Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 2018
• Docket Number: 1D17–1782,Nos. 1D17–1781,s. 1D17–1781
• Parties: John Eugene WILLIAMS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

244 So.3d 356

John Eugene WILLIAMS, III, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 1D17–1781

1D17–1782

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 18, 2018

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Lewis, J.

Appellant, John Eugene Williams, III, challenges in these consolidated cases his convictions for violating section 322.34(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), which makes it a first-degree misdemeanor for a person, except a habitual traffic offender, to obtain a second conviction for driving a motor vehicle while knowing that his or her driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges because the only offense with which he can be charged is driving without a valid driver's license given that he is a habitual traffic offender and he has never had a Florida driver's license and does not fall within a statutory exemption to the licensure requirement. For the foregoing reasons, we agree and, therefore, reverse and remand.

Appellant entered a plea of no contest to two charges of violating section 322.34(2)(b), while expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges. In his motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), Appellant argued that he could only be charged with driving without a valid driver's license because he was a habitual traffic offender and he did not have a driver's license or driving privilege. Specifically, Appellant contended that he did not have a driving privilege because he did not have a Florida driver's license and he did not fall within a statutory exemption to the licensing requirement. The State did not dispute Appellant's status as a habitual traffic offender and admitted that he has never had a driver's license. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that a person who has never been issued a driver's license by any government nevertheless has a driving privilege that can be suspended or revoked and that such person can, therefore, be convicted under section 322.34(2). The court reasoned that Appellant's interpretation of the statutorily undefined term "driving privilege" in section 322.34(2) allows persons who have never had a driver's license to escape punishment due to imprecise statutory drafting, elevates an unlicensed driver to a legally superior position over a licensed driver, and contravenes the Legislature's intent to foster public highway safety.

However, recognizing that there was support for Appellant's interpretation in the case law and in chapter 322, the trial court certified the following two questions as being of great public importance:

1: Does a person who has never had a driver's license issued to them by any government (state, federal, or foreign), and who is not exempt under section 322.04, have a ‘driving privilege’ in the State of Florida?

2: If the answer to Question One is no, can that person nonetheless be convicted of DWLSR, in violation of either section 322.34(1) or section 322.34(2), if DHSMV¹ has suspended or revoked that person's privilege to obtain a valid driver's license?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030 and 9.160, and we rephrase the certified questions as follows: Does a person who has never had a Florida driver's license and who is not exempt from the licensing requirement under section 322.031 or section 322.04, Florida Statutes, have a "driving privilege" such that he or she can be convicted under section 322.34(1) or section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes ? We answer the rephrased certified question in the negative.

The purpose of a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is to determine whether the undisputed facts the State will rely on establish a prima facie case, as a matter of law, so as to permit a jury to find the defendant guilty of the charged crime. State v. Depriest , 180 So.3d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Id. Questions of statutory construction are also reviewed de novo. W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See , 79 So.3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012).

The polestar of statutory construction is legislative intent. Id. at 8. To discern legislative intent, the court must first look to the plain and obvious meaning of the statute's text, which may be discerned from a dictionary. Id. at 9. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply that unequivocal meaning and may not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Id. The court must give full effect to all statutory provisions and avoid readings that would render a part of a statute meaningless; additionally, the court may not construe an unambiguous statute in a way that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. Bennett v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., Inc. , 71 So.3d 828, 838 (Fla. 2011). If an ambiguity exists, however, the court should look to the rules of statutory construction to help interpret legislative intent. See , 79 So.3d at 9.

"Except as otherwise authorized in [chapter 322, titled ‘Driver Licenses’], a person may not drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver license issued under this chapter." § 322.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; see also § 322.39(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, unless such violation is declared to be otherwise by this chapter or other law of this state."). Sections 322.031 and 322.04 set forth exceptions to the Florida driver's license requirement, which include nonresidents who possess a valid driver's license issued by their home state. §§ 322.031, 322.04, Fla. Stat. (2016).

Section 322.34 provides in part as follows:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked, except a "habitual traffic offender" as defined in s. 322.264, who drives a vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked is guilty of a moving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318.

(2) Any person whose driver license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264 , who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

....

(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

§ 322.34, Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphases added); see § 322.01(5), (17), (36), (40), Fla. Stat. (2016) (defining "[d]river license" as "a certificate that, subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive a motor vehicle and denotes an operator's license as defined in 49 U.S.C. s. 30301," "[c]ancellation" as "the act of declaring a driver license void and terminated," "[r]evocation" as "the termination of a licensee's privilege to drive," and "[s]uspension" as "the temporary withdrawal of a licensee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle") (emphases added); see also § 322.264(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2016) (defining "habitual traffic offender" as a person whose record shows that he or she has accumulated three or more convictions within a five-year period for "[d]riving a motor vehicle while his or her license is suspended or revoked") (emphasis added). The Legislature did not define the term "driving privilege." Cf. MERRIAM–WEBSTER , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/privilege (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (defining "privilege" as "a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor").

Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, a defendant who is a habitual traffic offender cannot be prosecuted under section 322.34(2). Finney v. State , 219 So.3d 254, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Moreover, "[a] person operating a motor vehicle on the roads of this State must possess a valid license issued by the State of Florida or fall under an exception to licensure." State v. Miller , 227 So.3d 562, 564 (Fla. 2017) (citing section 322.03(1) ). Considering sections 322.03 and 322.04in pari materia , the term "driving privilege" "refers to all the individuals who may lawfully operate vehicles on Florida's roads, even if they do not possess a Florida driver license." Id. at 564. A person who does not have a Florida driver's license and who does not fall within a statutory exemption to licensure does not have any driving privilege and is guilty of driving without a valid driver's license, a violation of section 322.03. Id. at 564–65 (noting that the Legislature has not created enhanced penalties for persons who accumulate multiple violations of section 322.03 ); see also Burgess v. State, 198 So.3d 1151, 1156–58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (en banc ) (interpreting "driving privilege" as "encompass[ing] an individual's ability to operate a motor vehicle in accord with law" and "at least includ[ing] both the ability to drive as conferred by a driver's license and the legal ability to drive as conferred by an exemption from licensure").

Turning to the cases before us, the trial court erred by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for two independent reasons.² First, given that it is undisputed that Appellant is a habitual traffic offender, he cannot be convicted under section 322.34(2).³ See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat.; see also Finney , 219 So.3d at 256. Second, given that it is undisputed that Appellant has never had a Florida driver's license and he does not fall within...