Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 12 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. A00A1410.,A00A1410. |
| Citation | 540 S.E.2d 305,246 Ga. App. 347 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James R. Newton, for appellant.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, Robert R. Auman, Melanie J. Brogden, Andrew W. Pope, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.
Following a jury trial, Zester Williams appeals his conviction of theft by receiving an electronic sound system stolen in a burglary at St. Paul's Missionary Baptist Church in Thomasville, Thomas County, Georgia, in January 1999. We affirm. Williams was also charged and acquitted of the offense of burglary in this incident.
Williams contends that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict as to the theft by receiving count, as the State failed to corroborate defendant's statement to police that he possessed the stolen property in Thomas County; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict because the State failed to prove the value of the stolen property was in excess of $500; and (3) the trial court erred in ruling that Williams placed his character in issue and allowing the introduction into evidence of a certified copy of the indictment, plea and sentence of the previous conviction that placed Williams on probation.
As to the applicable standard of review:
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Under that standard we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, including the State's witnesses, are a matter for the jury to resolve.
(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yarbrough v. State.1 See Wilson v. State.2
In reviewing cases on appeal, this Court is limited to considering those grounds presented to and ruled upon by the trial court. See Workman v. State;3 State v. Mayo;4 Godfrey v. State.5 Williams was indicted by the grand jury in Thomas County in Count 1 for the burglary of St. Paul's Missionary Church in said county on or about January 21, 1999. The crime of burglary is codified as OCGA § 16-7-1. He was also charged in Count 2 of said indictment with theft by receiving the subject property in Thomas County, on or about January 21, 1999. The crime of theft by receiving is codified as OCGA § 16-8-7.
Under OCGA § 16-8-7, "[a] person commits the offense of theft by receiving stolen property when he receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which he knows or should know was stolen." Pursuant to OCGA § 16-8-11, when prosecuting charges under OCGA § 16-8-7, "the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft."
Williams entered a not guilty plea to each of the charges. By pleading not guilty, Williams challenged all allegations contained in the indictment. A not guilty plea requires the State to prove every essential element of the crime with which the defendant is charged. The Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par VI, provides, inter alia, that "all criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed."
[V]enue is an essential element of a criminal charge. When a charging document alleges that venue is proper in a certain county, and a defendant pleads not guilty in response to that charging document, he has irrefutably challenged all allegations contained therein, including those pertaining to venue.
The record does not reflect that the court took judicial notice that Coolidge is a city in Thomas County or gave any notice that it intended to do so. As concerns judicial notice, however, our Supreme Court has declared that: "[I]f a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken." Graves v. State, supra at 775(4)(a), 504 S.E.2d 679.
Our Supreme Court has further held in Graves, supra at 776, 504 S.E.2d 679, that Petkas v. Grizzard7 "does not authorize the judicial notice of essential elements of a criminal charge, as they are alleged in prosecutorial pleadings." We note that "[v]enue is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." Graves, supra at 773, 504 S.E.2d 679. The State may prove venue through the introduction of evidence, legally sufficient to establish that fact. The State could not, however, establish venue in Thomas County solely by the introduction of evidence that Williams received, possessed, or controlled the stolen property in Coolidge. The trial court would have been authorized to take judicial notice of the fact that Coolidge is located wholly within Thomas County, if it had chosen to do so and had adhered to the procedural requirements of Graves. Thus, venue may be established by the State if the trial court properly takes judicial notice of the relevant facts.
The case proceeded to trial September 27-29, 1999, where the jury acquitted Williams of the burglary charge but convicted him of the charge of theft by receiving stolen property.
Reverend Anderson's testimony authorized the jury to believe that certain electronic sound equipment belonging to the church was stolen during a burglary at St. Paul's Missionary Baptist Church, Highway 319 North, in Thomas County during the period of January 19-24, 1999. After reporting the matter to the police, Rev. Anderson decided to canvas local pawnshops to see if he could locate the stolen equipment. He located the stolen equipment in nearby Tallahassee, Florida, where Johnny Gelabert, an employee of Folmar Gun & Pawn, matched the serial numbers provided by Rev. Anderson to equipment he had purchased on January 21, 1999. The investigation was turned over to the police, who, based on information provided by Gelabert, determined that Williams had been the individual who had sold the stolen equipment to Folmar Gun & Pawn in Tallahassee on January 21, 1999. Gelabert told police, and testified at trial, that Williams had shown him a picture ID at the time of the sale and that he had a present recollection of the transaction. He showed police the videotape of the transaction. At trial, the videotape was admitted into evidence without objection and played for the jury.
1. We review first Williams' contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the theft by receiving charge as the State failed to corroborate defendant's statement to police that he possessed the stolen property in Thomas County.
Williams' argument that the only evidence presented by the State of possession of the stolen equipment by him in Thomas County was his "confession," given to Deputy Walker, is without merit. Williams' written statement was not a confession. He implicitly denied having committed the burglary itself and offered an explanation of his possession of the stolen property which excluded any guilty knowledge of the property having been stolen, if believed. Such a statement is merely an admission of the facts contained therein. "`A statement which includes facts or circumstances which show excuse or justification is not a confession of guilt even if it admits the main fact.'" Robinson v. State.8 Williams has never contended that his statement was not voluntary or that it was improperly induced. The State introduced Williams' statement without objection at trial.
Williams' statement was not a confession, but rather, an admission, as it was not so comprehensive as to include every essential element of the offense. See Johnson v. State.9 An admission is the avowal of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, but only tending to prove the offense charged and not amounting to a confession of guilt. While admissions are scanned with care, for what they are worth, along with other evidence, unlike confessions, it is not required that they be corroborated. See OCGA § 24-3-53; Brown v. State;10 Sheffield v. State.11
However, in addition to his written statement, Williams testified at trial that "[I]'m from Thomas County." Williams and Freddie Johnson, Jr. both lived within walking distance of each other in Coolidge. Several other defense witnesses also lived in Coolidge. Williams' statement and the testimony of Johnson establish that Williams received the stolen property on the morning of January 21, 1999 at Johnson's house. Williams' statement outlines how he went to Johnson's house on the morning of January 21, 1999, to go job hunting. While there, Jose Martinez stopped by and left the stolen equipment in payment of a debt he owed to Derek Davis. Davis, who was in jail, owed Williams some money, and so Williams decided to take the equipment and sell it in satisfaction of Davis' debt. Williams also testified that following the sale of the stolen property, he returned to Thomas County and went home, which he had already testified was in Coolidge. Viewing this evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to establish venue in the theft by receiving case in Thomas County.
Williams also contends that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti. The State introduced the testimony of Rev. Anderson and Gelabert, as outlined above, to establish the fact that the subject property had been stolen, the value of the stolen property, and...
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