Williams v. State
Decision Date | 22 May 1984 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 664 |
Citation | 455 So.2d 210 |
Parties | Edward WILLIAMS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Maurice S. Bell, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg and Jennifer M. Mullins, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Edward Williams, the appellant, was charged in two separate indictments with the sale of marijuana. The cases were consolidated for trial and a jury found him guilty in each case. In each case he received a five-year sentence which was suspended on the condition that Williams serve two years' imprisonment with three years on probation, with the split sentences to run concurrently. Three issues are raised on appeal.
Williams argues that the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt was a doubt based on "a real reason, a substantial reason." He contends that the use of "real" and "substantial" to modify reason instead of doubt constitutes error.
In his oral charge the trial judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt is a doubt "based on a reason, a real reason, a substantial reason." After defense counsel objected, the trial judge stated:
Defense counsel made further objection because he did not believe the jury needed We find no error in the judge's instructions.
In Hall v. State, 54 Ala.App. 198, 202, 306 So.2d 290 (1974), cert. denied, 293 Ala. 757, 306 So.2d 286 (1975), it was recognized that a reasonable doubt is properly defined as "a doubt for which a reason may be given", and the following charge was approved:
However, our Supreme Court has viewed this definition of reasonable doubt more critically. In Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104, 108 (1874), that court held: See also Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238, 241 (1899) () . "Obviously this is true, since the doubt must be actual and substantial to entitle a defendant to an acquittal, and therefore a reasonable doubt, while a doubt for which a reason can be given may be capricious, speculative, and without the shadow of substance." Talbert v. State, 121 Ala. 33, 25 So. 690, 692 (1899). "There can be no question but that every doubt one has, is a doubt for which a reason may be given, but it does not follow that a doubt for which a reason can be given is necessarily a reasonable doubt." Avery v. State, 124 Ala. 20, 27 So. 505, 506 (1900) (Justices Haralson and Dowdell dissenting). "There may be a reason to doubt, which does not justify a reasonable doubt or the inference of probable innocence." Peagler v. State, 110 Ala. 11, 20 So. 363-64 (1896).
"According to common acceptation, to give a reason for the existence of a mental condition is to state why it exists, and in that sense a reason may be given for any degree of doubt; and a reason is nevertheless a reason, though it be based upon mere conjecture, or on matters disconnected from the evidence and improper to be considered by the jury." Avery, 27 So. at 506.
Although a requested charge which defines reasonable doubt as a doubt for which a reason can be given is misleading, Bain v. State, 74 Ala. 38, 39 (1883), its giving or refusal does not constitute error. Caddell v. State, 136 Ala. 9, 34 So. 191, 192 (1903); Avery v. State, 124 Ala. 20, 27 So. 505, 506 (1900).
While the instruction in this case may be subject to criticism, it is not erroneous in light of the authorities cited above. When read in conjunction with the entire oral charge, the objectionable portions were intended to impress on the jury the distinction between a reasonable doubt and a vague, imaginary, or possible doubt, and do not constitute such error as to require a reversal. ...
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