Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 03 February 1903
• Citation: 45 Fla. 128,34 So. 279
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.

34 So. 279

45 Fla. 128

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

February 3, 1903

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Minor S. Jones, Judge.

James O. Williams was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. When an indictment for murder in the first degree conforms to the statute in alleging that the assault was made and the shooting was done 'unlawfully, feloniously, and from a premeditated design to effect the death' of the person shot, it is not necessary to further allege that the assault and shooting were made and done with malice, or with malice aforethought.

2. Where it does not appear that the action of the trial judge in excusing a person called as a juror was in any way prejudicial to the defendant, or that there was any abuse of discretion, no error is shown.

3. In the conduct of a trial the trial judge must necessarily exercise a large discretion in excusing persons from jury service, in dealing with jurors who are sick, and in convening and adjourning the court; and where his conduct of the trial is not in any way prejudicial to the defendant, or in violation of any law, it affords no ground for reversal of a case.

4. A witness who is a physician, and who has testified as an expert for the defendant, and has stated that the defendant was suffering from acute delusions of insanity, may properly be asked on cross-examination: 'In discussing the act of a person, is not this the test of delusional insanity: Did he do the act under the delusion believing it to be other than it was?' and the further question: 'Then, if that person does the act knowing what it was, believing it to be exactly as it was, is he laboring under any delusion?'

5. A general objection to a question asked a witness, no precise ground of objection being stated, where the question objected to is not palpably improper, and inadmissible for any purpose or under any circumstances, will not be considered.

6. When a single assignment of error embraces objections to the rulings of the court on three distinct and separate questions asked a witness, this court will consider such an assignment no further after discovering that one of the objections is without merit.

7. With reference to the sufficiency of the scope of a hypothetical question propounded to an expert witness, the third headnote in Baker v. State, 11 So. 492, 30 Fla. 41, and the explication of the principle asserted therein, contained in the opinion, are approved and followed.

8. Where the only argument or comments in the briefs of plaintiff in error in reference to a number of assignments of error predicated on refusals of the trial judge to give various instructions is that 'we think the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested,' and where the same method of argument is pursued with reference to assignments of error based on the charge given by the court this court, following the rule laid down in Thomas v State, 18 So. 331, 36 Fla. 109, will read the charges and instructions, and, if no glaring error prejudicial to the plaintiff in error is discovered. will not further investigate the assignments involved.

9. An expert witness, who has given an opinion upon a question submitted to him, may be further examined as to the reasons for his opinion.

10. In a trial upon an indictment charging murder in the first degree, where there is a single defendant, and where the record shows who composed the jury, the court in which the trial is had, and the date of the return of the verdict, a verdict in the following form is sufficient: 'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and recommend him to the mercy of the court.'

11. Where there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the jury, even though the evidence be conflicting, and no error in law is discovered, this court will not reverse the ruling of the trial judge overruling a motion for a new trial based on the ground that the verdict is contrary to law against the weight of evidence, and contrary to the evidence.

12. Where the question of a defendant's sanity and responsibility has been fairly submitted to the jury, both in the evidence and in the charges of the court, this court will not reverse the judgment on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity at the time of the homicide. The doctrines of the law as to insanity as a defense enunciated in Davis v State, 32 So. 822, 44 Fla. ----, approved and followed.

13. When, after a verdict has been rendered by the jury finding the defendant guilty, a motion to stay the sentence and judgment is made, and the court is requested to impanel a jury to try the question of the present insanity of defendant, supported by affidavits, on the ground that the defendant is presently insane, and incapable of answering the court what he, the defendant, had to say why sentence should not be passed upon him, and where the affidavits offered to sustain such motion were made by persons who testified in the trial on behalf of the defendant upon the question of his sanity at the time of the homicidal act, and such affidavits do not set up any new facts tending to show the present insanity of the defendant, and the trial judge has had opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the defendant in court, and from such opportunity and other auxiliary means to form an opinion as to the sanity of the defendant, and the judge has no doubt of the present sanity of defendant, he commits no error in refusing said motion.

COUNSEL G. A. Worley and H. F. Atkinson, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., and Alex. St. Clair-Abrams, for the State.

OPINION

HOCKER J.

At the spring term, A. D. 1902, of the circuit court of Dade county, Fla., James O. Williams, the plaintiff in error, was indicted for the murder of Mark D. Bartleson, was tried at said term, was found by the jury guilty of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation to mercy, and was sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary. From the judgment and sentence a writ of error was sued out from this court.

The first assignment of error is: 'The court erred in denying defendant's motion to quash the indictment.' The only contention made in the brief of plaintiff in error to sustain this assignment is that the indictment does not allege malice; malice being an essential element of the crime of murder.

The indictment, which is in the usual form, after the ordinary introductory statements, presents that both an assault was made on Bartleson by Williams, and that Bartleson was shot by Williams 'unlawfully, feloniously, and from a premeditated design to effect the death of said Mark D. Bartleson.' Under our statute, the indictment sufficiently charges murder in the first degree.

The second assignment of error: The court erred in requiring the juror Bloodworth to answer question of State Attorney, 'Would the condition of your business so affect your mind as to prevent you from giving a careful and thoughtful consideration over the objection of defendant?'

The third assignment of error: 'The court erred in excusing the juror Bloodworth for cause as shown on the record.'

Considering the two last assignments of error together, it does not appear that the action of the judge in excusing the juror was in any way prejudicial to the defendant, or that there was any abuse of discretion. Edwards v. State, 39 Fla. 753, 23 So. 537; John D. C. v. State ex rel. Julia V. H., 16 Fla. 554, text, 561.

The fourth assignment of error: The court erred in making the following ruling: 'The panel of twelve jurors was tendered to the defendant by the state, two being absent from the box, reported sick. Counsel for defendant objected to the tender on the ground that two of the jurors were absent from the box. The Court: The court does not require you to accept or challenge any member of this jury, but the matter stands in abeyance until seven o'clock this evening for inquiry of the condition of the jurors. (Counsel for defendant objected to the passing of the case until seven o'clock, which objection was overruled, and defendant excepted.)' The record shows that when the court met at 7 o'clock, upon the report of physicians as to the condition of the two sick jurors, they were excused from service by the court. There was no abuse of discretion. Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 196, 12 So. 677.

The fifth assignment of error: The court erred in having the witnesses who were to testify merely as medical experts put under the rule over the objection of the defendant. No authority is cited by plaintiff in error in support of this assignment, and no argument made to sustain it. No abuse of discretion appears. Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238; 21 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 982.

The sixth assignment of error: The court erred in admitting the pistol in evidence. The pistol was proven by the sheriff to have been delivered to him by the plaintiff in error a short time after the shooting, when he informed the sheriff he had shot a man. It was shown to be the same or a similar pistol, loaned by one of the witnesses to plaintiff in error a short while before the shooting. The court admitted it in evidence as the pistol given to the sheriff. No error appears.

The seventh assignment of error: The court erred in requiring the witness for the defendant, Dr. H. D. Allen, upon cross-examination to answer the question: 'In discussing the act of a person is not this the test of delusional insanity: Did he do the act under the delusion believing it to be other than it was?' over the objection of the defendant that the question was an improper cross....