Williams v. State, No. 2-06-416-CR (Tex. App. 4/24/2008)
| Decision Date | 24 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-06-416-CR.,2-06-416-CR. |
| Parties | SAMUEL WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, State. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 372nd District Court of Tarrant County.
Panel A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and McCOY, JJ.
Appellant Samuel Williams appeals his conviction for sexual assault of a child. In eleven points, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in admitting his written confession because it was involuntary and not recorded by the investigating officer, the interview was not terminated upon his request, and the trial court erred in admitting six vaginal swabs into evidence. We affirm.
Appellant began to rebuild his relationship with his daughter D.W. when she was twelve years old after having no contact with her since she was two years old. On July 25, 2005, when D.W. was fifteen years old, appellant called and told her that he was coming to visit her. When appellant arrived at the apartment of D.W.'s mother, D.W. let him in and went to her room. Appellant followed and sat next to her on the bed. D.W. testified that she became uncomfortable when appellant asked her if she could take him away from his girlfriend. He then told D.W. to lie on the floor as he instructed and showed her a condom. When D.W. complied, appellant proceeded to remove D.W's shorts and panties and then removed his own clothes before engaging in sexual intercourse with her.
Shortly after, D.W.'s mother, Barbara M., returned home, and appellant, startled upon hearing the key in the door, quickly hid in the closet where Barbara found him half-naked. She called the police. After they arrived, she took D.W. to John Peter Smith Hospital (JPS) where sexual assault nurse examiner Barbara Hynson performed a rape examination of D.W. Hynson found numerous injuries consistent with blunt force trauma that can be caused by sexual intercourse.
On August 24, 2005, police arrested appellant, and the investigating officer, Sergeant Steve Benjamin, read appellant his Miranda rights in an interview room. After a short, unrecorded interview, appellant decided to give his version of the incident with D.W. in a written statement. Sergeant Benjamin left the room and allowed appellant to write out his statement. In his statement, appellant said that D.W. seduced him into having sexual intercourse and that he "got caught up in the moment."
The State charged appellant with sexual assault of a child. After a trial on November 14 through 17, 2006, a jury found him guilty. Appellant pled "true" to the habitual offender notification, and the jury assessed his punishment at eighty years' confinement.
In appellant's tenth and eleventh points, he argues that the evidence offered at trial was legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). Instead, we "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We must presume that the fact-finder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We then ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder's determination is manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To reverse under the second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not enough that this court "harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn [the] conviction." Id. We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently than the jury or because we disagree with the jury's resolution of a conflict in the evidence. Id. We may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-finder's. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the jury's determination of the weight to be given contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict "often turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in attendance when the testimony was delivered." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8. Thus, we must give due deference to the fact-finder's determinations, "particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence." Id. at 9.
An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant's complaint on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Appellant claims that the evidence the State provided failed to show that he actually caused the penetration of D.W.'s female sexual organ. Specifically, he contends that a reasonable jury could not have come to this conclusion because the testimony of D.W. was ambiguous, lacked credibility, and was subject to outside influence.
To convict appellant of sexual assault of a child, the State was required to prove that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of D.W.'s female sexual organ. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The testimony of a sexual assault victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault of a child. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07 (Vernon 2005);see Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Connell v. State, 233 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Courts give wide latitude to the testimony given by a child victim of sexual abuse. See Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In addition, there is no requirement that the victim's testimony be corroborated by medical or physical evidence. Garcia, 563 S.W.2d at 928; Kemple v. State, 725 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).
During trial, D.W. testified that in July 2005, when she was fifteen years old, appellant came to visit her when she was home alone. When appellant arrived, D.W. let him in and returned to her room where she was watching T.V. and listening to the radio. D.W. testified that appellant followed her into the room and sat next to her on her bed. D.W. became uncomfortable after appellant asked her if she could take him away from his girlfriend. Following this question, appellant asked D.W. to lie down on the floor. He then showed D.W. a condom and described what it was. D.W. testified that appellant then removed her shorts and panties, took off his clothes, and initiated sexual intercourse with her. D.W. stated that she felt pain during the incident and that appellant told her that it would not hurt until after he was finished. When appellant heard D.W.'s mother arrive home, he stopped sexual intercourse with D.W. and quickly hid in the bedroom closet.
In addition to D.W.'s testimony of the incident, the jury heard corroborating testimony from her mother, Barbara M., and sexual assault nurse examiner, Hynson. Barbara's testimony supports D.W.'s claim that she arrived home while the incident was taking place. Barbara testified that when she arrived home, she heard D.W.'s closet door close, and she saw D.W. sitting on her bed scared and crying. When Barbara opened the closet door, she discovered a man on all fours in the fetal position with no shirt on and his shorts down past his knees. Barbara recognized appellant when he raised his head. After a confrontation between Barbara and appellant,...
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