Williams v. State, CR

• Decision Date: 31 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 705 S.W.2d 888,288 Ark. 444
• Parties: James H. WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 84-30.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 888

705 S.W.2d 888

288 Ark. 444

James H. WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 84-30.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 31, 1986.

Jim Lyons Law Office, Jonesboro, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Clint Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

HICKMAN, Justice.

James H. Williams, Jr., was convicted of the capital felony murder of Earl Johnson of Jonesboro, Arkansas, and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal he makes four procedural arguments which we find meritless.

Williams first argues that the statement made by him at the police station was inadmissible at trial because it was made in the absence of counsel, a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A pretrial hearing was held and the trial court ruled that the statement was voluntarily made and admissible; however, the state did not introduce the statement; the defense did. The record reflects how this occurred:

Defense Counsel: Do you want me to go ahead? The defense is offering or intends to offer the confession taken from the defendant, through Mr. Dickie Howell at the Craighead County Sheriff's office.

The Court: The State, having objected to the procedure outlined by the defense, the matter was brought to the Court's attention at a bench conference. The Court admits it being somewhat perplexed by the offer of proof in this fashion, and feels that perhaps a hearsay objection would be proper, inasmuch as the State could foreseeably be precluded from cross-examining the defendant Williams.

However, I can see no other basis for excluding otherwise relevant evidence, and therefore will allow the defendant to play the tape through the officer taking the statement or other officers involved ...

Defense Counsel: All right. Officer Howell, on May the 30th, 1983, did you take a statement from Mr. James Williams?

Officer Howell: Yes, sir, I did.

Defense Counsel: All right. And did you record that statement?

Officer Howell: Yes, sir, I did.

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, at this time, I would like to play it before the jury.

The Court: Just a minute.

(Bench conference; out of hearing of the jury.)

Defense Counsel: For the record, the defense attorney states he is waiving any objection, based on voluntariness of this confession.

The Court: The previous hearing, having been had before the Court where the question of voluntariness had been raised, the Court having ruled the confession to be voluntary. Now Mr. Lyons is attempting to introduce the statement which the Court will allow. As indicated for the record, the previous motion has been withdrawn, and he consents to it and agrees that it was voluntarily made. You may proceed....

We ordered a rebriefing on this issue to be certain that any objections to the statement were waived. 696 S.W.2d 307. The record reflects there was a waiver. Williams waived any objections to the use of the statement by placing it in evidence. Spencer v. State, 285 Ark. 339, 686 S.W.2d 436 (1985); Scantling v. State, 271 Ark. 678, 609 S.W.2d 925 (1981). The reason for introducing the statement by the defense was obviously to exonerate Williams since his statement blamed the murder on Bobby Tippett, the codefendant. The defense attorney stated in his closing argument to the jury that the reason the state did not use the statement was because it was true--Tippett killed Johnson.

The second argument is the death qualified jury issue which we have repeatedly rejected. Hendrickson v. State, 285 Ark. 462, 688 S.W.2d 295 (1985); Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983).

In conjunction with that argument, Williams asserts that the trial court applied the wrong standard in releasing certain jurors who had scruples against the death penalty. Willimas contends the trial court should have inquired if these jurors could set aside their convictions in determining the guilt or innocence of Williams before a sentence would be considered. If so, Williams argues, the jurors should have been seated.

In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court clarified the standard to be used, which was pronounced in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The proper standard is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.

Since Arkansas...