Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 29 April 1908
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 63

110 S.W. 63

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 29, 1908.

Appeal from Falls County Court; D. H. Boyles, Judge.

Alfred Williams was convicted of willfully injuring real and personal property, and he appeals. Affirmed.

E. W. Bounds, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Frank Oltorf, Asst. County Atty., for the State.

RAMSEY, J.

Appellant was charged by information in the county court of Falls county with willfully, wantonly, and mischievously injuring certain real and personal property belonging to one Smith. In another count it was alleged that he injured a certain room in a dwelling house belonging to Smith by befouling, defacing, and discoloring the floor of said room, and in a third count the same charge was laid against him. In the first count the window charged to have been injured was alleged to be of the value of $1, in the second count the room injured was alleged to be of the value of $45, and in the third count the value of the room charged to have been injured was alleged to be of the value of $190. On trial he was convicted, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $5.

1. Appellant relies, substantially, on three propositions for reversal of his cause: First. It is claimed that the court erred in overruling appellant's special plea of former jeopardy and former conviction. The facts briefly show that a complaint was filed against him in the justice court of Falls county, alleging injury to property of the value of less than $50, and that on trial he was in the justice court convicted; but thereafter and within the time and manner provided by law he perfected an appeal in said cause to the county court of Falls county; that thereafter a nolle prosequi was entered in said cause and same dismissed. The contention of appellant, as we understand, is that the county attorney had no authority to dismiss the case appealed from the justice court to the county court without first filing his reasons therefor in writing and having such reasons incorporated in the judgment of dismissal, and that, said cause having been dismissed without such reasons being filed, the action of the county court is void, and the cause is still on the docket against appellant. We do not think that this contention can be sustained. In the first place, when appellant perfected his appeal from the justice court, this had the result to absolutely vacate the former judgment of conviction, and the case stood for trial in the county court de novo, and as though the prosecution had just begun, and as though no conviction had theretofore been had. It lay well within the power of the county attorney for good cause and by consent of the court to enter an order of dismissal or nolle prosequi therein. The statute requiring the county attorney in such cases to file his reasons is largely directory, and when and where, on filing such reasons, or without filing same, the court having jurisdiction of the case does in fact enter an order of dismissal, such judgment is conclusive. While in practice it is better for the protection and information of the court to preserve in substantial form the grounds of the county attorney's action, the failure so to do will not have the effect to render the judgment of the court invalid. Parchman v. State, 2 Tex. App. 228, 27 Am. Rep. 435.

2. Again, it is contended that the court erred in failing to charge the jury that Aurelious Nicholson, a witness in the case, was an accomplice, and that before they could convict appellant the testimony of this witness must be corroborated. We think, under the evidence, that this witness was an accomplice in the sense that this term is used in article 781 of our Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been not infrequently held that the word "accomplice," when applied to evidence, includes not only principal offenders, but accomplices, accessories, and all those who are particeps criminis; that it has a broader signification when applied to evidence than it has in article 79 of the Penal Code, which defines an accomplice in crime; that as used in our Code of Criminal Procedure, requiring the corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice in order to convict, it means a person who, either as a principal, accomplice, or...