Williams v. State
| Docket Number | 22A-CR-1682 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
| Parties | John Loren Williams, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Porter Superior Court The Honorable Jeffrey W Clymer, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 64D02-2007-MR-5252
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Nathaniel C. Henson Devon DeMarco Rhame Elwood & McClure Portage, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, John Loren Williams (Williams), appeals his convictions for felony murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2); aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5; and his adjudication as an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
[¶2] We affirm.
[¶3] Williams presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
[¶4] Around noon on January 29, 2020, Williams contacted Kyle Levitt (Levitt) via Facebook messenger, inquiring about the purchase of marijuana and marijuana wax from Levitt. Levitt agreed to sell Williams the illegal substances for $70. Although no specific time for the purchase was set, Williams "essentially, prolonged" the time at which he was to arrive at Levitt's apartment throughout the afternoon and evening. (Transcript Vol. IV, p. 222). During that same time period, Williams was also messaging Travis Thompson (Thompson). He asked Thompson if he had a "pew pew machine" Williams could borrow. (State's Exh. Vol. XII, p. 44). When Thompson asked why Williams needed the gun, Williams explained that he intended to "rob a soft ass dealer." (State's Exh. Vol. XII, p. 44). They discussed what the "take" would be, where the robbery would occur, how to get there, whether the dealer would be armed, and the means to accomplish the robbery. (State's Exh. Vol. XII, p. 44). After concluding that the dealer would not be armed, Williams and Thompson decided that they did not need the weapon. Williams suggested to make it look like a "home invasion." (State's Exh. Vol. XII, p. 45). They agreed that after the dealer opened the door, Williams and Thompson would "over power [sic] him." (State's Exh. Vol. XII, pp. 47-48). Williams then identified the target as Levitt.
[¶5] Later that evening, Williams' girlfriend, Shayli Chambers (Chambers), drove Williams to a gas station, Wal-Mart, and a fast-food restaurant before picking up Thompson and driving both Williams and Thompson to Levitt's residence. Prior to leaving with Williams and Chambers, Thompson informed his wife that he was (Tr. Vol. V, p. 126). During the drive to Levitt's home, Chambers asked Williams if they were going to get marijuana, to which Williams responded, "something like that," and clarified that he was "going to takeoff [sic] with [Levitt's] belongings." (Tr. Vol. V, p. 189). When they arrived at Levitt's residence, Williams asked Thompson, "are you ready?" and they exited Chambers' vehicle. (Tr. Vol. V, p. 192-93).
Chambers parked on the side of Levitt's apartment building and waited for Williams and Thompson to return.
[¶6] Williams and Thompson knocked on Levitt's door. When Levitt opened the door, Williams punched him in the face. Williams restrained Levitt's arms over his head and pushed him into the bedroom. Levitt tried to escape the room, but Thompson said, "no no, just don't" and hit him in the face. (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 228-29). Williams continued to attack Levitt, with Levitt attempting to break free. During the struggle, Levitt's nightstand was overturned, and Levitt's hunting knife fell on the floor. Levitt grabbed the knife and swung at Williams. Although he missed Williams, he struck Thompson. Thompson yelled, "he just f*&%ing stabbed me" and ran out of Levitt's apartment. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 232). Williams followed Thompson, taking the marijuana and wax with him. Levitt locked the doors behind them.
[¶7] Williams ran to Chambers' vehicle, informing her that they needed to go get Thompson. When they arrived at the front of the building, Thompson was lying on the sidewalk. Williams attempted to pick up Thompson and place him in the vehicle, but he could not lift Thompson. When Chambers informed Williams that she was leaving, Williams jumped into the car and left Thompson on the sidewalk, where he ultimately succumbed as a result of the knife having cut one of his femoral arteries. Thompson's body was later discovered by a passerby on her way home from work.
[¶8] Responding officers followed a blood trail from Thompson's body to Levitt's apartment. After entering the apartment, officers located Levitt, who was transported to the Valparaiso Police Department for questioning. When the officers noticed that Levitt's facial injuries worsened, they transported Levitt to the hospital for medical treatment. Levitt had incurred multiple fractures around his eye that required reconstructive surgery to remove bone fragments and to insert plates and pins required to place Levitt's eye back into position. He also suffered bruising and abrasions to his face, chest, and back.
[¶9] On July 14, 2020, the State filed an Information, charging Williams with Count I, felony murder; Count II, robbery, a Level 2 felony; Count III, attempted robbery, a Level 2 felony; Count IV, robbery, a Level 3 felony; Count V, attempted robbery, a Level 3 felony; Count VI, aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; Count VII, robbery, a Level 5 felony; Count VIII, attempted robbery, a Level 5 felony; and Count IX, battery, a Level 5 felony. The State also alleged Williams to be an habitual offender. On April 4 through April 14, 2022, the trial court conducted a jury trial. During the proceedings, the State sought to admit the Facebook messages exchanged between Williams and Thompson through Thompson's wife's testimony, to which Williams objected. The State argued that Williams' messages were admissible as statements of a party opponent pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and that Thompson's statements were admissible as statements made by a co-conspirator under Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(E). In response, Williams contended that the messages were not properly authenticated, were unfairly prejudicial, and did not demonstrate an agreement to commit robbery. The trial court overruled Williams' objections and admitted the messages. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict for felony murder, attempted robbery, as Level 2, 3, and 5 felonies, aggravated battery, as a Level 3 felony, and battery as a Level 5 felony, as well as finding Williams to be an habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated Williams' convictions for attempted robbery as Level 2, 3, and 5 felonies, and battery as a Level 5 felony due to double jeopardy concerns. The court sentenced Williams to fifty-five years for felony murder, enhanced by twenty years for his habitual offender adjudication, and sixteen years for aggravated battery, with sentences to be served consecutively.
[¶10] Williams now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[¶11] Williams first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Facebook messages exchanged between Williams and Thompson pursuant to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rules. We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 255 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion when the admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. In reviewing a trial court's ruling, we will not reweigh the evidence and will view conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, deferring to the trial court's factual determinations unless clearly erroneous. Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1114 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. We affirm "a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record." Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 924, 931 n.5 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (citing Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998)), trans. denied.
[¶12] In deciding whether to admit an out-of-court statement, a trial court must answer two preliminary questions: Is the statement hearsay, and, if so, does an exception apply? D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 226 (Ind. 2009). As to the first question, the State, Williams, and trial court agreed that the Facebook messages the State proffered for admission through Thompson's wife's testimony constituted hearsay statements. See Evid. R. 801(c) ("Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."). What divided the parties was whether the messages sent by Thompson to Williams properly fell within the hearsay exception of co-conspirator statements.[1] Supporting the trial court's decision the State insists that Thompson's messages to Williams are admissible because, as a co-conspirator, he sent those messages in furtherance of the conspiracy to rob...
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