Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 1899
• Citation: 54 S.W. 759
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

54 S.W. 759

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 18, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Waller county; Wells Thompson, Judge.

Dan Williams, convicted of manslaughter, appeals. Affirmed.

Lipscomb & Styles and W. J. Poole, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

Appellant was convicted of manslaughter, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of five years.

Appellant, a deputy sheriff, had arrested one Joe Wilson at Hempstead, in Waller county, for disturbing the peace, and, after arresting him, started to the jail with said Wilson, who was drunk; and in a struggle with the prisoner appellant threw him down, and had hold of him when deceased came up and struck appellant, —some of the evidence showing with a stick, and some with a brick,—and, in the course of the altercation with deceased, appellant said that if deceased struck him again he would shoot him. Deceased did so, and appellant drew a pistol and killed him. This is a brief statement, as we understand it, of all the main features of the evidence.

The first ground of the motion for new trial is "that the verdict and judgment is contrary to the law and the evidence, and the judgment is not supported by the evidence." We cannot say that either of these contentions is correct, but think the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.

His second complaint is "that the indictment and the alleged offense are of a very recent date, it being during the term of this court, while many people were in the city and about the place of the homicide. There was a great deal of prejudice against defendant, and it was at that time impossible for him to secure a fair and impartial trial." A bare statement of this character would not authorize us to reverse this case. The record must show something tangible, indicating the correctness of the contention. The constitution guaranties a defendant a fair, impartial, and speedy trial; and, if this trial is fair (and we see nothing to indicate the contrary), we have no ground for interfering with the verdict.

He contends in his third ground that the verdict of the jury is excessive. We cannot say that it is, under the facts of this case.

The fourth ground assigned as error is that the court failed to charge all the law applicable to the facts proven. In this assignment appellant does not state wherein the charge is defective. Taken as a whole, we believe the charge is the law applicable to the facts of the case. At any rate, there is not such error in the same as is calculated to prejudice the rights of appellant.

His fifth ground is: "The court erred to the prejudice of defendant in the following portion of his charge: `If you believe from the evidence that defendant, as deputy sheriff, had arrested and had in his custody Joe Wilson, and was in the act of taking him to jail, and deceased came up and struck defendant a blow with a stick, and tried to prevent defendant from taking said Joe Wilson to jail, and that thereupon defendant shot and killed deceased, then it is for you to determine from all the facts and circumstances in evidence whether or not defendant had the right to resort to use of weapons to prevent a rescue of his prisoner, if you believe a rescue was being made, and whether the resort to such weapons was the use of more force than was reasonably necessary in his position, and whether or not, under the facts in evidence, defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree, or guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty, as you may find under these instructions,'" —appellant's contention being that the court did not charge all the law applicable to the facts, in this: that the charge restricts defendant's right of defense to a blow with a stick, when under the evidence the blow might have been with a brick, with the fist, or by shoving defendant's head against an iron fence. This charge must be taken in connection with the whole charge. We find upon an inspection of the same that the court instructed the jury upon murder in the second degree, manslaughter aroused from...