Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 1904 |
| Citation | 48 S.E. 368,120 Ga. 870 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It is not incumbent on a trial judge, in the absence of a timely written request to charge, to specially call the attention of the jury to a theory suggested by particular testimony relied on by one on trial for murder as establishing his plea of self-defense, and instruct them that they should consider this particular evidence in determining whether or not, at the time of the killing, the accused was actuated by the fears of a reasonable man.
2. An omission to charge a proposition of law favorable to the accused cannot be taken advantage of by assigning error upon a wholly unobjectionable instruction given to the jury.
3. In charging the jury in the present case the trial judge did not, by any error of commission or omission, deprive the accused in any measure of the benefit of his plea of self-defense.
4. There being evidence upon which the jury could properly find as they did, that the accused was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the court did not err in charging them as to the law bearing upon that grade of homicide.
Error from Superior Court, Coweta County; R. W. Freeman, Judge.
Bud Williams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.
A. H Freeman, for plaintiff in error.
H. A Hall, Sol. Gen., for the State.
The accused was brought to trial on an indictment for murder, and the jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. He made a motion for a new trial, and to the judgment overruling this motion he excepts.
1. One of his complaints is that the court failed to charge the jury as to the law bearing on the evidence introduced by him as to the character of the deceased for turbulence and violence, the contention of the accused being that in committing the homicide he acted under the fear that his life was in danger, or that a felony was about to be perpetrated upon him. In our opinion, if the accused desired any special instruction given the jury respecting the bearing which this particular evidence had upon the defense interposed by him, he should have presented to the court a timely written request to charge on the subject. Without such a request, it was not incumbent on the court to specially call the jury's attention to this particular evidence, and instruct the jury that they should consider it in determining whether this defense was or was not interposed in good faith. In this connection, see Knight v. State, 114 Ga. 48, 39 S.E. 928, 88 Am.St.Rep. 17, wherein it was held that: "Failure by the judge to apply a rule of evidence to the testimony of a particular witness is not, in the absence of a request so to do, erroneous." In that case complaint was made that the court did not, of its own motion, caution the jury that certain evidence introduced by the state to impeach witnesses testifying in behalf of the accused ought not to be considered by them for any other purpose.
2. It is further insisted by the plaintiff in error that the court ought to have charged concerning the character of the deceased for turbulence and violence while instructing the jury as to certain other circumstances to which they could look in determining whether or not the accused acted under the fears of a reasonable man; and error is assigned on the charge given upon this subject because the court did not, in the same connection, tell the jury they might also consider the evidence as to the character of the deceased for turbulence and violence. The charge given was unobjectionable; and, even had it been incumbent on the court to charge concerning the character of the deceased, the omission so to do could not be taken advantage of by assigning error upon this charge. Roberts v. State, 114 Ga. 450, 40 S.E. 297.
3. In stating the contentions of the accused the court said: "He says he had a right to kill to save his own life; that he was acting in self-defense to prevent a serious personal injury, it being a felony, from being committed upon him--to prevent a felony from being committed upon him." The error assigned upon this instruction is that it did not correctly state the defendant's defense, and was not a correct statement of the law, in that it imposed upon the defendant the necessity of showing "that a felony was being committed upon him, when it was only necessary to show, and it was defendant's material contention, that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was apparently about to be committed upon him." If the court did not correctly understand and state to the jury the contentions of the accused, it would seem that his counsel ought to have informed the court as to what such contentions really were. But be this as it may, the court did, of its own motion, give the accused the full benefit of his "material contention" by instructing the jury as to his right to act upon the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was apparently about to be committed upon him. The effect of misstating the contentions of the defendant was not, therefore, to deprive him of the defense upon which he mainly relied; and, as the court was merely endeavoring to state his contentions, and not to charge as to the law governing the case, what was said in this connection certainly did not impose upon the accused the necessity of showing that a felony was actually being committed upon him. Indeed, when the court undertook to instruct the jury as to what would constitute a good defense, he expressly told them that the accused would be justified, and they should acquit him, if, "at the time the killing occurred, the defendant believed the deceased was about to kill him, or about to commit a felony on him," provided he acted under the fears of a reasonably courageous man, "and the circumstances were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man."
In charging upon the law of self-defense the court informed the jury that "justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in self-defense, as against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise to commit a felony upon him," and that, "as against one who manifestly intends by violence or surprise to commit a felony upon his person, such person has a right to take human life, if it is necessary for his defense." This charge was fully in accord with the definition of justifiable homicide given in Pen. Code 1895, § 70. However, complaint is made that this "charge withdrew from consideration by the jury the apparent necessity to kill, and restricted them to a consideration of the question of the absolute necessity to kill." The charge cannot have had this prejudicial effect, for the court followed it with a correct instruction as to the law with regard to the fears of a reasonable man acting under an apparent necessity to kill, and in the same connection gave the instruction above set out touching the right of the accused to kill the deceased if, "at the time the killing occurred, the defendant believed the deceased was about to kill him or about to commit a felony on him." The court, while charging as to what the law regards as the fears of a reasonably courageous man, told the jury that the danger "apprehended must be urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing." It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that this instruction was not applicable to this case, and could only apply to a case where the evidence disclosed "a mutual intention to fight." We cannot concur in this view. "A bare fear" of injury can never be regarded as sufficient to justify a homicide. Pen. Code 1895, § 71. And, as was said in the case of Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271 (1), 18 S.E. 298, 44 Am.St.Rep. 22: "The doctrine of reasonable fear as a defense does not apply to any case of homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or...
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