Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 92-KA-00761-SCT,92-KA-00761-SCT
• Citation: 667 So.2d 15
• Parties: Leroy Christopher WILLIAMS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 15

667 So.2d 15

Leroy Christopher WILLIAMS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 92-KA-00761-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 11, 1996.

Roy O. Parker, Jr., Tupelo, MS; for appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Jackson, MS; W. Glenn Watts, Sp. Ass't Attorney General, Jackson, MS; for appellee.

Before PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and McRAE, JJ.

BANKS, Justice, for the Court.

Here we are called upon to examine the interplay between our spousal competence doctrine and the hearsay exception prescribed in Rule 804(b)3 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Because the statement at issue does not genuinely inculpate the declarant, we conclude that it was erroneously admitted. Accordingly, we reverse. Along the way we examine the impact of the Confrontation Clause on the 804(b)3 exception in the context of the circumstances here and we treat other issues susceptible to recurrence should this matter be retried.

I.

On the early morning of December 6, 1990, in Tupelo, Mississippi the defendant Chris Williams received a knock on his door from Rodney "Knuckles" Richardson. Richardson, appearing to be intoxicated from alcohol and drugs, loudly demanded money that Williams apparently owed Richardson's brother. Williams insisted that Richardson leave, but he refused to comply. Williams testified that he saw Richardson make a gesture as if he were reaching behind his back, at which time Williams grabbed his gun and fatally shot Richardson.

After the defendant shot Richardson, he grabbed Richardson and placed him in the trunk of the defendant's car. It is disputed whether he received help in doing so from Chelsea Williams, who was in the defendant's home at the time of the shooting. He then drove to a garbage dump and disposed of the body. After dumping the body, Williams disposed of his own clothes and attempted to wash the blood out of the trunk of the car. The following day, Williams traded his car and moved into a hotel that night. While attempting to move his furniture out of his home and into a storage warehouse, he was arrested and charged with the murder of Rodney Richardson.

Prior to trial, the defendant made motions in limine to exclude evidence of the removal of the victim's body from the crime scene and evidence of Williams' flight after the killing, which were both overruled. The defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the State had failed to comply with the special magistrate's order which required the State to provide two eyewitnesses that the defendant had been unable to locate at the preliminary hearing. This motion was also denied by the trial court. The defendant was denied a related motion to limit testimony of the eyewitnesses to the statements which they had received from the State.

Williams also attempted to prevent the introduction of a statement made by Chelsea Williams, whom he married just prior to trial. The statement was made while Chelsea was in custody and alleged that Richardson was still alive when he was placed inside of the trunk. The statement further alleged that Chris Williams considered returning to the garbage dump and shooting Richardson again to ensure that he was dead. The trial court allowed the introduction of the statement as a valid exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 804(b)3 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.

The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter and, following the adverse disposition of post verdict motions, Williams now appeals to this Court to consider the following issues:

A) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CHELSEA BLANCHARD WILLIAMS' STATEMENT;

B) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DENIED WILLIAMS DUE PROCESS IN HIS AVERY PRELIMINARY HEARING;

C) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF WILLIAMS' REMOVAL OF THE BODY;

D) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED FLIGHT;

E) WHETHER THE JURY VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; AND

F) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ISSUING INSTRUCTION D-16 WHICH INSTRUCTS THE JURY THAT ANY REASONABLE DOUBT IS TO BE RESOLVED IN THE FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.

II.

a.

Williams asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of Chelsea Williams' statement into evidence. He contends that the statement is inadmissible because of the spouse's incompetence to testify, that the statement is inadmissible hearsay, the involuntary nature of the statement, and that the statement violates his right to confrontation under both the Mississippi and the United States Constitutions.

The trial court ruled that Chelsea Williams, the defendant's wife, was unavailable to testify under Rule 804(a)1 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence following Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424 (Miss.1986). The court also held that a reading of the statement would lead one to the reasonable conclusion that it was made against Williams' interest. Furthermore, in allowing the introduction of this statement the trial court expressed that a "presumption of truthfulness" attached to the statement because it "contains sufficient incriminating statements to subject [the] ... defendant to criminal prosecution as an accessory."

Chelsea's statement is clearly inadmissible hearsay under Rule 802 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence unless it falls within one of the hearsay exceptions contained in Rule 804(b). An inquiry into the admissibility of Chelsea Williams' statement should begin with the determination of whether it is a statement against the declarant's penal interest as defined in Rule 804(b)3.

Rule 804(b)3 provides:

(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

....

(3) A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

MISS.R.EVID. 804(b)3. The interpretation of this rule has been expanded by the federal courts as well as the Mississippi Supreme Court to include declarations against penal interest as well as those against pecuniary or proprietary interest. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1094-1095 (5th Cir.1981); Mitchell v. State, 495 So.2d 5 (Miss.1986); Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d 1239 (Miss.1988); Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824 (Miss.1995).

In order for this statement to qualify under Rule 804(b)3, the declarant, Chelsea Williams, must be unavailable as defined in Rule 804(a). The defense as well as the state have asserted that Chelsea Williams is incompetent to testify as the defendant's spouse. Under Miss.Code Ann. 1972 § 13-1-5 (Supp.1995), husbands and wives may only be competent as witnesses in their own behalf, in all controversies between them, or in a criminal prosecution of either husband or wife in matters involving the neglect, delinquency, desertion, nonsupport, or abandonment of their children. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that § 13-1-5 prohibits the prosecution from calling the defendant's wife to testify against her husband. See Bayse v. State, 420 So.2d 1050, 1054 (Miss.1982); Wallace v. State, 254 Miss. 944, 183 So.2d 525 (1966); Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So.2d 661 (1949). Rule 601 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence incorporates this statutory provision.

It is apparent that Chelsea Williams is unavailable to testify concerning the subject matter of her statement under Rule 804(a)1. The next relevant inquiry is whether the statement qualifies under Rule 804(b)3 as a statement against the declarant's penal interest. Rule 804(b)3 was adopted by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence in 1986, extending our common law statement against interest exception to statements against penal interest. Since this extension, this Court has looked upon such declarations against penal interest which inculpate others unfavorably and has usually held that such statements are unreliable and untrustworthy. See Mitchell v. State, 495 So.2d at 11; Parker v. State, 514 So.2d 767 (Miss.1986); Gullett v. State, 523 So.2d 296 (Miss.1988); Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d at 1239. In Ponthieux v. State, this Court stated that testimony of a co-conspirator's counsel, as to his client's role in the crime, was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)3 because the statements were "intended to serve, not prejudice, ..." the declarant's interests. Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d at 1246.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the statement must be "sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest 'that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.' " Williamson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2437, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). ¹ The Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has stated that in determining whether such a statement is against the declarant's penal interest, the government should "be required to show that the statement clearly and directly implicates the declarant himself in criminal conduct." U.S. v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d at 1101.

The Fifth Circuit further stated that "a close examination of all the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement is required in order to determine whether it so contravenes the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person in [the declarant's] ... position would not have made the statement accusing a third person unless [she] ... believed it to be true." Id. at 1102. In Sarmiento-Perez, the defendant challenged the admission of a confession of a co-defendant who, while in custody, stated that the defendant was the source of cocaine and an active...