |
| Decision Date | 14 July 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 53707,No. 1,53707,1 |
| Parties | P. D. WILLIAMS et al. v. SOUTHLAND CORPORATION |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Driebe & Lawson, Charles J. Driebe, Eugene E. Lawson, Jonesboro, for appellants.
Ervin, McCullough & Sherrill, John A. Sherrill, Atlanta, for appellee.
Appellants sued the Southland Corporation for fraud, for breach of an oral contract, and for specific performance of a written contract. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment as to all three counts. Appellant has abandoned the count for specific performance and appeals the granting of summary judgment as to the counts for fraud and breach of the oral contract. Finding that it was error to grant summary judgment as to those two counts, we reverse.
In 1972 and 1973 Southland performed two oral contracts it had made with appellants through Pete Overton, Southland's real estate manager in charge of the development of 7-11 stores. First of all, Overton promised appellants that, if they acquired a specific piece of property in Jonesboro and had it rezoned for commercial use, Southland would buy the property from them; this deal was consummated as agreed. Secondly, again in furtherance of Southland's quest for development of 7-11 stores, Overton promised appellants that, if they bought certain property on the Flint River, had it properly zoned and built a store on it, Southland would lease the property from appellants. In consummation of this agreement, Southland, through Overton, signed a twenty-year lease on the newly constructed store, with appellants' association as landlord.
After Southland moved into the Flint River store, Overton requested of appellants that they buy a piece of property located on Boy Scout Road in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and sell it to Southland. Overton asked appellants to buy the Boy Scout Road property, the property in issue in this case, for the reason that they could probably acquire it for a much lower cost than could his corporation. He assured appellants that Southland would buy the property from them at a price which would reimburse them for the interest they had paid and the rent they had lost due to Southland's delay in occupying the Flint River store. In reliance upon these representations appellants agreed to Overton's proposition, and on January 2, 1974, they entered into a contract to purchase the Boy Scout Road property from Mr. and Mrs. William K. Friar for $17,500. On February 12, 1974, appellants and Overton, on behalf of Southland, entered into a written contract for the sale of the property to Southland for $23,000. Then, on February 25, 1974, as a result of Overton's further assurances that Southland's division manager had rendered final approval of the property and that Southland would definitely buy, appellants bought the Boy Scout Road property from the Friars. Southland has refused to purchase this property from appellants.
1. Appellants alleged in their complaint that Southland had twice agreed to buy the Boy Scout Road property from them, once by the written contract of February 12 and once by oral contract. They further alleged that at the time of entering into these contracts Southland fraudulently represented it had the intent to perform, an intent which it never actually possessed, and that, in purchasing the property and being unable to sell to Southland, they relied to their detriment on the fraudulent representation. Southland did not conclusively disprove that, through its agent, it had perpetrated a fraud upon appellants, and it was therefore error to grant Southland's motion for summary judgment.
It was undisputed that Overton was the employee of Southland throughout the events involving the Boy Scout Road property and that Overton had represented...
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