Williams v. Spencer

• Decision Date: 01 January 1890
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. SPENCER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

150 Mass. 346

23 N.E. 105

WILLIAMS v. SPENCER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

January 1, 1890

COUNSEL

F.P. Goulding and J.M. Cochran, for appellants.

W.S.B Hopkins, for appellee.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

How far the opinion of witnesses as to the mental condition of a testator may be received in evidence in proceedings to establish the validity of a will is a question about which there is a great conflict of authority. In this commonwealth and in the courts of common law in England, and in many of the states of this country, it is held that an ordinary witness cannot give a mere opinion, whatever opportunities of observation he may have had. On the other hand, in the ecclesiastical courts of England, and in many courts in the United States all witnesses have been permitted to give, not only facts upon which an opinion may properly be formed, but their opinions founded on those facts. It is universally held that an attesting witness may give his opinion, formed at the time, as to the sanity or insanity of the testator when the will was executed. In those courts where opinions are admitted on the ground that conclusions in regard to the mental condition of another, formed by one who has had an opportunity of observing him, are in themselves valuable and unobjectionable as evidence, there may be good reasons for holding that the final opinion of the witness at the time of the trial should be received. But where a different doctrine is held the opinions of attesting witnesses to a will stand upon a peculiar ground. The witnesses are chosen by the testator, and are thereby, under the law, charged with an important duty in relation to the execution and proof of the will. It may be presumed that, in the performance of that duty, they will observe carefully the appearance of the testator at the time, and form an opinion as to his sanity. That opinion naturally and properly may determine their action in signing or refusing to sign as witnesses. It is regarded as a fact of some significance, which enters into the transaction, and which the court should be permitted to know and consider, like any other fact touching the execution of the instrument. Upon this theory, the opinion of an attesting witness, formed at another time, before or after the execution of the will, should stand like that of any other witness. It might be competent, in cross-examination to affect the value of his testimony as to his conclusion at the time of attestation, but it could not be received on account of the value to be attached to it as a mere opinion. In Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330, the court permitted the witnesses to give "the judgment they formed of the soundness of the testator's mind at the time of executing the will." In Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 409, referring to the time of execution of a will, the court say: "It is the opinion then formed that is admissible." In Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, it is said of the facts testified to by the witnesses, which occurred at the time of attesting, that "it is legitimate to give them such additional weight as may be derived from the conviction they produced at the time." Jarman states the rule to be that "subscribing...