Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 10 July 1916
• Docket Number: 121
• Citation: 188 S.W. 826,125 Ark. 287
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

188 S.W. 826

125 Ark. 287

WILLIAMS v. STATE

No. 121

Supreme Court of Arkansas

July 10, 1916

Certiorari to Pulaski Circuit Court; R. J. Lea, Judge reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Robert L. Rogers, for appellant.

1. Appellant was clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the court while serving his sentence in the State penitentiary and had made no request to have his sentence set aside or modified. 110 Ark. 251; 7 A. & E. Enc. L. 36; 60 N.Y. 559; 19 Am. Rep 211; 30 Tex.App. 566; 70 Mich. 324 79 Id. 320; 44 N.W. 615; 42 Id. 1123; 70 Mich. 320.

2. Appellant was not guilty of contempt and there is no such punishment, under our laws, as "solitary confinement." Kirby's Digest, §§ 719-725, 3134, 3121-4 and cases supra.

Wallace Davis, Attorney General, and Hamilton Moses, Assistant, for appellee.

1. The appellant was under the complete jurisdiction of the court. 110 Ark. 251; Kirby's Digest, 3127, 3877; Act 222 Acts 1913; 50 Ark. 161; 32 Id. 462; 40 Cyc. 2160; 166 F. 74; 4 Wigmore on Ev. § 2199; 61 P. 961; 46 L. R. A. 707; 7 Paige, 150; 45 Ark. 245; 9 Barn. & Cress. 446; 110 Ill. 627; 51 Am. Rep. 706.

2. The action of the court in suspending the sentence was a proper exercise of judicial power. 74 Ind. 87; 67 N.Y. 218; 110 Ga. 234; 7 Utah 378; 65 Cal. 138; 49 Mo. 282; 124 Ky. 115; 50 Tex. Cr. Rep. 114; 61 Cal. 387; 9 Wallace, 38; Black on Judgments, § 297; 12 Cyc. 788; 106 N.Y.S. 925; 117 F. 798; 117 N. Car. 804.

3. Appellant was guilty of contempt. 185 S.W. 473; Const. Art. 7, § 26; 69 Ark. 550; 14 Id. 538; 16 Id. 384. The punishment for contempt is largely within the discretion of the court and no abuse of discretion appears.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

The appellant, Oscar Williams, has brought here for review the record of the proceedings of the circuit court of Pulaski County wherein he was adjudged by that court to be in contempt and sentenced, as a punishment for said contempt, to "solitary confinement" in the county jail of Pulaski County for a period of four months. It appears from the record that appellant was, on April 19, 1916, tried upon an indictment charging him with murder in the second degree and was convicted of that offense and sentenced to the State penitentiary for a term of five years, and on April 28th he was duly sentenced by the court and was delivered to the State penitentiary to begin his sentence.

L. B. King was indicted on the charge of being an accessory after the fact to the crime committed by appellant and was placed on trial in the Pulaski circuit court. Appellant was brought out of the penitentiary to attend the trial of King, and was by the State introduced as a witness, but he refused to testify in response to certain questions propounded to him by the prosecuting attorney, whereupon the trial court remanded appellant to the county jail until the next day. It is stated in the briefs, and not denied, that King was acquitted, though it does not appear that that fact was brought into the record in the present proceedings. At any rate, the appellant was subsequently brought out of jail upon order of the trial court, and an order was made setting aside the judgment of conviction and he was put on trial before the court for contempt in refusing to testify in the King trial. Certain questions were propounded to appellant by the court and by the prosecuting attorney as to his reason for refusing to testify against King, and as he gave no satisfactory excuse for such refusal the court adjudged him to be in contempt and ordered him confined in the county jail in "solitary confinement" until September 16, 1916, a period of four months from the date of judgment.

It is contended in the first place that there was no statutory authority for the court to compel or to provide for the attendance of appellant as a witness, but we pass over that point without discussion as we are of the opinion that when appellant was brought into court, by whatever means that were adopted, the court had the power to compel him to testify and to punish him for contempt for his refusal. The statute (Acts, 1913, [188 S.W. 827] p. 961) makes a convict competent as a witness, and the court had jurisdiction over his person when he came or was brought into court.

We pass, therefore, to the more serious question whether or not the court had the power to set aside the former judgment of conviction of felony, which judgment was then being enforced, for the purpose of imposing punishment for contempt and enforcing the judgment. While the question is not entirely free from doubt, we are of the opinion that the court possessed no such power. The Attorney General relies upon the established doctrine that all courts have continuing powers over their own judgments during the terms at which they are rendered; but while that power is an undoubted one, there are limitations upon the extent to which it may be exercised. There seems to be no question about the power of the court to set aside a judgment of conviction before the convict has begun serving his sentence, nor is there any doubt that the court has the power at any time during the term to set aside a judgment for the correction of errors. Here we have a case of the court attempting to set aside a judgment, not before the term of the sentence was begun, nor for the purpose of correcting any errors, but merely for the purpose of imposing another sentence during the period of the suspension of the judgment.

The court in its order imposing the punishment of confinement in the jail ordered that the appellant be brought into court at the expiration of the term for further proceedings in the original cause. The law takes no account of parts of a term of sentence, which continues from beginning...