Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 26 July 1972
• Citation: 491 S.W.2d 862
• Parties: Ira L. WILLIAMS et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 862

491 S.W.2d 862

Ira L. WILLIAMS et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

July 26, 1972 Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court March 5, 1973.

William T. Warren, and Robert T. McGowan, Nashville, for Ira L. williams.

David Vincent, Nashville, for John W. Partee.

John K. Kyle, Nashville, for John E. White.

Robert E. Hoehn, Nashville, for Earlis Jackson, Jr.

David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold Peebles, Jr., Martha C. Daughtrey, Asst. Dist. Attys. Gen., Nashville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

O'BRIEN, Judge.

Ira L. Williams, John W. Partee, John E. White, and Earlis Jackson, Jr., were indicted, and tried jointly, on a charge of murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The trial of a fifth defendant was severed and is not a matter for consideration here. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree against the four defendants, and fixed punishment at confinement of the State Penitentiary for a period of ninety-nine years and one day for each of them. The trial court rendered judgment accordingly. Motions for new trial were overruled and the matter is now properly before this court.

Separate briefs and assignments of error have been filed on behalf of each of the defendants by their appointed counsel.

The evidence in this case shows that on Christmas Eve, 1970, the defendants were involved in a robbery of the J & G Liquor Store in Nashville, Tennessee. In the course of the robbery a store employee, James Curley Stone, was shot, and died as a result of the shooting.

Each of these defendants assign error because the trial court failed to suppress their separate confessions, and each assess various reasons for making this assertion.

The trial court held an extensive and lengthy jury-out hearing over a period of nearly two full days on motions to suppress the statements of the defendants, held the matter under advisement over several days, reviewed the factual evidence as well as the law in issue, and then ruled the confessions admissible under conditions fixed by the court. We have reviewed the evidence heard by the trial judge on the questioned of whether the confessions of the defendants in this case were voluntarily, understandingly and knowingly made. This evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court ruling, and against the defendants, and will not be disturbed here except on a clear preponderance of the evidence indicating some prejudicial entrenchment upon the constitutional rights of the accused, which we do not find. All of the assignments charging error in failing to suppress the confessions of the individual defendants are overruled. See Janow v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 19.

Each of the defendants, with the exception to Jackson, have charged error to the trial court in admitting the masked confessions, of their co-defendants.

This question too was considered extensively in the two day preliminary hearing on suppression of confessions. The trial judge permitted the State's attorney to make a summary of the confession applicable to each defendant, omitting any possible reference to a co-defendant, and permitted the police officer who took the confessions to testify accordingly. We have thoroughly examined these statements and do not find that as admitted the separate confessions of the defendants violated the rule established in Bruton. The trial judge instructed the jury that the facts contained in each of the statements could only be considered as evidence, if any it was, against the defendant making the statement and should not be considered as evidence against any of the co-defendants. Of course, the confession or admission of any individual defendant was admissible against him. In the context in which they were admitted in the trial court, the admission of these separate confessions was not prejudicial to any co-defendant.

Further, if any such prejudicial error was incurred by the admission of the composite statements of the individual defendants, it is clear that any such error was cured, and rendered harmless, by the testimony of the defendant, Earlis Jackson. Jackson was the only one of the four defendants to testify. His testimony indicates he did so in an endeavor to exonerate himself from guilt for the robbery and murder. His full, unedited statement, implicating each of the other defendants by name, was introduced on cross-examination by the State's attorney. Each of the other three defendants had the right of confrontation by cross-examination of this defendant. This fully satisfied any question of violation of the Bruton rule. Also, see O'Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597; Garner v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 469 S.W.2d 542; Gant v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 518; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340.

Defendant, Williams, assigns error on the admission of the testimony of Bobby Bates nad Frank Hedspith on the premise that these witnesses had been present in court in violation of the rule sequestering witnesses. It appears from the record in this cause that witnesses, William Parrish and Robert Lee Bates did inadvertently enter the courtroom during the testimony of some of the State's witnesses in violation of the rule. The trial court found in a jury-out hearing that the testimony overheard by these witnesses was not related to the testimony they would give in the proceeding, and permitted them to testify. This is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and in the absence of any prejudicial exercise of this discretion, this court will not reverse. See Robilio v. United States, 263 U.S. 716, 44 S.Ct. 137, 68 L.Ed. 522; Ezell v. State, 220 Tenn. 11, 413 S.W.2d 678. The record does not indicate that the witness, Hedspith, was in the courtroom during the testimony of any other witness.

The fifth assignment of error on behalf of the defendant, Williams, Alleges that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce into evidence a gun allegedly used by this defendant when no proper foundation was laid for the introduction of such gun into evidence.

Although the State's description of the death weapon in its brief is inaccurate, the defendant by his confession admits he was holding the only gun fired in the robbery. He further admitted that after the robbery, he gave the gun to the witness, Robert Bates. Bates' testimony confirms that he obtained the pistol from the defendant, Williams. Subsequently, this weapon, a .25 caliber automatic, with part of the handle broken off was found concealed in Bates' apartment. Other witnesses placed this weapon in the possession of the defendant Williams. Subsequent evidence identified this weapon to be the one which fired the slug recovered from the body of the deceased. The evidence in the record clearly establishes a proper foundation for the admission of the weapon and the assignment is overruled.

The sixth assignment for the defendant, Williams, charges error to the trial court in requiring the defendants to present their proof, and the cross-examination, in a definite pattern without regard for the defendant's own preference and without regard for the strategy of the defendants. This assignment is not sustained by the record and is overruled.

The only remaining assignment of error on behalf of the defendant, Partee, not heretofore considered, charges error to the trial court in not suppressing and excluding as evidence the line-up and courtroom identification of this defendant.

Defendant cites Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 77, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, as authority for reversal on these grounds. The facts of this case do not exceed the standards set forth in Simmons, supra, and the photographic identification procedure employed was not impermissibly...