Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. PD-0916-08.,PD-0916-08.
• Citation: 272 S.W.3d 614
• Parties: Jesse WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

272 S.W.3d 614

Jesse WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0916-08.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 17, 2008.

Appeal from the 390th District Court, Travis County, Julie H. Kocurek, Judge.

Todd S. Dudley, Austin, for Appellant.

Holly Taylor, Asst. District Atty., Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

Petition for discretionary review refused.

JOHNSON, J., filed a statement concurring in the refusal to grant review of appellant's petition, in which PRICE and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

On May 14, 2002, the two-year-old son of a friend of appellant began having respiratory distress while he was in appellant's custody, and appellant's mother called 911. When the first-responders asked what had happened, appellant said, "This is probably going to be my fault."

The following day, May 15, appellant was taken to the police department in handcuffs. A reasonable person in such circumstances could reasonable conclude that he was under arrest or, at the very least, in custody.¹ Appellant became agitated when he was left alone in the interrogation room. At some point, Detective Merrill entered and advised appellant of his rights. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22(2)(a). In response, appellant said, "I want to terminate everything right now."

There is nothing about that statement that is ambiguous.² Appellant had just been advised of his Miranda rights and acknowledged that he understood them. He then chose to exercise his right to end the interview. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 38.22(2)(a)(5). Under the standard of "scrupulously honoring" the invocation of that right, interrogation should have ceased immediately. It did not.

Instead, Detective Merrill attempted to confirm the invocation and reminded appellant that he did not have to talk to Merrill. Appellant replied that the only reason that he went to the police station "was to comply ... with the other detective," indicating that his presence at the police station was not entirely voluntary. The interrogation still did not end. Detective Merrill again asked if appellant wanted to terminate the interrogation. At that point, appellant agreed to answer questions.

The continued interrogation after an unambiguous invocation of the right to terminate it violated appellant's right to remain silent. Because the admission of the video tape of the improper interrogation is of constitutional dimension, the issue becomes whether the reviewing court can determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment." TEX.R.APP. PROC. 44.2(a).

The improperly obtained statement from May 15 contained general information about appellant's relationship to the injured child and appellant's denials of any act that injured the child and of ingestion of drugs or alcohol. After that interrogation, the police released appellant and drove him to the hospital where the child was being treated. Police arrested appellant two days later for injury to the child, Detective Merrill again advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and appellant again acknowledged that he understood those rights. It was only in this interrogation on May 17 that appellant began to concede that he might have injured the child, although inadvertently, by shaking him twice and with enough force to cause the child's head to snap back repeatedly. On May 18, appellant called Detective Merrill from the jail and told him that he had ingested marijuana and "more than three" beers and that "someone had told" him that he had also "consumed some PCP."

Appellant testified at his trial, and his testimony in large part reiterated his statements from the...